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Adviser: Prof. Howard H. Lentner
In September of 1988, the government of Jamaica heralded its official entry into 
the information industry with the establishment of the US$2 million Jamaica Digiport 
International facility. The significance of this announcement was surpassed only by the 
state’s decision to close the domestic telecommunications sector to competition as the 
global satellite regime and the global market embarked on its own course of 
liberalization. This decision spelt victory for one of two contending factions. On the one 
hand was Jamaica Promotions (Jarnpro), Jamaica’s economic development agency, which 
attempted to liberalize the sector's use of satellite technology with the operation of the 
American Satellite Company. On the other hand, the Ministry of Public Utility and 
Transport, in conjunction with the international company Cable and Wireless, 
Telecommunications of Jamaica, Industrial Commercial Development (ICD), the
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National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NEBJ) and the international support of Comsat, 
elected to close the sector to competition.
The closing of the domestic telecommunications sector to competition raised two 
salient questions which this dissertation addresses. First, what explains Jamaica’s failure 
to liberalize the sector’s use of satellite technology, as demonstrated in its 1988 decision 
to prevent competition? Second, how was it possible to undertake this measure amidst the 
powerful forces of global market liberalization trends in the telecommunications sector as 
well as within the international satellite regimes of Intelsat, whose principles and 
practices endorsed liberalization in the provision of satellite services?
This dissertation concludes that there were two overriding sectoral characteristics 
which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global forces. The first 
was compelling domestic interests in the sector that led to its closing. The second was the 
Intelsat regime itself, which acted to protect its monopoly. Intelsat's structure and the role 
played by signatories within the system functioned to protect the status quo of the single 
global organization and to bar the entry of other firms whose activities did not enhance 
Intelsat’s investment goals. As a result, Intelsat’s monopoly remained intact because of 
limitations placed by its signatories on the operation of competitive firms given that the 
liberalization of Jamaica’s domestic satellite services was inconsistent with its signatories 
and their interests.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Preface
This dissertation began as an interest in one small developing state’s attempt to 
acquire satellite technology and the extent to which the information highway could create 
new opportunities for development in small states that would allow them to bridge the 
economic gap between the industrialized and small developing states. However, it later 
shifted to the question of the impact of increasing economic openness upon a state’s 
capacity to govern its national economy1 The overriding questions of interest are how 
states respond to the challenges of managing their economic systems in the face of 
increasing economic openness? Are states free to follow different paths in response to 
openness? Do they abandon old norms and institutional arrangements and assume new 
policies and new arrangements that are consistent with competitive neo-liberal norms? If 
so, what might these paths be, and what determines the path a state pursues? This case 
study would forge a theoretical nexus between the dynamics of state, bureaucratic 
politics, international politics, multinational corporations, international 
telecommunications satellite policy, modernization and development and international 
satellite regimes to address this issue.
Linda Weiss, ed. States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions 
Back In. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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In September of 1988, the government of Jamaica heralded its official entry into 
the information industry with the establishment of the US$2 million Jamaica Digiport 
International facility. The significance of this announcement was only surpassed by the 
state’s decision to close the domestic sector to competition simultaneously as the global 
satellite regime and the global satelite market embarked on its own course of 
liberalization. This decision, however, spelt victory for one of two contending factions. 
On the one hand was Jampro which initated the policy that attempted to liberalize the 
sector's use of satellite technology using the American Satellite Company. On the other 
hand, the Ministry of Public Utility and Transport, in conjunction with Jamaica’s 
telecommunications providers, Cable and Wireless, Telecommunications of Jamaica, and 
other interested parties elected to close the sector to competition.
This process which resulted in the closing of the sector to competition raised 
two salient questions which this dissertation addresses. First, what explains Jamaica's 
failure to liberalize the sector's use of satellite technology as demonstrated in its 1988 
decision to prevent competition? Second, how was it possible to undertake this measure 
amidst the powerful forces of global market liberalization trends in the 
telecommunications sector as well as the powerful international satellite regimes of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Intelsat whose principles and practices endorsed liberalization in the provision of satellite 
services?
This dissertation concludes that there were two overriding sectoral 
characteristics which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global 
forces. The first was compelling domestic interests in the sector that led to its closing.
The second characteristics was the Intelsat regime itself. Intelsat’s structure and the role 
played by signatories within the system therefore functioned to protect the status quo of 
the single global system and to bar the entry of other firms whose activities did not 
enhance Intelsat’s investment goals. Intelsat's leadership therefore served as gatekeeper - 
monitoring the entry of non-Intelsat satellite firms within the global market. As a result, 
the monopoly status quo remained intact because of limitations placed by Intelsat’s 
signatories on the operation of competitive firms because the liberalization of Jamaica’s 
domestic satellite services was inconsistent with signatories and their interests.
This dissertation examines both international and domestic factors that 
impinged on the outcome of the Digiport project. The analysis begins with an 
understanding of the historical evolution of the Intelsat system that led to new rules and 
regulations among which was the decision to allow competition and that produced the 
new separate satellite systems and policies supporting them. These factors were at the 
heart of the tensions that Jamaica experienced as it sought to liberalize its satellite sector. 
This study also examines the implications of these changes on Jampro’s decision to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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liberalize the provision of satellite services and the implications it had on international 
politics.
An understanding of the structure of Intelsat and the role played by signatories 
within that structure is also central to this study. That role conditioned their domestic 
preferences on the issue of telecommunications liberalizing within the domestic satellite 
sector. It provides the foundation for understanding the way in which the Intelsat 
monopoly regime impinged on the outcome of the Jamaica Digiport decision and the 
closing of the sector.
In addition to external characteristics that impinged on the satellite negotiation, 
this study will address the domestic factors that led to the outcome of the Digiport 
negotiatons. In laying the foundation for explaining why Jamaica failed to liberalize its 
services in satellite technology, this study will examine the domestic contexts within 
which the negotiations were embedded and that also impinged on the Digiport decision. 
Its focus will be on the central actors in the sector and their interests and needs that 
might impinge on the outcome of the negotiations.
Domestic Institutions and the Teleport Initiative
The Digiport negotiations involved several participants, each of which exercised 
differing degrees of influence. The participants were: a)The Jamaica Promotions, Inc, or 
Jampro, b) the Jamaica telecommunications providers: Jamaica International
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Telecommunications Company (Jamintel), Jamaica Telephone Company (JTC) and 
Telecommunications of Jamaica, the parent of both entities; c) Cable and Wireless, the 
Jamaican subsidiary of the British telecommunications company;2 d) the Ministry of 
Public Utilities and Transport, e) Industrial Commercial Development Ltd., an indigenous 
enterprise with investments in Jamintel, and f) the prime minister’s office.
All of the participants played major roles at different levels of the satellite acquisition.
The Teleport project was initially conceived in 1985 by the Jamaica National 
Investment Promotion (JNIP) which was later transformed into the Jamaica Promotions 
(Jampro) in April 1988. Jampro was the result of a merger between three bureaucracies: 
the Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation (JIDC), the Jamaica National Export 
Corporation (JNEC), and JNIP. It was established as a limited liability company in 1988 
but was changed to a statutory body in 1990. The purpose of the merger was to achieve 
greater efficiency and to streamline the economic development process.
Jampro’s new mandate was “the development and implementation of programs 
to encourage investment, provide training, modernize industries and stimulate export
2At the beginning of the negotiations the Jamaican government owned the majority 
share in JAMINTEL; however, in subsequent negotiations with the IMF, Jamaica was 
forced to abandon its shares, increasing those of Cable and Wireless, and selling the 
remaining shares to Industrial Commercial Development Ltd.[See Canute James, “State 
Reduces Holdings in Jamaica Telecoms Group,”in The Financial Times (London), Sept., 
6,1988, p.27)]. "
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
trade for Jamaica.”" It was also given the charge to “create jobs and increase productivity 
in targeted industries through the effective delivery of technical promotional and 
facilitatory services.”4 Jampro’s jurisdiction was the Ministry of Production, Mining and 
Commerce; however, it had its own board of directors which consisted of 14 members 
that were drawn from the private sector.
Cable and Wireless, the British multinational corporation, owned 80% of 
Telecommunications of Jamaica, the parent company of Jamintel. Jamintel was the 
division of Telecommunications of Jamaica that was responsible for the overseas traffic 
of telecommunications service. Jamintel was also Jamaica’s signatory to Intelsat. Cable 
and Wireless and Jamintel were both firmly committed to the Intelsat monopoly system 
of which they were a part’s owner Eli Matalon purchased 21% of Telecommunications of 
Jamaica in 1987 when the Jamaican government privatized telecommunications, making 
him the only private individual investor.5
Deryck R. Brown, ed. Evaluating, Learning and Caribbean Development, 
(Kingston, Ja.: Canoe Press. U.W.I., 1998)p. 42.
4 Ibid.
See unpublished paper by Pablo T. Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson. Regulation. 
Institutions and Commitment: The Jamaican Telecommunications Sector. March 23, 
1993, p. 25.
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The interested parties to the negotiations fell in two distinct camps. On the one 
hand was Jampro whose intent it was to avail itself of newly emerging foreign technology 
and expertise. On the other hand were the domestic telecommunications suppliers- Cable 
and Wireless and Telecommunications of Jamaica. The former sought to diversify into 
new technology whereas the latter sought to remain within the Intelsat system through 
which it had economic ties. The winning coalition in the negotiations desired the 
continuation of the Intelsat monopoly which the sector enjoyed since 1963 and with 
which they had established . This monopoly operation using both Cable and Wireless and 
Telecommunications of Jamaica was instituted by the Ministry in 1988. Its actions were 
part of a restructuring plan that was designed to prevent the operation of competitive 
satellite systems in the domestic component. The goal of the restructuring plan was to 
facilitate the new cross-subsidization policy to protect the domestic component.
Paradoxically, the decision to allow the use of separate satellite systems was 
authorized by Intelsat’s signatories whose interest it was to have the sector remain closed 
to competition. In Jamaica, the signatories had an interest in the market’s remaining 
closed, and they would benefit from such a closing. As a result, Intelsat’s signatories 
failed to act to open the market in accordance with Intelsat’s policies. Coalition politics 
had a greater effect on Jamaica's failure to liberalize the use of satellite services than 
global trends and regime practices. These domestic interests in the sector served as the 
second set of factors that led to the closing of Jamaica’s sector to competitive satellite 
technology.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Jampro was unsuccessful in liberalizing the Jamaican telecommunications sector 
because the needs of the domestic signatory were at odds with the prevailing international 
regime norms. As a result of the structure of the international telecommunications regime 
and the enormous influence of the signatories in Intelsat, Jamintel and Comsat were able 
to override the international regimes’ separate satellite systems policy in its attempt to 
preserve Jamaica’s monopoly status quo. Jamaica was then able to block competition at 
the domestic level.
Jamaica Digiport Negotiations
For more than two decades, beginning in 1963, the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Company (Intelsat) stood at the apex of a highly 
centralized international satellite regime where it served as the single legitimate supplier 
and regulator of international satellite service. However by 1984, the regime began to 
change its character with the introduction of new firms and the passing of a separate 
satellite system policy by the United States which allowed the operation of non-Intelsat 
companies. Nevertheless, despite the changing character of the international satellite 
regime at the international level, nations seeking to take advantage of the new permissive 
climate found themselves stymied at the domestic level. Those seeking to avail 
themselves of newer non-Intelsat satellite systems were finding it impossible to do so.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In 1989, the fifth year of Jampro negotiations to acquire licenses for the operation 
of a United States’ satellite company in Jamaica, the negotiators failed. Jampro was 
unsuccessful in acquiring the domestic license for the operation of the US satellite 
company despite their initial success in gaining approval from Intelsat and the United 
States’ Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Approvals from both of these 
agencies were requisite for the use of satellite companies operating outside the Intelsat 
system. Nevertheless, despite Intelsat and FCC approval, the Jamaican government 
ultimately continued operating within the Intelsat satellite system in Jamaica instead of 
using the competitive non-Intelsat satellite system which Jampro originally intended.
Jampro’s failure to acquire the license to operate the non-Intelsat satellite system, 
which compelled Jamaica to remain within the Intelsat monopoly system, occurred after 
the historic decision to permit the operation of non-Intelsat satellite systems. It also 
occurred during the decade in which economic liberalization, primarily but not only in the 
telecommunications sector, spread throughout the industrialized nations in the United 
States, Western Europe and Japan and then throughout the globe.
This dissertation examines why liberalizing changes in the telecommunications 
regime at the international level failed to take root at the domestic level and why it was 
that Jamaica chose to remain within the Intelsat system using Intelsat satellites despite the 
availability of more competitive satellites. Ignoring international approval to utilize an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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outside satellite and the more liberalized international telecommunications climate, 
Jamaica chose to remain faithful to the single global system.
Jampro was unsuccessful in acquiring a domestic license to operate the separate 
satellite system. Instead, the government chose to remain within the Intelsat monopoly 
system even after Intelsat and its most powerful members, the United States and Great 
Britain, approved the operation of separate satellite systems within Jamaica’s borders. 
The dissertation seeks answers an answer to why Jamaica made such a decision at the 
historical juncture that it did when liberalization had indeed taken root in the 
telecommunications as well as in other sectors. Developing nations were also seeking 
relief from dominant monopolies within their borders.6 These issues are examined 
through the lens of the Jamaica Digiport International project negotiations.
Jamaica’s failure to liberalize its telecommunications sector was a peculiar 
occurrence for several reasons. First, it transpired at a historic juncture when
6
Ben Petrazzini, The Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform in 
Developing Countries; Privatization and Liberalization in Comparative Perspective 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995). See also Paul Cook and Colin 
Kirkpatrick, eds. Privatization in Less Developed Countries (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1988); Bella Mody, Joseph D. Straubhaar and Johannes Bauer, eds. 
Telecommunications Policy: Ownership and Control of the Information Highway in 
Developing Countries ( Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 1995); Alex E. 
Jilberto and Andre Mom men eds. Institutional and Economic Change in Latin America. 
Africa and Asia (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Christopher S. Adam, William P. 
Caverdish, and Percy S. Misty, Adjusting Privatization: Case Study for Developing 
Countries (Oxford: Heinemann, 1993).
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liberalization of domestic telecommunications sectors had crescendoed across the globe. 
Second, at the helm of this movement were the system’s leaders from the industrialized 
nations of the United States, Europe and Japan who were determined in their goal to 
liberalize the telecommunications regime. Third, Jamaica’s failure to liberalize occurred 
in an issue area which was highly institutionalized, one in which regime rules were 
established through a hierarchical structure and where rule enforcement was paramount. 
The goal of this dissertation is to determine how domestic interests were able to prevail 
given the new order of liberalization in the international telecommunications regime; 
global leadership committed to this new order and institutionalized system where 
enforcement was paramount.
While analysts have stressed the importance of either the domestic political 
process, the structure of the international system or both in explaining policy outcomes, I 
will argue that explanations which refer solely to either domestic processes or 
international systems are necessary but not sufficient to explain the international satellite 
sector. This analysis will define a sector as a population of firms producing a specified 
range of potentially or actually competing products and the institutional arrangements 
required to coordinate the activities generated within sectors or across sectors. So while 
this analysis acknowledges that both domestic political processes and international 
regime processes are important for explaining the decision to remain within Intelsat’s 
single global system, the defining factor for understanding policy outcomes is the sectoral 
characteristics that impinge on both domestic and international political processes. These
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
structural characteristics of the international satellite sector include the number and type 
or firms in operation and the role played by these firms in both the domestic and 
international processes.
Globalization and the Liberalization of the International Telecommunications 
Sector
The decade of the 1980s was characterized by the liberalization of the 
telecommunications sectors of many nations within the global economy. This was the 
process in which domestic telecommunications sectors which had restricted the sector to 
the operations of one firm, had released these restrictions to accommodate multiple 
operators. These changes began first in the equipment market and moved to include 
services, rapidly eroding the position of monopoly suppliers. Beginning first in the United 
States, Britain and Japan, the changes moved throughout the industrialized nations to the 
post, telephone and telegraph (PTT) agencies of the developing nations. The wave of 
liberalization resulted in the breakup of large monopolies in Europe and Latin America 
and Japan, the privatization of state-owned telecommunications enterprises (SOTEs), 
liberalization of domestic markets and the deregulation of many domestic 
telecommunications sectors in developing nations.
Within the industrialized nations, liberalization came as a result of internal 
pressure from several sources. The first source of pressure came from governments of 
nations caught up in the information revolution. These governments held the view that,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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for them to make the transition into the new post-industrial society, it was imperative that 
they “unleash the competitive and entrepreneurial drive of the private sector.”7 They then 
allied with large corporate users in service industries such as international banking and 
finance, the mass media and transportation which relied heavily on telecommunications, 
believing that the only efficient means at arriving at this post-industrial information age 
was through the liberalization of the economy. The changing needs of industries required 
more customized and diversified telecommunications services. The telecommunications 
sector needed to be free from the burden of regulation as members of the sector moved 
into a new sphere in which new telecommunications technology began to merge with new 
computer technology. Both the telecommunications sector and the computer sector 
preferred a more liberal telecommunications sector where more competition would result 
in cheaper and more specialized services and equipment, thereby benefitting the nation 
and the economy as a whole.8
The breakup of the AT&T monopoly into smaller firms in the United States began 
a series of liberalization measures within the global telephone and telegraph sector. A 
similar trend subsequently spread throughout the major industrialized nations in Europe 
and Japan, ending in the demise of many national telecommunications monopolies and in 
the creation of competition. In the international satellite sector, liberalization was not
7
Kelly Lee, Global Telecommunications Regulation: A Political Economy 
Perspective (London: Pinter, 1996), p 109.
8 Ibid, p. 112.
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without restraint. Intelsat, with the support of Japan and the major industrialized nations 
in Europe and the United States, agreed to the use of non-Intelsat systems solely on 
condition that they did not conflict with or undermine the Intelsat global monopoly.
Unlike the situation in the industrialized nations where liberalization emerged as a 
result of internal pressures from competition, in the developing nations liberalization was 
a result of pressures outside the telecommunications sector. Liberalization was 
precipitated by pressures from international financial institutions in response to the 
economic and fiscal crises these governments faced. These externally recommended 
privatization and liberalization of SOTEs were readily adopted by these states as the 
solutions to the fiscal and economic crises these governments faced.
In the early 1980s developing nations began to give considerable attention to the 
reform of their telecommunications sectors where liberalization had till then failed to take 
root. Petrazzini’s insightful work attempts to understand why nations fail in their attempts 
to liberalize their telecommunications sectors. The author argues that a nation’s failure to 
liberalize can be explained by two factors: a) the economic profile of the nation and b) the 
timing of the nation’s liberalization attempt vis-a-vis attempts to privatize. Nations that 
are not appealing to major investors or who are experiencing economic crises, such as 
Jamaica and Argentina, those with “poor economic prospects,” the author argues, are 
more likely to fail in achieving privatization and liberalization simultaneously than
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nations that attract major investors - those “an attractive economic profile.” 9 In nations 
with “reasonable economic prospects” such as Mexico, Malaysia and Thailand, 
liberalization had a greater likelihood to succeed if it occurred simultaneously with the 
sale of the SOTE.
In the event that a nation chooses to liberalize its telecommunications sector prior 
to privatizing the sector, Petrazzini argues, the state has to resist the deeply entrenched 
domestic anti-liberalization coalitions consisting of state managers and state employees. 
Opposition to liberalization was relatively high. Nevertheless, when liberalization 
targeted non-basic services, such as the provision of satellite services, opposition to 
liberalization was found to be low due to the fact that most national carriers in developing 
nations were unable to provide non-basic services in the short ran; therefore, 
liberalization was expected to succeed. Other nations, such as Argentina, sacrificed 
liberalization which allowed the entry of multiple firms in favor of successful 
privatization where state-ownership was replaced by private ownership.10
The analysis of the Jamaica Digiport Initiative supplements Petrazzini’s analysis 
in several ways. First, it highlights the differences in the characteristics of the 
telecommunications satellite sector from that of the telephone and telegraph sector, a 
difference which will be explained by the international structure of governance. Second, it
9 Petrazzini, pp. 30-33.
10 Ibid.
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addresses and introduces an additional scenario in explaining liberalization in the 
telecommunications sector distinct from those addressed by Petrazzini, that is, 
liberalization after privatization. Third, it adds the dimension of liberalization in the 
context of non-basic services. Finally, it contributes a fuller understanding of the role of 
nonstate actors in the international telecommunications sector.
International Telecommunications Sector
The international telecommunications sector consists of three elements: 
international governance, a global network of national telecommunications governance 
systems, and international markets (Figure 1-2). The governance of the sector consists of 
international regulatory agencies such as the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), which oversees international telephone and telegraph services, and Intelsat, which 
oversees international satellite and space technology services as well as 
telecommunications operations at the national level. These international institutions set 
the rules within which companies operate in the international telecommunications system. 
At the international level, the ITU provides governance in the area of telephone and 
telegraph while Intelsat provides governance that is limited to the telecommunications 
satellite sector. A third telecommunications institution, the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization (Inmarisat), provides governance in the area of marine 
telecommunications
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The second element of the international telecommunications system consists of 
national telecommunications regulatory systems. National regulatory agencies, such as 
Jamaica’s Ministry of Public Utility and Transport, are governmental agencies or national 
post, telephone and telegraph agencies (PTTs) that oversee and regulate the supply and 
use of domestic telecommunications services. In many developing nations, where the 
telecommunications companies that supply telephone and telegraph services have most 
often been foreign multinationals, these bureaucracies negotiate the terms of the 
contractual arrangements under which the corporations that supply domestic 
telecommunications service operate. These bureaucracies may also prevent companies 
from providing services by denying a license to operate.
The third element of the international telecommunications system is the global 
market which consists of major telecommunications multinational corporation suppliers 
or carriers, such as Cable and Wireless and American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T). 
These suppliers design, manufacture, and distribute telecommunications goods and 
services such as telephone, telegraph, satellite, computer equipment and related services. 
These services are sold or distributed to both corporations and households.
The ownership-control structures of suppliers of telecommunications services in 
the national markets have ranged from public (100% government-owned) companies to 
privately owned telecommunications companies. Within this range are suppliers with a 
combination of private and public ownership. This variety of ownership structures not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
only characterizes the global market but may also describe variations in the internal 
structure of a supplier, for over a period of time a corporation may also shift between 
private and public ownership.
One subset of the telecommunications market is the market for satellite goods and 
services (Fig. 1-3). This segment has grown in importance as a result of to the rapid 
changes and developments in information technology since the 1980s. In addition to the 
proliferation of technological innovations and increasing demand in this sector, there has 
also been increased participation of both international and national regulatory agencies in 
the governance and regulatory activities of the sector.
The breakup of AT&T in the United States in 1984 opened the way for new 
competitive firms to enter the international telecommunications market. Similar breakups 
were to follow in other industrialized countries. In the same year the state-owned British 
Telecom (BT) of Great Britain began selling its shares to private investors as a prelude to 
the creation of a more competitive industry. Concurrently, a similar contagion swept 
through other European nations as well as Japan — all of which experienced breakups of 
their telecommunication monopolies and privatization of their telecommunications 
operations.
Similarly, new companies emerged in the satellite sector. Some companies, such 
as MCI and Sprint, had already been in existence but were restricted by Intelsat and FCC
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regulations from fully accessing the global marketplace. Other newly-created companies, 
such as Orion and PanAmSat, needed the necessary FCC authorization to operate in the 
global marketplace and provide services. (Appendix III). Many of the newly created 
firms that emerged in this period were equipped to supply satellite and other 
telecommunications services to both developed and developing nations, but while barriers 
to entry into the telephone sector were eliminated, in the telecommunications satellite 
market new satellite companies still encountered barriers to free competition. The 
increasing number of firms seeking to participate in the international satellite market 
wereexpected to later impact Intelsat and the international telecommunications satellite 
regime, resulting in the transformation of its existing operating procedures.
Intelsat and the International Satellite Regime
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Jamaica’s decision to close the telecommunications sector to competition was 
determined by two sets of forces - one internal and the other external. The external force 
which played a large role in the outcome of the sector was the Intelsat regime. Intelsat 
was an international intergovernmental organization established by the industrialized 
nations in 1963 as the governing body of the international satellite system. The 
organization had two types of members: corporate members, known as signatories, and 
state representatives. The corporate representatives consisted of both the domestic 
monopolies of developing nations through which member nations received Intelsat 
satellite services and technology as well as corporations appointed by industrial nations 
— such as Comsat — to represent their national satellite interests. Participating nations 
were represented by government officials as well as signatories —  both having the 
responsibility of formulating Intelsat’s rules, while being subject to Intelsat Board of 
Directors.
Intelsat’s dual membership structure reflected the organization’s dual function in 
the international telecommunications satellite system. One function of the organization 
was to govern the international satellite system through legislation and regulation. It 
established the rules by which the market for satellite technology and services operated.
Its second function was that of the principal supplier of commercial satellite services to 
member nations, a function that was carried out through its signatories. As a commercial 
organization, Intelsat drew on those of its signatories which manufacture and innovate
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satellite technology which the organization’s manager in turn distributes to its member 
nations.
In Intelsat’s earlier years, its commercial activities were carried out by the 
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), the United States’ signatory, which also 
served as manager. During the first decade, Intelsat was the only supplier and regulator of 
the international satellite system. In that initial stage of Comsat’s management, its 
primary responsibility was supplying satellite services to member nations and to engaging 
in research and development. Comsat’s own commercial satellites were utilized in the 
provision of satellite services through the Intelsat system. Comsat also became the 
primary beneficiary of the organization’s research endeavors.
Intelsat’s commercial operations began to thrive under Comsat’s management. 
However, Comsat’s domination of the research, development and manufacturing of 
satellite technology became a source of contention among the other European signatories 
seeking a competitive edge in the satellite technology race. Added to the European 
opposition to Comsat was the mounting opposition from the new firms within the United 
States such as Sprint, MCI and PanAmSat, which later served as catalysts for change of 
the international satellite system.
By the late 1970s, when the new firms began to emerge, a new and more 
competitive international satellite system began to take shape. The new
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telecommunications suppliers consisted of the newly-formed Orion and PanAmSat, as 
well as other regionally owned or operated systems such as Arabsat of the Arab world, 
Eutelsat of Europe and Association of South East Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) Palapa 
(Appendix II). The member nations from which these new satellite companies emerged 
welcomed the new satellite systems on the grounds that they provided services in areas 
which Intelsat did not or could not reach. As the heavily-trafficked North Atlantic route 
continued to grow, more satellite companies attempted to enter the international satellite 
market to challenge Intelsat’s monopoly in the provision of services within the heavily- 
trafficked North Atlantic route. PanAmSat was the first of these firms seeking to 
challenge Intelsat’s monopoly.11
The entry of new firms in the international market did not signify an end to 
Intelsat’s monopoly since new companies could not operate without the authorization of 
Intelsat. Instead, the growing number of new firms only increased the regulatory 
responsibilities of Intelsat. Because many had the capability of competing with Intelsat’s 
services, states desiring the use of these new firms had to petition Intelsat’s executive 
board, known as the Board of Governors, for approval.
Terry Dodworth, “Launch Of Private Satellite To Challenge Intelsat’s Monopoly,” 
Financial Times (London), October 5, 1987, p.44. See Chapter 3 for a list of other firms 
that emerged with similar intent.
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The Board of Governors makes decisions regarding the use of both international 
and domestic satellites. Approval would be granted provided that companies did not 
interfere, either economically or technically, with the provision of Intelsat satellite 
services.12 Intelsat allowed non-Intelsat corporations limited opportunities to supply 
satellite services only if approval from Intelsat and other domestic authorities were 
granted. Intelsat continued to maintain its monopoly over satellite services by reserving 
the right not to approve the operation of firms that compete with Intelsat. Nevertheless 
limited opportunities existed for newer companies to operate in areas that constituted new 
services or where Intelsat did not possess the technical capability to operate.
The non-Intelsat satellite system had to pass the technological scrutiny of the 
organization. This meant that such systems had to be technologically compatible with 
Intelsat satellite systems. The non-Intelsat system also could not jeopardize Intelsat’s 
economic security. A new company could also not interfere with Intelsat's ability to make 
a profit. All non-Intelsat companies —  without exception —  were required to undergo the 
approval process since these new suppliers were perceived by Intelsat’s members as 
competitors to Intelsat and a threat to Intelsat’s income.
Any system that failed to adhere to Intelsat’s technological or economic criteria 
would be forbidden to provide satellite services to the global marketplace. This regulatory
See Chapter 3 for more details.
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process provided the needed assurance to Intelsat members that Intelsat’s income would 
not be threatened by its competitors. At the same time Intelsat allowed the newer firms to 
assist in the provision of services in the heavily-trafficked areas, where increased supply 
was needed, on condition that their activities did not jeopardize Intelsat’s income in these 
markets.
Separate Satellite Systems and the International Telecommunications Regime
In the United States in 1984, following the break up of AT&T, new firms 
attempted to gain licenses from the FCC to provide satellite services in the international 
markets. The FCC received a number of applications filed by films petitioning for 
authorization to establish separate satellite systems to operate globally. The volume of 
new applicants and subsequent pressures to grant approvals led to the issuance of 
Presidential Determination Number 85-2 in 1984, which was later known as the United 
States’ separate systems policy.13 This policy authorized the operation of separate satellite 
systems in the US. It constituted a shift in US domestic policy that would significantly 
transform Intelsat’s twenty-year commitment to Intelsat as the sole provider in this single 
global system.
Ibid.
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The United States’ decision generated a variety of responses both domestically 
and internationally.14 Several new firms such as the American Satellite Company seeking 
to enter the international satellite market, welcomed this new policy because it promised 
new opportunities for them to provide services. Intelsat signatories such as Comsat, Cable 
and Wireless, and Jamintel, strongly opposed the new policy allowing the operation of 
private firms.1'1 However, despite the internal opposition of many of Intelsat’s members, 
Intelsat adopted its own separate satellite system policy allowing the operation of new 
companies under specified conditions.16
Jamaica and the Political Economy of the Teleport
The new separate satellite systems offered new opportunities for Jamaica’s 
economic growth as well as opportunities for potential conflict. The new policy opened 
the way for an array of new firms and new services, broadening the scope of services 
provided by Intelsat. It provided competition among new firms, promising lower costs. In 
1984, at the beginning of these cascading international changes, Jampro, the agency with
14
Judith Tegger Kildow, INTELSAT, Policy-Makers’ Dilemma. (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1973).
15
See INTELSAT, “INTELSAT Director General Statement on United States’ 
Actions Regarding Separate Satellite Systems,” BG-64-76E, August 19, 1985.
16
Ibid. Intelsat approval would be granted only if the proposed service would not 
cause economic or technical harm, that is, only if Intelsat could not provide the service 
and if the proposed service was either new or significantly different from those services 
offered by Intelsat.
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the responsibility of formulating and implementing Jamaica’s economic development 
plans —  decided to establish the Jamaica Digiport International.17 The Digiport was 
Jamaica’s attempt to avail itself of the changes in information technology which would 
allow Jamaica to establish its offshore processing industry.18 The upgrading of the 
infrastructure meant the acquisition of a high speed teleport facility that could most 
effectively transfer large amounts of data to be processed using more sophisticated 
satellite systems.
As a result of the liberalization in telecommunications in the industrialized 
nations and the United States, there were a number of satellite companies available to 
provide satellite services at a cost that was lower than that of the Intelsat system. 19 From 
the increasing number of available firms, Jampro selected the American Satellite 
Company as its carrier, based on research on its technology and its costs. Jampro
17 Hereafter known as the Digiport
is
Interview with Mr. Winston Gooden, a former Vice President of Jampro in charge 
of Production and Promotion from 1983 to 1994 at the Jampro headquarters in Kingston, 
Jamaica, on July 21, 1993.
19
Federal Communications Commission, Separate Satellite Systems for 
International Communications: In the Matter of Establishing Satellite Systems Providing 
International Communications,@ 101 F.C.C. 2d 1046 (1985), pp 290-291. Also 
Interview with Mr. Winston Gooden, a former Vice President of Jampro in charge of 
Production and Promotion from 1983 to 1994, on July 20, 1993. Also see Memo from 
Teleport International to JNIP dated May 1984, located at the Jampro Archive (JA) in 
Kingston, Jamaica, West Indies.
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determined that the American Satellite Company was the company which offered the 
most efficient technology at the lowest cost.20
The selection of a United States non-Intelsat satellite company required three 
levels of negotiation. Jampro required negotiations with Intelsat, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and finally with Jamaica’s Ministry of Public 
Utilities and Transport. Intelsat’s separate satellite systems policy required that Jampro 
first seek approval from Intelsat.21 Jampro required FCC approval because the American 
Satellite Company was a United States company.22 Third, Jampro needed the Ministry’s 
approval for the American Satellite Company to operate locally. These negotiations 
lasted from 1984 and 1989.
20
A teleport is a state of the art telecommunications facility that has three distinct 
elements; the ability to transport data, voice and images from one location to a next, a high 
speed satellite that is capable of carrying enormous amounts of information very long 
distances in relatively short periods of time at lower costs, and a private telephone network 
that provides special services to businesses, such as 800 numbers.
INTELSAT, “Technical compatibility Consultation”, BG-70-7; INTELSAT, 
“Preparation for the next Assembly of Parties,” BG-70-3E; INTELSAT, “Economic Harm 
Discussions,” BG-70-10E. See also INTELSAT, "Events in the United States Relating to 
Separate International Satellite Systems", BG-72-44E B/6/87, Pg 5. The document may be 
found at the FCC office in Washington, D.C., United States of America.
22
Ibid. See also Federal Communications Commission, Separate Systems Notice. 
100 FCC 2d at 294, 314; Separate Systems Order. 101 FCC 2d at 1090; Separate System 
First Reconsidered paragraph 5.
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Jampro’s commitment to securing the American Satellite Company was met with 
opposition from several sources. Jamintel, Cable and Wireless, and the Ministry 
disapproved of the use of American Satellite Company.23 They perceived that decision as 
an economic threat to their interests in the Intelsat system.24 They argued that 
Telecommunications of Jamaica was capable of supplying the requisite satellite services, 
making use of the American Satellite Company an infringement on the domestic supply 
of services.2:1
Industrial Commercial Development also voiced its opposition to the use of the 
American Satellite Company. Eli Matalon argued that the introduction of a newer 
telecommunications company constituted a violation of the contract between the 
Jamaican government and Cable and Wireless, and would undermine Cable and Wireless' 
ability to generate future profits. Industrial Commercial Development joined with the
23
The Ministry raised opposition to Jampro in a letter dated August 28, 1985, (JA). 
See also a letter to both JAMINTEL and the Ministry from Cable and Wireless dated 
April 5, 1986, (JA); a letter to JAMINTEL and the Ministry from the chairman of the 
board of Directors of Cable and Wireless, April 5, 1986, (JA); a letter to the Prime 
Minister from Mr. Mayer Matalon, brother of Eli Matalon, Chairman of the Board of 
Industrial Commercial Development, the Chairman and CEO of the Jamaica Telephone 
company, on April 15, 1986. (JA);
2 4
A letter to JAMINTEL and the Ministry from the chairman of the board of 
Directors of Cable and Wireless. April 5, 1986, (JA).
25
Ibid. Opposition was based on JAMINTEL’s “Proposal for he Provision of 
Enhanced Telecommunications Services for Jamaica’s Free Zone,” (JA).
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Ministry in maintaining their committment to maintaining the use of the Intelsat system, 
of which Industrial Commercial Development and Cable and Wireless were a part.26
At the end of the five years of negotiations with Intelsat, the FCC and the 
Ministry, Jampro managed to acquire two of the three authorizations - that of Intelsat and 
FCC. Despite the approvals, the prime minister and his cabinet made the determination to 
maintain the Intelsat monopoly in Jamaica. Thus, Jampro was unsuccessful in acquiring 
the authorization for the American Satellite Company to operate in the Digiport project. 
Instead, Cable and Wireless, AT&T and Jamintel entered into a partnership which 
allowed them to operate the Digiport project using the Intelsat satellite system.27 Coalition 
politics was crucial to the outcome of the negotiations
The alliance of Industrial Commercial Development with Cable and Wireless, 
Jamintel and the Ministry, all desiring to preserve the Intelsat monopoly, resulted in the 
preservation of the Intelsat monopoly status quo and insuring the use of Intelsat satellites 
for the teleport. Internationally, Comsat’s successful challenge of the FCC approval of the 
American Satellite Corporation in the US courts further solidified its monopoly of the 
international satellite market. The powerful influence of the winning coalition was
See footnote 16.
27
TCanute James, ’’AT&T, Britain Join In Jamaica Data Project,” Journal of 
Commerce, February 23, 1988, p.5a. See also “AT&T In Joint Venture Agreement To 
Establish Digiport.’The Daily Gleaner. Kingston, Jamaica, Feb. 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
responsible for its success and Jampro’s failure to negotiate the license needed to 
liberalize the operation of a separate satellite system in the sector. The result confirms 
that coalition politics had a greater effect on Jamaica's failure to liberalize the use of 
satellite services than global trends and regime practices as a result of domestic interests.
Overview
Chapter Two explores the international relations literature, particularly the way in 
which the present literature has evolved in its analysis of the relationship between 
international and domestic politics in explaining domestic policy outcomes. The chapter 
will argue that even though there has been a narrowing of the gap in the literature which 
has evolved in its inclusion of both realms in the analysis of domestic outcomes, in the 
area of international regimes, more effort is still needed. This study of the Jamaica 
Digiport negotiations will be used to demonstrate the fruitfulness of this endeavor. The 
chapter will argue that in the issue of the international telecommunications satellite, a 
model that includes both domestic and international systemic analysis is indispensable for 
understanding domestic as well as international policy outcomes.
Chapter Three is the first of two chapters which lays the international context on 
which Jamaica’s decision to establish the Digiport decision using a competitive domestic 
satellite system was undertaken. It accomplishes two objectives. First, it analyses the 
historical evolution of the Intelsat system which produced the regulations that allowed 
competition. The chapter describes the conditions that preceded Jampro’s decision to use
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a separate satellite system. The chapter also analyses the structure of Intelsat and the role 
played by signatories within that structure. It examines the challenges to this system 
posed by liberalization in the telecommunications sector and the subsequent separate 
satellite systems rule and the responses of its constituents to the new challenges. Finally, 
the chapter lays the framework for understanding how Intelsat affected the domestic 
satellite policy outcomes of member states, as was seen in the Digiport negotiations.
Chapter Four, the second of the two chapters which addresses the international 
context which impinged on the Jamaica Digiport negotiations, looks at the evolution of 
the international satellite industry in the United States and Western Europe. In 1984, 
when the negotiations were under way, the global market began to experience 
transformations in its structure, where it moved from a sector with few firms and 
significant barriers to one with many firms and more accessible to newer commercial 
entities. It examines the way in which the international telecommunications satellite 
market has been transformed through the emergence of new companies. The chapter 
examines the evolution of the international satellite market from 1960 until it 
experienced significant transformations in 1989 when the Digiport decision was 
implemented, highlighting the technological changes that occurred and the implications 
of these innovations for the Digiport negotiations. Finally, the chapter examines the 
implications of these transformations on the global market.
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Chapter Five begins the analysis of the Digiport negotiations by examining the 
domestic context within which the telecommunications sector was located at the time of 
the negotiations. The chapter begins with an examination of the historical evolution of the 
sector and demonstrates how it progressed from multiple providers to that of the single 
Cable and Wireless monopoly. Second, it examines the domestic and international 
economic contexts that impinged on a state-directed restructuring of the sector that 
resulted in Cable and Wireless’ emergence as the dominant supplier of the sector and the 
ways in which this restructuring impinged on the Digiport negotiations. The chapter lays 
the foundation for explaining why Jamaica failed in its attempt to liberalize its services in 
satellite technology.
Chapter Six examines Jamaica’s negotiations for permits from Intelsat, the FCC 
and the Ministry for the use of a United States’ non-Intelsat satellite corporation. The 
chapter examines the interaction between the domestic political processes and the 
changing international telecommunications regime processes that resulted in Jampro’s 
failure to win the battle for the non-Intelsat satellite company. The chapter examines the 
process of intense opposition from Cable and Wireless, Jamintel and the Ministry that 
ended in defeat for Jampro. Despite liberalization and the apparent openness of the 
international telecommunications regimes, the choice of satellite technology was still 
restricted by constraints that can best be understood by an analysis of the sector.
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Finally, Chapter Seven concludes that there were two overriding sectoral 
characteristics which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global 
forces. The first factor that led to the coalition’s success was the structure and processes 
within which the regulation of the global sector occurred. The Intelsat system functioned 
by setting guidelines for the operation of the global satellite. Among the guidelines was 
the separate satellite systems policy whereby national systems were permitted the use of 
separate systems which do not undermine Intelsat’s operations.
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CHAPTER TWO
DOM ESTIC PO LITICS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SATELLITE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Introduction
The last two decades have seen a proliferation of international relations literature 
emphasizing the importance of combining both domestic politics in the analysis of 
international relations as well as incorporating international factors in explaining 
domestic decisions.28 This reflects a measure of progress that has occurred in the field 
since the post World War era when the realist paradigm gained preeminence as the most 
acceptable conceptual framework for understanding and explaining interstate relations. 
This system level paradigm was the dominant mode of international politics analysis. 
Realism was one approach that devalued the role of nonstate actors, international
28
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, “Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the 
Nation-state” American Political Science Review, Vol 72, #4 (1978), pp. 1276-87; and 
G. John Ikenberry, “The State and Strategy of International Adjustment” World Politics, 
Vol 39, #1, 1986, pp 53-77; Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theories and Empirical 
Studies of International institutions,” International Organization at Fifty: Explorations 
and Contestations in the Study of World Politics: , Vol 52 #2, See G. John Ikenberry, 
David A. Lake, Michael Mastanduno, “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining 
American Foreign Economic Policy” in International Organization Vol 42, no. 1, Winter 
1988, pp. 1-14.
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institutions and domestic politics as viable elements in understanding and explaining 
decision-making within the global arena as states sought to increase their power while 
pursuing the wealth of the nation.
The need to pay attention to the role of domestic and international political 
variables must begin with Singer’s analysis of the two methodological approaches to the 
study of international politics - the system level paradigm and the national level 
paradigm.29 In the former approach, a high degree of universality is assumed, 
exemplified by Morgenthau’s traditional realist assumption of “[all] statesmen think and 
act in terms of interest defined as power,” thereby producing a “black box” or “billiard 
ball” concept of decision makers.30 This generalization which created a separation 
between the international and domestic realms for analytical purposes was considered 
necessary' to understand fully understand either sphere of activities. The usefulness of this 
modus operandi to explain political behavior has since been questioned, especially within 
the global context of heightened interdependence where domestic and international 
spheres are heavily intertwined and where the actions of nonstate actors and the presence 
of civil society in international decisions are prevalent. This dissertation removes this
2 9
See I. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” 
World Politics, Vol 14, No. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays. (Oct, 1961), 
pp. 77-92.
30 Ibid, p. 81
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false dichotomy and unites both realms which is necessary for understanding Jamaica’s 
decision.
This chapter examines the progression of the literature in international relations 
and demonstrates the ways in which the incorporation of both levels has been useful in 
explaining the outcome of the JDI project. It begins with a review of the three major 
approaches to the study of state decision-making. These approaches are system centered, 
state centered and society centered.31 The goal of the chapter is to develop a multi-level 
analytic approach which combines the panoramic view of the international system while 
focusing on the microscopic view that the domestic decision unit provides in explaining 
the domestic outcome. The chapter will also uncover the limitations of analyses that 
separate domestic from international levels of analysis and seek an analytic approach that 
bridges both levels.
System-Centered Analyses
The system centered approach views international politics through the lens of the 
international system of states as a whole while treating the nation-state and its policy
31
Ikenberry et al. “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American Foreign 
Economic Policy.”
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making process as a black box.32 Here, states’ behaviors are conditioned more by 
systemic forces and less by factors internal to the individual states that are the principal 
actors in the international system. In explaining state behavior, the systems approach rests 
on a greater understanding of the international system and how it works.
The most significant system approaches are realist and neorealist theories. Realist 
theory begins with three fundamental assumptions about the international political 
system: a) states are the central actors and therefore the primary units of analysis in 
international politics, b) in the international arena states are rational and coherent .as they 
pursue their interests, which is the national interest, and c) human nature is inherently 
conflictual and as a result so is international politics. As a result of these assumptions, 
international politics becomes the arena in which states struggle to maximize their power
Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973); Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International 
Trade,” World Politics Vol. 28 (April 1976) pp. 317-343; Robert Keohane, “The Theory 
of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes” in Ole Holsti, 
R. Siverson and A. George eds.. Changes in the International System (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1980); Duncan Snidal “Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.” International 
Organization Vol 39 (Autumn 1985) pp. 579-614; Kenneth Waltz, Theories of 
International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979); 
Emanuel Wallenstein, The Modern World System Vol. 1,2 (New York: Academic Press,
1974)
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by controlling the military and economic resources necessary to pursue their national 
interest.33
Within this perspective, international organizations such as the United Nations 
and Intelsat are understood as merely arenas in which states convene to pursue their 
national interests, rather than viable institutions capable of acting in their own right to 
influence domestic output:
The contributions international functional agencies make to the well-being 
of members of all nations fade into the background. What stands before 
the eyes of all are the immense political conflicts that divide the great 
nations of the earth and threaten the well-being of the loser, if not his very 
existence.34
The neorealist construct of the international system is one in which two elements 
are significant for understanding international politics - the structure of the international
33
E. H.. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Knopf, 1978); Arnold 
Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1962); Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of 
International Relations (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), translated by Richard 
Howard and Annette Baker Fox.
34 Morgenthau, 1960, p. 528.
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system and the interactions that occur between the units or states. Waltz defines the 
structure of an anarchical international system as consisting of two elements: a) the 
organizing principle which is anarchy, and b) the distribution of power and capabilities. 
Understanding the structure of the system is to understand and explain behavior of states 
and policy outcomes. While neorealists concurred with realists that the state is the unit of 
analysis in international politics, neorealists attributed the behavior of states to their wish 
to preserve their respective positions in the international system.3'-’
Structural theories of international relations have also looked to the structure of 
the international system for an explanation of the creation, maintenance and demise of an 
international order. Structure refers to the organizing principle and the distribution of 
power and resources in the system.36 In an anarchic structured international system, 
cooperation can best be explained by hegemonic stability theory. The hegemon is that 
nation that possesses a preponderance of power and dominance over other states in the
3h
Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979).
36
Charles P Kindelberger, The World in Depression. 1929-1939 (Berkeley: 
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Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the 
Structure of International Trade," World Politics 28 (April 1976): 317-347. Duncan 
Snidal, "Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" International Organization. Vol. 39, 
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system.37 Hegemonic stability theory suggests that international cooperation and the 
creation of international institutions are best achieved by the hegemon which establishes 
the rules that govern the system. A change in the hegemonic power weakens the old order 
and leads to the creation of a new international order of cooperation, under a new set of 
norms and values.38
Gilpin’s analysis of the international system maintains the traditional realist 
beliefs that the state is the primary unit of analysis and that the nature of the international 
system is contlictual which he attributes to human nature and its drive for power. He, 
however, argues that the international market and the pursuit of wealth and control of 
market forces are important national interest objectives of the state. Central to his 
definition of the international systemic structure is state power and the formation of
3 7
See Charles Kindelberger, World in Depression (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973) and "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: 
Exploitation, public Goods, and Free Rides," International Studies Quarterly. 25 (June 
1981), pp 242-54. For further discussions of hegemonic stability see Duncan Snidal, "The 
Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", International Organization Vol 39: pp.579-614; 
Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Keohane "The Theory of Hegemonic 
Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977" in Ole 
Holsti, ed., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 
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economic blocs.39 The neorealist position of both Gilpin and Waltz agree that 
international organizations such as the United Nations and Intelsat are merely instruments 
for the maximization of state interests, without the potential to be viable actors in their 
own right in the international system.
Unlike realism and neorealism, liberal and neoliberal theories explain 
international outcomes more through the relationships between and among states in the 
international community and less in terms of the structure of the international system. 
Mitrany’s classic functionalist approach begins with the premise that the authority of 
international organizations was based on functional criteria performed within these 
international institutions. Mitrany predicted that functional loyalties would eventually 
supersede national loyalties, resulting in increasing instances of international corporation 
and decreasing incidences of international conflict.40
Keohane’s A fter Hegemony challenge the two fundamental assumptions of 
hegemonic stability theory - a) that a strong hegemonic power is necessary for economic 
regimes and b) that a hegemon is necessary for the stability of the system. Keohane
3 9
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argues three points. First, he argues that a) a hegemon is not a sufficient condition for 
strong international regimes; b) that hegemonic cooperation is not the only possible form 
of international cooperation and c) that other forms of non-hegemonic cooperation do 
occur, such as multilateral institution.41
Keohane and Nye’s neoliberal institutionalism also challenges many of the
assumptions of the realist and neorealist paradigms. First, realists perceive the
international system as the domain of states who are the primary unit of analysis.- Second,
the neoliberal institutionalist position challenges the realist view of the international
system as an inherently conflictual domain. Third, they established the importance of
international cooperation and international institutionalization. They advance the theory
of international cooperation to argue that in a world of complex interdependence, nation
states are not the only actors in the international system. Neither are security issues and
the maximization of national interest the sole nor predominant driving forces behind state
action. States are motivated to pursue other economic and social issues. Other actors
include multinational corporations (MNCs), government bureaucracies, individuals and
groups who may sometimes be at odds with their own official state policies:
The existence of transgovernmental policy networks leads to a different 
interpretation of one of the standard propositions about international 
politics —  that states act in their own interest. Under complex
41
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1984), p. 7.
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interdependence this conventional wisdom begs two important questions: 
which self and which interest? ... The ambiguity of the national interest 
raises serious problems for the top political leaders of governments. As 
bureaucrats contact each other directly across national borders (without 
going through foreign offices), centralized control becomes more difficult.
There is less assurance that the state will be united when dealing with 
foreign governments or that its components will interpret national interests 
similarly when negotiating with foreigners. The state may prove to be 
multifaceted, even schizophrenic. National interests will be defined 
differently on different issues, at different times, and by different 
governmental units.42
Complex, interdependence consists of three models of interactions: transnational, 
transgovernmental and intergovernmental relations.43 Transnational relations are activities 
between individuals and groups in one state with individual and groups in another — all 
of which occur outside the realm of official state behavior. Rissen Kappen defines 
transnational relations as “regular interactions across national borders when at least one 
actor is a nonstate agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an
4 2
Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, “Complex Interdependence, Transnational 
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York: Random House, 1988), p. 268.
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international organization.44 Transgovernmental relations are activities between branches 
of government that also bypass high-level channels of foreign policy relations. 
International intergovernmental relations are interstate activities that involve official 
governmental actors.44 These three approaches have traditionally failed to examine the 
process through which decisions are made and those actors who influence outcomes, 
thereby blurring the distinction between domestic and international politics.
Unlike their place in realism and neorealism, under complex interdependence, 
international organizations play a major role in the international system. They exemplify 
one mechanism through which international intergovernmental (IGO) relations take place. 
They have the capacity to set global agendas and build international coalitions.
While Keohane and Nye’s models of interaction identified the role of nonstate 
actors and domestic governmental bodies in international relations, the introduction of 
these categories left room for developing a better understanding of the role of private 
individuals and nonstate domestic actors and their effects on IGOs. Further developments 
are needed for a clearer insight into the interaction between these categories, elucidating
Rissen Kappen. Bringing Transnational Relations Rack in
Ibid.
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the ways in which individuals, national bureaucracies, state representatives and 
international regimes interact to affect policy outcomes at all levels.46
The State-Centered Approach
While the system level analysis of international politics excludes domestic 
politics by virtue of the “black-box" assumption which allows some generalization about 
state behavior, the state-centered approach, by contrast, focuses on the internal dynamics 
of states as the unit of analysis. This approach sees the state as “an important intervening 
or independent variable between international forces on one hand and foreign policy 
made at the domestic level.47 The state is that entity that connects both the international 
and domestic arenas 48 Since the state is the institution charged with the responsibility of 
conducting the nation’s foreign policy, as the unit of analysis, it is used by the state- 
centric approach to connect international outcomes with decisions made within the 
context of the domestic political process.
4 6
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Quarterly Vol. 40 No. 4, December 1996, pp. 451-478.
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Snyder et al also argue that in order to understand state action, what is needed is 
an understanding of the goals, wants and needs of the individuals acting 011 behalf of the 
state. The actors’ perception of the potentially relevant variables within both the domestic 
and external setting will have an impact on the choices that are made.49 These variables 
may include economic capabilities, military capabilities, other domestic actors, 
international alliances, bilateral relations or supranational structures. These factors drive 
the “because o f ’ and the “in order to” motivations of the significant actors involved in 
state decisions.50
There are two dominant views of the role of the state. One, the statist paradigm, 
views the state as an actor whose goal it is to maximize the “national interest” while 
insulating itself from narrow parochial interests51 Krasner views the state as an 
autonomous actor rather than a summation of private interests. The state, Krasner argues, 
is a set of roles and institutions, having its own peculiar drives, compulsions and aims 
that are separate and distinct from those of societal groups. The goals of the state are 
based on its perception of the “national interest.” It is in striving to carry out that
49
Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin in James N. Rosenau ed. “The 
Decision-making Approach to the Study of International Politics” in James N. Rosenau 
ed. International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. (New 
York: The Free Press, 1969), 199-206.
50 Ibid.
51
Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments 
and United States Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
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perception of the “national interest,” Krasner argues, that the state encounters resistance 
from both domestic and international societal groups.
Critics of this perspective reject the notion of the “national interest” on several 
grounds. First, it presumes an identifiable policy alternative that is distinguishable from 
other alternatives one that assumes an objective reality outside of the realm of politics, 
devoid of influence by private interests.52 Others argue that the role of the state is to 
advance the interests of the capitalist class and the needs of the capitalist system as a 
whole.'’3 Yet others argue that the state is not an autonomous actor but depends on special 
interests whose interests they articulate. State policy is seen as the result of societal 
pressures, “the resultant of effective access by various interests.”54 Still other critics also 
argue that the capitalist system is symbolic of ties between the capitalist class which 
controls the state and public officials.55
5 2
See Joseph Frankel, National Interest (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970). See 
also Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration pp. 147-166.
53
Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism ; translated from the French 
by David Fern bach. Imprint London : Verso, 1979.
54 David Truman. The Governmental Process, p. 507
Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London, Weidenfeld and 
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The state-centric approach is one that engages in the structural analysis of the 
state. Katzenstein notes that the state’s foreign policy is determined by a range of factors 
that include the level of autonomy from societal groups, the relative strength of the state 
and the degree of fragmentation along bureaucratic lines.56 He argues that while the 
liberal, the marxist and the realist approaches identify different external limitations on 
domestic policy outcomes, the “critical” intervening variable between international 
interdependence and political strategies is the domestic structure of the nation-state and 
the ability of state officials to realize state objectives/'’7 The domestic structure is defined 
as the coalition between business, the state and the policy networks that link the public 
and private sectors.
5 6
Ikenberry et a!. See also Peter J. Katzenstein, ’’Conclusion: Domestic Structures 
and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy” in Katzenstein ed., Between Power and 
Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Katzenstein, Small States in 
World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986).
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One contribution to the state-centric approach is Graham’s bureaucratic politics 
model.''8 This model holds that a state’s domestic and foreign policies are the outcome of 
a series of rivalries, bargains, and compromises among different bureaucratic entities at 
the domestic level. The decision-making process is where state policies are formulated 
after much compromise between competing state bureaucracies with unequal levels of 
power, authority and resources.
Allison argues that state decisions and actions often involve bureaucracies which 
hold different perspectives, different goals and different objectives. Often these goals and 
objectives are parochial, contradictory and conflictuai. State decisions are the result of 
compromise, bargains and coalition-building among bureaucracies which seek to promote 
their own power, interests and goals and are affected by the sheer power and/or 
bargaining skills of the actors.'19
58
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1971); Morton H. Halpern, Bureaucratic Politics 
and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1974); and Graham T. 
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Both domestic and foreign policy decision-makers participate in bargaining games 
with each other. The players from different departments bring to the proverbial table 
different perceptions, different motivations and a variety of personal objectives. Decision­
makers’ parochial priorities and perceptions, coupled with their different stands, goals, 
interests and stakes, all affect the final outcome of state policy.60 The dominant actor in 
the bureaucratic conflict is the one who would determine the outcome of state policy 
because “what a government does in any particular instance can be understood largely as 
a result of bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the government.”61
Figure 2-1: Bureaucratic Politics Model 
National Government
Players in positions (A - E)
Goals, interests, stakes, and stands (r - z)
Power
Action - channels
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The bureaucratic politics model stressed the major role played by mostly state but 
also non-state actors at the domestic level. The weakness of this approach, however, is 
that it understates the importance of decisions made in the transgovernmental and 
transnational contexts. It also understates the significant role played by nonstate actors, 
such as and international institutions and multinational corporations, both nationally and 
internationally, in domestic decision-making.
In their analysis of bureaucratic politics, Laver and Schepsle make the distinction 
between cabinet ministers who formulate policies that affect domestic output and civil 
service bureaucrats who actually implement those policies. They argue that effective 
power to both make and implement public policy lies more in the civil service than within 
the cabinet. The reason for its effective power, they argue, is the fact that cabinet 
ministers are generally politicians who come and go. Since career civil servants are there 
to stay, they are therefore in a “very strong position to effectively determine government 
policy outputs.”62 They note that the preferences of civil servants and bureaucrats may 
differ from those of elected politicians.63 Garrett and Lange argue that bureaucrats will
6 2
Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Schepsle. Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary 
Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p 6.
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Change” in Keohane and Milner ed., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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not change the way they make and implement policy in lockstep with the preferences of 
government or societal actors. The more authority over policy rests in the hands of 
independent bureaucratic agencies, they argue, the less policy change should be 
associated with a given change in the constellation of preferences in the private sphere.64
The bureaucratic politics approach is one that opens the “black box,” providing 
more insight into the decision-making process that impacts interstate relations. Critics of 
this model have argued that this approach is problematic in its inability to identify the 
importance of interests and motivations of individuals and demonstrate their impact on 
policy output.66 The model is also incapable of demonstrating the ways in which societal 
actors affect policy outcomes.
Putnam argues that the limitation of the bureaucratic politics model is that it is 
“state-centric.” It is therefore insufficient to grasp the complexities Involved in the 
domestic-international mix. Instead of the state-centric approach, he recommends a
society centered approach that incorporates politics, parties, social classes, interest
64 Ibid.
65
I.M. Destler, “Organization and Bureaucratic Politics” in Presidents, Bureaucrats 
and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 52-81.
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groups, legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials 
and institutional arrangements.66
The Society-centered Approach
The society-centered approach looks at the role of societal actors, particularly the 
dominant groups or social classes and the manner in which they impact domestic and 
foreign policy. State officials and institutional processes are not the only significant 
factors in the policymaking outcome.67 Migdal acknowledges different levels of 
disaggregation where policy is made, ranging from the commanding heights of agencies’ 
central offices to dispersed field offices to the trenches. He disaggregates the state rather
66
Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games" International Organization 42 (Summer 1988) p. 442.
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than viewing the state as a monolith.68 Vitalis also identifies divisions within states, 
which he attributes to divided business interests.69
Migdal, Kohli and Shue note that boundaries do exist between state and societal 
actors.70 Kohli and Shue, however, note that the boundaries between both state and 
society are blurred. They have the effect of mutually transforming the nature of state- 
society interactions.71 Markovitz acknowledges that boundaries between the state and 
civil society is in fact blurred. However, he argues that the state and civil society are more 
than intertwined, for the elements of civil society are not merely affected by the state, but
68
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are seated in the state.72 He notes that the connection between state and society cannot 
really be understood if we persist in seeing the state and civil society as separate, 
balancing entities.73
In the African political economy, Markovitz notes that the state and civil society
are intertwined into “networks and webs of relationships,” that are “not of individuals,
but of families” which are “repeated and systematic encounters over time.”74 These occur
when civilians from organizations or interests in civil society are loaned or 
seconded to the institutions of government that are responsible for the 
oversight, management or conduct of those organizations or interests; 
when the structures and organizations of civil society are created, 
enhanced, supported and promoted by structures, organizations and 
officials of the state, or the reverse.75
Irving Leonard Markovitz, “Uncivil Society, Capitalism and the State in Africa,” 
in Nelson Kasfir, ed. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives 
(London: Frank Cass, 1998)p. 21.
73 Ibid, p. 22.
74 Ibid. p. 24.
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Their actions occur within an international and national framework that supports and 
limits the liberty of interests within civil society.76
Markovitz’s conception of the “organizational bourgeoisie” is also helpful in the 
analysis of state-society relations. Markovitz defines the “organizational bourgeoisie” as 
“a combined ruling group consisting of the top political leaders and bureaucrats, the 
traditional rulers and their descendants, the leading members of the liberal professions, 
the rising business bourgeoisie, and top members of the military and police forces.77 The 
“organizational bourgeoisie”is distinct from both the classical and the state bourgeoisie. 
Its distinction lies in the fact that the business bourgeoisie does not merely use states as 
instruments or as its allies but it occupies state offices, wielding power and controlling 
the terms of economic activities.78 The organizational bourgeoisie not only managed, they 
exploited as well.79
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The power of this class, both cause and consequence of occupying 
positions of state authority, is such that the state serves its ends to the 
extent that the two spheres of the public and the private ... have if 
anything become, in certain ways, at all levels more tightly bound 
together.80
Krasner sees the state as independent from societal forces. He notes that the 
society-in-the-state position as articulated by Markovitz, fails to explain why some 
governments have been successful in pushing forth positions that were not supported by 
dominant groups. He also notes that the society-in-the-state position cannot explain why 
some governments have prevailed in the presence of conflicts between the state and 
private corporations.81
Nordlinger argues that the actions and inactions of the democratic state are 
determined by the contours of civil society, in conjunction with the distribution of 
political resources, and the policy preferences of those societal groups that control the
greatest amount of societal resources.82 However, Nordlinger’s position is distinctly 
different from the latter position when he argues that he sees the state as :
80 Ibid, p. 10.
81 Krasner, Defending the National Interest
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It is most implausible that the democratic state — the elected and 
appointed officials who populate this large, weighty, resource-laden, 
highly prized ensemble of offices —  is consistently unwilling or unable to 
translate its preferences into public policy when they diverge from those 
held by the politically weightiest societal groups.83
Unlike the Marxist, pluralist and social corporatist perspectives which view the 
state as “malleable” in the hands of the most powerful group, Nordlinger asserts that 
when state and society preferences diverge, the society centered model denies, ignores or 
downplays possibilities of public officials acting on their own preferences and denies 
states turning their preferences into authoritative action when opposed by societal actors 
who control the weightiest political resources.84 He concludes that when state and societal 
preferences diverge, it is the preferences of public officials that are translated into 
authoritative action.83 In addition, Nordlinger’s analysis presumes the existence of 
monolithic state preferences rather than a variety of conflicting preferences among 
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Systems Analysis and Domestic Politics: A Combined Approach
Others have acknowledged that both the systemic and domestic perspectives fail 
in their respective individual attempts to fully explicate the complexities of decisions 
within the international political economy. Since a knowledge of each level is important 
in the understanding of domestic policy processes, and since each approach is insufficient 
without the other, a more fruitful endeavor would be a combined approach — one that 
looks at the way in which both domestic and international factors affects domestic 
political output. Keohane echoes this sentiment and argues that
[A]n international-level analysis ... is neither an alternative to studying 
domestic politics, nor a mere supplement to it .... On the contrary, it is a 
precondition for effective comparative analysis. Without a conception of 
the common external problems, pressures and challenges . . .we  lack an 
analytic basis for identifying the role played by domestic interests and 
pressures .... Understanding the constraints imposed by the world political 
economy allows us to distinguish the effects of common international 
forces from those of distinctive national ones.86
Keohane's liberal international relations approach begins with the assumption that 
state behavior is shaped by both domestic influences and the transnational society in
86
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which it is embedded.87 On the one hand societal forces influence the way states behave 
by shaping state preferences defined as the fundamental social purposes underlying the 
strategic calculations of governments.88 The fundamental actors within domestic and 
transnational interaction are individuals and private groups whose endeavor is to promote 
their interests. The state represents a subset of domestic society, the interests of which 
determine state preferences and which forms the basis of state action in world politics.
The new liberal international relations theory, therefore, requires relaxing the 
fundamental systemic assumption of the state as a unitary actor, instead assuming a 
polyarchic structure of the state.89
Polyarchy, Milner argues, assumes that different groups within the state have 
different preferences and goals.90 A polyarchic analysis therefore allows a more detailed 
look at the domestic political struggle that ensues among the domestic actors. It fosters 
the identification of different goals, objectives, motivations, and perspectives within both 
the state, as well as those external to it.
87
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This combined approach is useful for two reasons. First, Milner and Keohane note 
that the context within which national decisions are made is a global context. They argue 
that we can no longer understand domestic politics without a realization of the linkages 
between national economies and the global economy. Second, forces at one level impact 
actions at the next. The world economy alters domestic politics by creating new policy 
preferences and coalitions.91 It also affects political institutions since when actors’ 
preferences change and new policies are pursued, institutions also change.92 Policy 
preferences of actors within countries fluctuate based on their global economic interests.93 
Preferences also change as a result of political pressures from powerful actors within the 
international system such as United States and the International Monetary Fund.
Milner argues that while the international system impacts domestic politics, 
domestic politics also has the capacity to impact the international system. Domestic 
political institutions can mitigate the effects of internationalization and offset changes
91
Ronold Rogowski, Commerce and Coalition: How Trade Affects Domestic 
Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1.989).
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Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World” in Robert O. 
Keohane and Helen V. Milner, ed., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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from occurring even in the face of systemic pressures.94 Milner notes that domestic 
politics and international relations are intricately bound because a nation’s international 
position affects its internal politics and economics. Conversely, a nation’s domestic 
situation impacts its foreign relations. To overlook domestic politics by assuming the 
state is unitary actor as realism does, Milner argues, overlooks key elements in explaining 
state behavior and misinforms our analysis.95
The course of action for international political scholars is, therefore, to develop a 
theoretical position that successfully “acknowledges and accounts for the power of agents 
[at the domestic level] and recognizes the causal relevance of ‘structural factors.’”96 
Dessler argues that “[s]ince social action is a result of both structural and agential forces, 
a strict structural or agential e\p l ination of action will necessarily be incomplete. One 
alone won't do.”97
The research agenda of the past decade has pursued this new course. Milner’s 
analysis of international trade policies looked at the critical role of domestic interest
94 p. 21.
95
Helen V. Milner, Interest. Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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97 Ibid, p. 444.
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groups, national governments and foreign governments in the making of trade policies. 
She argued that the distribution of power among the actors impacts the economic policy 
outcome and the distribution of wealth.98 Frieden also identified the role of the domestic 
system in the analysis of international political economy, arguing that globalization - 
defined in terms of a global system of highly-integrated financial markets with a high 
level of international capital mobility - has a clear impact on the domestic environment. 
He demonstrated that globalization had a different impact on local interests. Local 
interests, he noted, in turn applied pressure on the domestic political system to ensure the 
implementation of policies in their best interests.99
Mastanduno et al., using a realist perspective, also incorporated a multilevel 
analysis. The authors argue that one consequence of interdependence is that international 
developments constrain the ability of governments to pursue domestic politics effectively. 
The success of domestic politics depends on the ability of state officials to secure
98
Helen V. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of 
International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1988), p. 3
99
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accommodations in the international arena. Therefore, in order to pursue their 
international goals, states also needed success in the pursuit of domestic goals.100
Weiss also argues that the state’s ability to respond to international pressures, 
which she identifies as its transformative capacity, is a result of the state’s priorities, its 
domestic linkages and the nation’s key economic actors.101 Katzenstein noted that state 
capacity depends on the ways in which societal groups are organized. His foreign 
economic policy model is one that includes political and economic forces operating, both 
at home and abroad, that have an influence on state bureaucracy.102 Evans argues that 
state capacity is based on a set of institutions that insulate the economic bureaucracy from 
special interests at the same time having established channels of cooperative links 
between state bureaucrats and organized business.103 This state of “governed 
interdependence” is one in which both spheres maintain their autonomy while 
cooperating to advance the interests of each.
100
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While Evans sees a separation between the state and societal actors, Milner, on 
the other hand conflates the two spheres. Her model of state-society relations is one that 
identifies the interaction of public institutions, political actors and private interests as they 
converge to determine policy. The author notes that domestic politics arises due to the 
fact that the state is not a unitary actor. It consists of different societal and political actors 
with different policy preferences. Economic actors can be identified by their common 
interest which is the maximization of income and profits whereas the interest of political 
actors is to retain political office. While interests remain constant among each group, 
policy preference does not. Policy preference is the means through which actors interests 
are realized. Policy outcome is the result of competing policy preferences.
Policy outcome, Milner argues, is determined by the structure of domestic 
preferences which varies with issue area. Outcome is also based on the ranking of 
preferences of actors based on the relative power of internal actors. The most powerful 
actors are the political executive (president or prime minister, the legislature and interest 
groups.104 Interest groups are the primary source of information and their access to 
information affects the power of the group. Information is also central to the outcome in 
this model. Milner’s analysis generates the following hypotheses from her model:
104
Helen V. Milner, Interest, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations, p. 16.
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a) When the most dovish domestic actor (closest in preference to foreign 
country) holds greater internal decision-making power in domestic politics, the 
outcome is positive, that is the absence of armed conflict.
b) When the more hawkish actor is most powerful in the domestic decision­
making unit, the policy outcome is negative, or armed international conflict
c) When the executive and the legislature have policy preferences that are far 
apart, the government is far more divided and cooperation is less likely.Kb
Milner’s analysis introduces another key element in the explanation of policy 
outcomes - the notion of the “divided government.”106 The divided government is the 
situation in which there is a lack of consensus between or among the primary state 
decision-making bureaucracies. This may occur between the executive and legislature 
branches of government or among cabinet members themselves within the executive 
branch. The author argues that when the government is divided, successful policy 
outcomes are the result of factors other than the structure of preferences. In a divided 
government, the author notes, policy outcome is more the result of party dynamics and 
coalition formation rather than the ranking of preferences. Divided governments occur in 
both presidential and parliamentary systems.
Ibid, Chapter 3.
Ibid, p. 38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
66
Interest groups have a significant impact on divided governments, Milner argues, 
as a result of the dual role they play. First, they act as information providers to policy­
makers, directly helping to shape their preferences. Second, by providing financial 
support in the form of campaign contributions and by their capacity to mobilizing votes, 
they serve as pressure groups, whose goal it is to directly affect the policy preferences of 
decision-makers. The preferences of interest groups, the author notes, depend on the 
distributional consequences of the policy under consideration.107
Milner’s analysis of the divided government clearly dispels the commonly-held 
assumption of the state as a unitary actor.108 It elucidates the many of the complexities 
that impinge on policy outcomes. However, what is missing from the analysis is a model 
which better informs us as to why different structures of preferences emerge and vary 
from issue to issue. The model needs a clearer elucidation of domestic political processes. 
Such a model helps us to understand the domestic-international link, as well as which sets 
of actors’ preferences and institutions at each level can be expected in the decision­
making process.
107 Ibid, p. 60.
108
See J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” 
World Politics, Vol 14, No. 1, The International System: Theoretical Essays. (Oct, 1961), 
pp. 77-92.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
Putnam’s “two-level games” is another model that establishes the theoretical link 
between international politics and domestic outcomes. The author argues that 
international negotiations in which the statesman is located at the point where 
international and domestic politics intersect.109 The statesman is strategically located 
between two “tables,” one representing domestic politics and the other international 
negotiations. Each context is equally dependent on the outcome of the other.110
At the national level, domestic interest groups compete against each other to have 
their interests represented in international negotiations as state policy. At the international 
level states try to gain the maximum benefits that are in line with domestic interests. 
Decisions that may be rational at one level may be totally irrational at the next. Pressures 
from local interests that are not in harmony with the interests of competing states are 
likely to obstruct international cooperation.111
109 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics". 
10 Ibid.
Putnam and Bayne, in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam. 
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics.(Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993). pp. 10-12. See also Evans et al Double-Edged 
Diplomacy.
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Knopf argues that Putnam’s two-level-game approach has three shortcomings. 
First, it fails to incorporate the complexities of domestic-international interaction.112 
Second, it overlooks yet a third level of interaction, namely institutional alliances 
between groups of states. This third level is especially relevant in understanding the role 
of military alliances in international security negotiations. Third, Putnam’s approach fails 
to draw out the role that domestic groups play in initiating international negotiations.
Knopf introduces a “three-three approach” to understanding international regimes 
consisting of three levels of analysis and three types of domestic interaction. The three 
levels of analysis are international, national, and the group level. The three types of 
domestic-international interactions are: a) trans-governmental interactions where internal 
divisions result in state bureaucracies from one nation connect across borders with the 
like-minded faction in the next b) transnational interactions where different societal 
groups from one nation connect across borders with groups in the next as in international 
non-governmental organizational relationships and c) cross-level interactions where 
leaders from one nation connect with societal groups of a next. Examples of each, Knopf 
argues, are apparent in the US-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in 
the 1980s.
] 12
Jeffrey W. Knopf "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction 
in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations" International Organization, 
Vol 47, No. 4 Autumn 1993.
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Knopfs work incorporates international institutions, alliances, state and non state 
actors in the analysis of international negotiations. Knopfs analysis, however, contains 
one weakness. In his explanation of the way international regimes and domestic politics 
impinge on domestic output, K nopfs model is unable to explain why the specific 
domestic-international interaction emerged and why some patterns of domestic- 
international interactions are more likely to emerge in some issues and not in others.
A successful model needs to explain why we are more likely to see a greater level 
of transgovernmental interactions over transnational interactions in some issues more 
than in others. It ought also to inform us of when we can expect to see a greater degree of 
cross-level interactions in some issues and not in others. As with Putnam, the focus on the 
negotiator as the unit of analysis is insufficient to give us the depth of details required to 
address the broader issues of transnational and transgovernmental interactions. 
Nevertheless, the strength of Knopfs analysis is its inclusion of both domestic and 
international interactions as they impinge on international institutions, a move which 
many have argued has been seriously lacking in the international regimes literature.
Theories of International Regimes
The study of international regimes had its beginnings in discourse on the role of 
the hegemon in maintaining international corporation and stability. Keohane and Nye’s 
neoliberal institutionalist position argues that while the hegemon may facilitate 
international cooperation, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fostering
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international cooperation. Instead, they argue that international cooperation is possible in 
the absence of a hegemon because shared interests can result in the creation of 
international regimes.113 Strong international regimes, especially economic ones, depend 
on a hegemonic power for sustenance and stability. Similarly, the demise of an 
international regime could have been attributed to the decline of the system’s hegemon.114
An international regime is defined as embodying “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”11'’ Haggard and 
Simmons identify four categories that have traditionally defined the study of international 
regimes. These categories are structural, functional, game-theoretical and cognitive."6
113
Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Glenview, 111: 
Scott, Fores man and Co. 1989, pp 39-40, and Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1983). p. 50.
115
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Intervening Variables,” International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 
p. 2. See also Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 57.
116 Haggard and Simmons, pp. 491-517.
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Three of them- structural, functional, and game-theoretical - approach their analysis from 
the level of the international system.117
The structural approach, where international regimes are viewed through the 
prisms of the realist perspective, explains international regimes largely through the role of 
the powerful states. The functional approach to international regimes explains the 
presence of international regimes by the extent to which they provide benefits for their 
member nations and satisfy the needs of the international community. Benefits include 
reduction of uncertainty, reduction of costs (information costs and transaction costs), and 
correction of market imperfections.118
While changes in the world political economy affect the regime’s ability to 
continue to provide benefits to its members, the expected result would be changes in the 
international regime that would seek to address emerging needs. Keohane and Nye point 
to the examples of technological changes and changes in the world political economy
117
Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes", 
International Organization, Vol. 41, Summer 1987, pp. 491-517.
1 18
Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes" International 
Organization. Vol36, no 2 pp. 141-171, 1982. See also Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation- 
State: Functionalism and International Cooperation (Stanford University Press, 1964); 
James P. Sewell, Functionalism and World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1960); 
Both Haas and Sewell’s conception of functionalism provided the foundations for later 
functionalist approaches of international regimes.
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which make existing international regimes obsolete.119 New international regimes would 
emerge to address new functions and new needs as a result of changes in the system.120
Nevertheless, in spite of major technological changes that create new needs and 
that require new norms, older international regimes often fail to address the new reality 
even after the conditions from which they emerged have vanished. Once institutions and 
their norms are established, the authors argue, they are quite difficult to eliminate even 
when they become obsolete. When significant international economic changes fail to 
produce regime change, several underlying factors may be at play. Keohane and Nye 
argue that when important economic changes take place and regime changes fail to occur, 
bureaucratic inertia often serves as an obstacle to change.121 Elsewhere, Keohane also 
argues that regimes continue to exist despite the disappearance of those conditions under 
which they were created because the regimes perform functions that are important to the
J 19
Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann "Institutional Change in Europe in the 
1980’s in Keohane and Hoffmann, ed, The New European Community: Decision-making 
and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991)and Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed.(Glenview, 111.: Scott, 
Foreman and Co., 1989) pp. 39-40. .
120
Keohane and Nye, Power And Interdependence. The authors refer to this 
phenomenon as the economic process model.
121 Keohane and Nye, Power And Interdependence, p 55.
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states they serve, one of which is the arena for cooperation in which states interests are 
harmonized.122
The third approach, the game theoretical approach, looks at international regimes 
as games in which states have clearly defined goals and objectives. States, diligently 
pursuing power and wealth under conditions of anarchy, are rational utility maximizers, 
pursuing their national interests.123 In so doing conflict of interest situations arise among 
players who interact according to predetermined rules.124 Each actor faces its own sets of 
benefits and stakes which determine its level of participation. Regime change occurs 
when the benefits and stakes are no longer the same as different sets of rewards and 
payoffs emerge among actors.
While the game theory approach provides insight into the range of options that 
elicit certain responses from states, the approach has failed to incorporate non-systemic
122 See Keohane, After Hegemony
123
R. Harrison Wagner, "The Theory of Games and the Problem of International 
Cooperation, "American Political Science Review 70 (June 1983), pp. 330-46; Robert 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation New York: Basic Books, 1984) and "The 
Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists", American Political Science Review 75 (June 
1981) 306-318; George Downs and David Rocke, Tacit Bargaining. Arms races and Arms 
Control, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Andrew Kydd and Duncan 
Snidal, "Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regime" in Volker 
Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993)."
124
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factors such as domestic political factors. It also has not helped us in understanding of 
how regimes’ benefits and stakes are established and changed. For that we need to 
examine the domestic context out of which regime actors emerge.
The fourth approach to the analysis of international regimes, the cognitive 
approach, begins with the assumption that international regimes are made up of humans 
who selectively respond to their environment. Chister Jonsson argues that the definition 
of international regimes — “Principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge (Jonsson’s emphasis) in a given issue area” 
— seems to set the stage for a strong cognitive thrust in the analysis of international 
regimes. This definition, therefore, places us in the cognitive world of the decision 
makers.125
This approach looks at individuals in the context of international institutions 
responding to their environments, on behalf of their states.126 The key elements that 
condition international cooperation, according to the cognitive perspective, are the shared 
ideology and world view of the actors, how they define their reality and interests and the
125
Chister Jonsson, "Cognitive Factors in Exploring Regime Dynamics", in Volker 
Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983), pp. 202-203.
126
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976). Jervis looks at the cognitive process and its impact on 
decision-making in the international arena.
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limitations imposed on their rationality.127 These factors lead to the creation and 
maintenance of international regimes that facilitate cooperation.128 Jervis also adds that a 
decision-maker’s beliefs about politics, the images he holds of key players, and instances 
of misperception will play a key role in international interaction.129
The cognitive approach is significantly different from other approaches to the 
study of international regimes in that it demonstrates the importance of the roles played 
by ideology, belief systems, information and learning of individuals as they define the 
interests of actors. The approach attributes changes in these factors to changes in 
international regimes130 Nye has shown that regime changes have resulted from changes 
in the learning process. Regimes, he states, change in response to new information, 
therefore learning is the principal factor that accounts for regime change.131 The learning
127
Ernst Haas, "Words Can Hurt You: Or Who Said What to Whom About 
Regimes" in Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press 1983) p. 57; Haggard and Simmons, pp. 509-511.
128
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in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) p. 57; 
haggard and Simmons, pp. 509-511.
129 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
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process is where actors acquire and use new knowledge for the purpose of adopting 
“different, and more effective, means to attain one’s end.”132
In their critique of the literature on international regimes, Haggard and Simmons 
noted that the literature has been written largely from a systemic level of analysis, to the 
exclusion of domestic politics and nonstate actors.1’3 As a result the structural, functional 
and game theory approaches have fallen short for several reasons in explaining 
international outcomes. First, they assume the state as a rational and unitary actor. Their 
analyses therefore fail to inform us of the way in which domestic politics and the 
domestic policy process impact international outcomes. The authors argue that what has 
been missing from the literature on international regimes is a discussion of the domestic 
political determinants of international cooperation and how international regimes 
influence policy choices at the national level. They advocate an approach to international 
regime analysis that not only looks at the interaction among states, but that also looks at 
the interaction of nonstate actors at the domestic level, international level and between 
cross-national coal itions.134
Ll‘ Joseph Nye "Nuclear Learning" International Organization Vol 41, 1987 p. 378.
133 Ibid.
iM Ibid.
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Haas cites yet another factor that affects regime change — the epistemic 
community.135 He credits the epistemic community as a source of new knowledge and 
notes that it promotes learning within regimes.136 The epistemic community is the 
community of intellectuals from the realm of academia or government or other sectors of 
knowledge in society which provides the intellectual justification for a particular 
outcome. It is “ ... a professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect 
relationships, truth tests to assess them, and shares common values, ... shares a common 
vocabulary, common political objectives, a common network in which findings are 
exchanged and shared concerns are formulated, common world view and concerns about 
the same subject matter.”137
As the source of ideas and knowledge which sometimes ran counter to the 
established mode of thinking of those in power, epistemic communities provide 
legitimacy for emerging social groups that are in opposition to the dominant groups and 
their ideas. As a result they greatly inform us on the genesis of regime change. The goal
135
Peter M. Haas. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
136
Peter M. Haas "Do Regimes Matter?: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control" in International Organization, Vol 43, No. 3, Summer 1989, pp 377- 
404: Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental 
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Peter Haas, "Epistemic 
Communities and International Policy Coordination" in International Organization. Vol 
46 No. 1, Winter 1992, pp 1-36;
137 Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, 55.
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of emerging social groups is to implement their new policies and objectives. Policy 
makers with different points of view often refer to the epistemic community for 
information and policy advice. It is the epistemic community that validates the new 
information and the changes in belief system, ideology, and ultimately the changes in the 
international regime.
Haufler attempts to broaden the scope of systemic analysis by including the role of 
nonstate actors in international regimes. The author argues that states sometimes build on 
a foundation of norms and practices that have been laid down by nonstate actors. States 
may use nonstate actors to implement some of the functions of the regime, nonstate actors 
may also create their own regimes or they may at times play an equal role with states. 
Where nonstate actors play an equal role with states, a “mixed parentage” regime, state 
actors do not always determine the outcome. Nor do states always prevail in decision 
making when conflicts arise.138 The author cites Amnesty International as an example of a 
nonstate international organization that is often successful in achieving its objectives in 
conflicts against the state. Haufler’s analysis notes a relationship between domestic 
politics, international regimes and nonstate actors. However, the analysis does not 
identify the ways in which each factor can be expected to influence international 
outcomes.
138
Haufler, Virginia, “Crossing the boundary Between Public and Private: 
International Regimes and Nonstate Actors,” in Volker Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory 
and international Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. pp. 94-111.
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Martin and Simmons also advocate the introduction of domestic politics back into 
the analysis of international institutions. They argue that international institutions can 
change state behavior by substituting for domestic practices. The crucial variables, they 
point out, are the conditions under which domestic actors are willing to substitute 
international institutions for domestic institutions; identifying the beneficiaries of this 
transfer of power; and the possibilities of enforcibility and compliance with international 
institutional decisions by domestic institutions. They concluded that domestic actors 
intentionally delegate policy making authority to the international level when it means the 
advancement of their interests.1’9
International Regime and Domestic Politics
In their analysis of the relationship between international regime rules and norms 
and domestic policy outcomes, Cortell and Davies begin by asserting that international 
rules and norms do have an influence on national policy. This influence is exerted when 
domestic political actors incorporate international regime values and belief systems in the
i:w
Lisa Martin and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies of 
International Institutions,” International Organization. Vol. 52 no. 4, Autumn 1998, p. 747.
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standard operational procedures of bureaucracies as well as when regime values and 
norms are incorporated in domestic laws and policy measures.140
International regimes become more relevant in the context of bureaucratic 
conflicts. When bureaucratic actors or societal groups choose to question the legitimacy 
of a competing position or seek to justify an unpopular position, each side in the conflict 
may appeal to international regime rules and norms to justify its particular stance. The act 
of bringing international regime norms and rules in the national policy debate, the authors 
note, is a strategy that has been frequently employed by both bureaucrats and interest 
groups in their attempts to influence policy outcomes.
For such a strategy to successfully affect policy outcomes, Cortell and Davis note 
that two conditions must be present. First, the issue around which the conflict is 
generated, and on behalf of which the international rules or norms are being appealed, 
must be a salient issue. Second, the appropriate domestic decision-making structure that 
fosters societal penetration must also exist. The authors classify the range of possible 
domestic decision-making structures along two continua. The first continuum is the 
degree of centralization of the decision-making authority whereby decision-making 
institutions may be centralized to decentralized. The second continuum is the pattern of
140
Andrew' P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr. "How' Do International Institutions 
Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms." in International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol 40 No. 4 Dec. 1996. pp 451-454.
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state-society relations that relate to the issue to be considered whereby the relations 
between state and society may either be distant to the decision-making process or close. 
These two categories result in four types of decision-making structures (Fig. 2-3).141 
These structures are centralized states with distant societal relations, centralized states 
with close societal relations, decentralized states with distant societal relations and 
decentralized states with close societal relations. Type I and Type II structures are 
centralized decision-making units that involve fewer bureaucratic players while type III 
and Type IV are decentralized involving more bureaucratic players. Type I and Type II 
structures are expected to be more independent of international regimes where decision­
makers are unlikely to appeal to international rules and norms to validate their positions 
whereas Type III and Type IV, are more likely to appeal to international rules and norms 
to validate their positions.
Ibid, p. 457.
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Type I and Type III are distant structures where decision-makers may or may not 
make appeals to relevant international rules and norms to validate their positions, 
depending on the salience of the issue. If they do appeal to international rules and norms, 
their appeal may or may not be successful. In Type II and IV structures where there are
Figure 2-2: Cortell and Davis’ typology of domestic structural contents
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T y p e  III T y p e  TV
close relations with societal actors, societal actors are more inclined to appeal to 
international rules and norms to influence policy outcomes. When there are close societal 
relations, in the event of domestic conflict, the international regime rules and norms 
become central to the resolution of the conflict. The successful appeal to international 
regime rules and norms to resolve the conflict, Cortell and Davis argue, is more likely to 
occur in a decentralized decision-making environment where societal groups play a role 
and when one side appeals to international regime rules and norms to legitimize its 
position. This is especially relevant when
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...the societal actor utilized a domestic procedure that sets in motion the 
prescriptions of an international institution. In this case, the institutional 
arrangements linking societal actors to the policy process serve a dual role, 
not only enabling societal actors to invoke the international rule, but also 
according them a legal right by which to elicit the government's 
implementation of the rule's prescription.142
Risse-Kappen’s analysis of domestic output addresses the one major shortcoming 
of Cortell and Davis. Like that of Cortell and Davis, the author’s analysis seeks to 
determine under what domestic and international conditions transnational actors and 
coalitions will induce policy change in a specific issue-area. The author identifies two 
factors that affect the ability of transnational actors and coalitions to successfully 
determine state policy. The first factor is the degree of international institutionalization of 
the issue-area. International institutionalization is defined as “the extent to which the 
specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or 
international organizations.”143 The more the issue-area is regulated by international
Cortell and Davis, p. 457
143
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction” 
in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In : Nonstate Actors. 
Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA : 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.6.
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Figure 2-3: Tvpes of Structures and Countries Investigated
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Structures, and International Institutions, p. 23.
regime norms of cooperation, the more “permeable” the domestic society becomes as a 
result of these transnational activities.144
The second factor that impacts domestic outcomes is differences in domestic 
structures. Domestic structure is the avenue that facilitates the penetration of transnational 
actors into the political system. Risse-Kappen’s domestic structure consists of three 
elements: a) the structure of the state, b) the structure of society and c) the policy 
network. The state may be centralized or fragmented, the society may be weak or strong, 
and the policy network may be consensual or polarized. From this scheme emerge six
144 Ibid, p. 5.
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types of domestic structures: state-controlled, state-dominated, stalemate, corporatist, 
society-dominated and fragile.145
The state-controlled structure is highly centralized with strong government and 
weak societal organizations to which belong the USSR, East Germany and Romania.
Here, the society is too weak to counter the power of the state. State-dominated, on the 
other hand, also possesses a strong state and centralized domestic structures. In this 
category we find Singapore, South Korea, Zimbabwe. However the political culture and 
societal organizations provide more of a challenge to the power of the state than exists 
under the state-controlled structure. Under the stalemate domestic structure, to which 
belong India and pre-1989 Hungary, a strong state faces strong social organizations in a 
decision-making system that is highly polarized.
In the context of weak state structures, the corporatist structure is one that 
operates in the face of powerful social organizations where continuous bargaining takes 
place, the resuit of which is often compromise. Here, Risse-Kappen places the Japanese 
state. The society-dominated system, also possessing a weak state, consists of 
fragmented and decentralized government where there are strong societal interest groups. 
Here we find Hong Kong, the Philippines, and the USA. To this category, this author 
adds Jamaican. Finally, fragile domestic structures are also systems that possess
Ibid, pp. 22-24.
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fragmented state institutions and weak social organizations. In this category, we find 
Kenya and Russia. Based on these ideal types, Risse-Kappen makes the following 
conclusion. Given similar international conditions, variation in the policy impact of 
transnational actors will be determined by differences in domestic structures. It is the 
domestic structures, the author argues, that “mediate, filter, and refract the efforts by 
transnational actors and alliances to influence policies in the various issue-areas.”146
Risse-Kappen also notes that two hurdles must be overcome in order for 
transnational actors to affect policy outcomes. First, they must gain access to the domestic 
political system. Their ability to gain access is largely a function of the domestic 
structure. Access is most difficult in state-dominated or controlled structures, and easiest 
in fragile or society-dominated structures. In state-controlled domestic structures, 
governments have the freedom to restrict transnational access, whereas in fragmented 
states the governments are less capable of preventing transnational activities. In society- 
dominated and fragile structures, transnational actors have easy access and are able to 
penetrate the political system.
While access is a necessary first step to control of policy outcomes, Risse-Kappen 
notes, it is not sufficient to achieve the desired outcome. The second hurdle and necessary 
step is generating winning coalitions or alliances among social groups that lead to the
Ibid, p. 25.
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implementation of predetermined policy objectives. The structure of the state is what 
determines the ability to not only gain access, but more important, to form winning 
coalitions.147
The third, and important element which, the author argues, plays an important role 
in mediating the policy impact of transnational actors is international structures of 
governance. The more institutionalized and regulated the international environment, the 
more transnational activities are expected to flourish and the less national governments 
should be able to constrain them. However, in an atmosphere that is unregulated by 
international agreements, domestic structures should account “almost exclusively” for the 
differences in policy impact, the author notes.148
International institutions, the author argues, are expected to facilitate the access of 
transnational actors to the national policymaking process and increase the availability of 
channels which transnational actors can use to target domestic structures in order that 
they might influence national outcomes. In so doing they reduce the effects of domestic 
structures on domestic outcomes. International regimes and organizations provide the 
channels into the domestic political systems which domestic structures might otherwise 
limit. The author concludes that international institutions facilitate access to national 
political processes, enabling the creation of transgovernmental networks. Secondly,
147 Ibid, p. 29.
148 Ibid, p. 30.
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international institutions in the respective issue-area are expected to reduce the coalition- 
building requirements for transnational coalitions, particularly those advocating norm 
compliance.149
Risse-Kappen’s analysis identified three important elements that affect domestic 
output. First is the nature of the domestic decision-making structure and the ability of 
societal actors to gain access to that structure. The second is the international structure of 
the issue and the extent to which the issue is regulated and institutionalized. Third is the 
ability of societal groups to generate winning coalitions in order to achieve desired policy 
objectives.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that Jamaica’s failure to liberalize the 
domestic telecommunications satellite regime by acquiring the domestic license for the 
operation of the US separate satellite system at a time when economic liberalization had 
permeated the global economy can be explained by three characteristics of the domestic 
satellite sector. First, the sector’s monopoly was control by the Cable and 
Wireless/Jamintel partnership which doubled as supplier of telecommunications services 
as well as Intelsat signatories doubled as enforcers of the rules of the international 
satellite regime. Intelsat’s structure was one in which signatories occupy the dual role as
Ibid, p. 32.
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both rule-makers and rule enforcers in the international satellite sector. Their rule-making 
function occurred within the Intelsat global context whereas their rule-enforcement 
function is carried out within the confines of the domestic telecommunications sector.
Second, Cable and Wireless/Jamintel partnership maintained a close relationship 
with the state regulatory institution. This relationship allowed the partners the dual 
capacity to effectively nullify the rules of the system by simply failing to enforce them. 
Therefore, while the mandate of the new separate system policy was to create a 
competitive environment, Jamintel’s mandate was to eliminate competition. As the 
environment gave way to a new climate of liberalization internationally, the new 
competitive climate were at odds with the interest of domestic telecommunications 
companies, such as Jamintel. Therefore, despite approvals from both Intelsat and the 
FCC, Jamaica remained within the Intelsat due to pressures from Cable and Wireless, 
COMSAT and Telephone Company of Jamaica to maintain a closed domestic industry.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOM M UNICATIONS SATELLITE 
ORGANIZATION (INTELSAT)
Introduction
For two decades the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 
(Intelsat) stood at the apex of the global satellite system and played a major role in 
international and domestic satellite decisions. From- its inception in 1963, it oversaw and 
regulated all aspects of international and domestic transactions, requiring domestic 
authorization prior to all transactions involving satellite technology. As a result, 
Jamaica’s decision to broke new ground in international satellite communications by 
using a non-Intelsat satellite company warranted their intervention and prior approval. 
Jamaica’s decision therefore had international as well as domestic repercussions.
This is the first of two chapters which lay the international foundation on which 
Jamaica’s decision to establish the Digiport decision using a competitive domestic 
satellite system must be understood. It has two objectives. First, it outlines the historical 
evolution of the Intelsat system that led to new rules and regulations among which was 
the decision to allow competition. This history includes a look at the conditions that
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produced the new separate satellite systems and policies supporting them - all of which 
were at the heart of the tensions that Jamaica experienced as it sought to liberalize its 
satellite sector. The chapter examines the implications of these changes on Jampro’s 
decision to liberalize the provision of satellite services and the implications it had on 
international politics.
Secondly, this chapter also analyses the structure of Intelsat and the role played by 
signatories within that structure. That role conditioned their domestic preferences on the 
issue of telecommunications liberalizing within the domestic satellite sector. It provides 
the foundation for understanding the way in which the Intelsat monopoly regime 
impinged on the outcome of the Jamaica Digiport decision and the closing of the sector. 
The chapter presents the view that the decision of the Intelsat signatories Cable and 
Wireless and Jamintel to close the sector was one which benefitted the Intelsat and 
provided its signatories with a motivation to maintain a closed sector. Chapter Four 
examines the changing satellite market over which Intelsat presided.
The Intelsat System
It began as an international intergovernmental organization when a group of 18 
industrial nations attempted to meet their own domestic and international satellite needs 
and the needs of other nations in the world. This intergovernmental organization was 
established to function as a global satellite monopoly. In addition to government 
representatives, its primary members also included national telecommunications
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
companies which collectively owned and operated Intelsat’s communications satellite 
system. The purpose of the organization was cooperatively to provide uninterrupted 
global satellite services to all interested nations.
The Intelsat satellite system consists of a two segments: space segment and an 
earth segment. Together they comprise the equipment required for the transmission of 
Intelsat services. The space segment consists of 15 satellites in geosynchronous orbit 
above the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Geostationary satellites are located 
exactly 22,238 miles above the Equator. At that orbit the satellites rotate at the same 
speed as the earth, making them perfectly synchronized with the earth stations that send 
messages back and forth between them. The space segment is fully owned by Intelsat. 
Member nations possess investment shares in the space segment based on their respective 
use of the satellite system. Nations with high telecommunications volume such as the 
United States possess a larger number of shares of the space segment than smaller 
developing nations whose level of usage is relatively lower. The United States’ signatory, 
Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), owns the largest proportion, 61% of  
total shares.
Intelsat has made great strides in the development of its space segment. The first 
satellite for commercial use, Intelsat I, was launched and placed in orbit in April 1965 
over the Atlantic. A second set of satellites, the Intelsat II series, was launched two years 
later, placing two satellites in orbit over the Atlantic and two over the Pacific.
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Components of the third series, Intelsat III, were launched between 1968 and 1969 and 
were placed in orbit over the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.
The Intelsat IV series of satellite were launched in 1970 at Cape Canaveral. It had the 
capacity of transmitting six thousand telephone calls and twelve simultaneous television 
programs. It was designed by Hughes Aircraft Company. By 1984, Intelsat had launched 
five new generations of satellites, each generation more powerful in their capabilities and 
more extensive in their global reach. Six new Intelsat V satellites were in operation. In 
addition to the newer generation, the number of earth stations also increased from five in 
the United States, France, Great Britain, West Germany and Italy, to 300 stations in 146 
countries in 1982.1'>0
The ground segment consists of each nation’s earth stations. Intelsat has 
established the standards for earth stations to which each signatory is bound to comply. 
Adhering to these standards allows the proper transmission of services to more than 1600 
earth station-to-earth station paths. Communications between the earth stations and the 
satellites have resulted in the existence of more than two thousand paths that transmit 
services between satellites and earth stations for business users located in the member 
nations. Services include television, telephone, data, telex, facsimile and specific business 
services such as video conferencing, electronic mail and high speed data services. 
Intelsat’s services are made available to all member nations at the same rate regardless of
15 0
Edward Plowman, Space, Earth and Communication (Westport: Quorum Books,
1984) p. 82.
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a nation's membership status. Membership is extended to any nation which is a member 
of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). While Intelsat owns the space 
segment, the earth stations are owned and operated by the signatories or 
telecommunications companies of the countries in which they are located.
The Origin of Intelsat
In 1962, partly as a result of the reaction of Congress to the 1957 launch of the 
Soviet satellite, Sputnik, and partly to advance its own fledgling space program, the 
United States took the initiative in forming Intelsat by passing the Communications 
Satellite Act.1’1 The Act stated that:
...it is the policy of the United States to establish, in conjunction and in 
cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable, a 
commercial communications network, which will be responsive to public 
needs and national objectives, which will serve the communications needs 
of the United States and other countries, and which will contribute to 
world peace and understanding.152
151
Richard R. Collino, “Global Politics and Intelsat: The conduct of Foreign 
Relations in an Electronically Interconnected World,” Telecommunications Journal 
September 1986, pp. 195-208.
152 Section 102 of the United States Communications Act of 1962.
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In late 1962, the U.S. began preliminary discussions with the United Kingdom and 
Canada, followed by a series of negotiations with the nations of western Europe,
Australia, Canada and Japan,
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Tabic 3-1: INTELSAT'S FOUNDING MEMBERS















Sweden January 18, 1965 0.604
Switzerland 23635 1.22
United Kingdom 23608 7.245
United States 23608 52.6
Vatican City 23608 0.043
Source: Comsat Annual Report, 1970, pp. 101-106 
*date on which agreement was signed
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to determine the specifics of the new organization. The new organization was formed 
with eighteen member nations (Table 3-1), which together controlled more than 80% of 
world telephone traffic.
The US Communications Satellite Act authorized the creation of Comsat to 
provide the United States with official representation to Intelsat. Comsat had as its head a 
fifteen-man board of directors. Six of these were appointed by the United States Congress 
to represent the public shareholders, three were appointed by the President and six were 
appointed representatives of carrier shareholders. Of the six carrier representatives, three 
represented AT&T, two represented ITT, and one represented the Hawaiian 
Telecommunications Company (HTC). By 1969, ITT and HTC had sold their shares in 
Comsat to the public, giving up their seats on the Board and leaving AT&T as the only 
common carrier with representation on the board.
Organizational Structure: the Old Agreement
Early discussions between COMSAT and the founding member states resulted in 
the establishment of specific guidelines within which the organization would function. 
These early discussions yielded two separate but interrelated agreements: a) the 
intergovernmental “Agreement Establishing an Interim Arrangement for a Global 
Commercial Communications Satellite System" or Interim Agreement and b) the “Special 
Agreement and Supplementary Agreement on Arbitration’’ or Special Agreement. Both 
agreements resulted in the creation of a four-part organizational structure. This structure
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consisted of a) the consortium of states, b) the consortium of signatories c) the executive 
organ, the fCSC, and d) the manager Comsat. This four-part structure was put in effect in 
August of 1964.153
The Interim Agreement created a consortium of member states, whereas the 
Special Agreement authorized the creation of a consortium of officially-designated 
national telecommunications agencies or signatories. Signatories range from 100% 
government-owned operations to 100% private enterprises, such as Comsat. The Special 
Agreement also assigned ownership of the Intelsat space segment to the signatories “in 
proportion to their respective contributions to the costs of the design, development, 
construction and establishment of the space segment.”1'’4 Both state representatives and 
signatories shared the responsibilities of establishing and implementing long range policy 
goals and objectives.
153
United States Department of State, “Agreement Establishing Interim Agreements 
for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System,” Treaties and International 
Acts Series. No. 5646, Article VIII.
154 Ibid, Article HI.
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The Interim and Special Agreements authorized the establishment of two 
additional bodies, an executive body and a manager. The Interim Communications 
Satellite Committee (ICSC) served as the executive body while Comsat served as the
Figure 3-1: The Organization and Services of Intelsat in 1970
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manager. The ICSC established guidelines on operational issues such as the criteria for 
joining, the use of services by nonmembers, payment of dues and penalties for lack of 
payment, withdrawal from the organization, minimum shares, procurement matters ancl 
the rights and obligations of Signatories and Parties. Decision-making in the ICSC was 
achieved by voting. Each nation’s vote was equivalent to its ownership share or use of 
Intelsat's space segment. Comsat controlled 61% of the organization's shares; the 
European nations controlled 30%; and the remaining 9% was owned by Canada, Australia
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and Japan combined. Because of its technical expertise, Comsat agreed to assume the role 
of manager.
In the first decade of its operation, the organization’s decision-making was 
plagued by disagreements. Disagreements revolved around three major issues. The first 
was whether Comsat was in fact exercising excessive control over Intelsat with limited or 
no accountable to Intelsat’s members. Accusations of excessive control emerged from 
European nations, led by France. Europeans perceived a conflict of interest between 
Comsat’s role as the majority shareholder of the Intelsat space segment and its role as the 
space-segment manager. The Europeans members argued that Comsat’s decisions were 
designed to maximize Comsat’s gain vis-a-vis the other service providers. As a result, 
Comsat’s research and development decisions were viewed with suspicion, being 
perceived instead as directed towards maximizing its Comsat’s corporate profits rather 
than those of the international community. I;,?
A second range of issues revolve around the growing power imbalances between 
developing nations and industrialized nations within the organization. Since decision­
making was allotted according to ownership shares and since more than 80% of the 
shares were owned by the industrialized nations, the organization’s control rested heavily 
in the hands of the industrialized nations and to whom also accrued the sector’s profits.
155
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Developing nations desired that Intelsat begin to address the growing concerns of 
inequity within the organization and look for ways in which this issue could be resolved 
to the satisfaction of all.156
The third issue of concern was the structure of the international 
telecommunications satellite system itself. Comsat continued preference was for the 
single global system despite opposition whereas others sought the liberalization of the 
international satellite regime by allowing the operation of separate satellite systems.157 
Separate systems were privately owned communications satellite system established to 
provide new or specialized communications needs outside of the Intelsat system, that led 
to the opening of the international telecommunications market to outside competition.158 
Whereas in the United States and several European nations there were considerable 
domestic pressures in support of separate satellite systems, Europeans, nevertheless 
preferred the establishment of their own regional systems where they could control 
decisions concerning research and development and technological innovation.159
15f>
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157 Ibid
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The New Operating Agreement
By 1973 when Intelsat’s membership had grown from the original 18 members to 
83, they met to negotiate a new set of agreements, the Operating Agreement that replaced 
the temporary Interim Agreement. The Operating Agreement was established as a 
mechanism through which the organization attempted to address the issues of Comsat 
control, the power imbalance between states and the issue of access to the global market. 
The new agreement maintained the four-tier structure which consisted of a) the Assembly 
of Parties, b) the Meeting of Signatories, c) the new Executive Organ of the Board of
Figure 3-2: The Organization and Services of Intelsat in 1989
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Governors which met four times per year, and d) Intelsat’s management led by the new
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Director General.160 Under this new arrangement, the Board of Governors replaced the 
Interim Communications Satellite Committee, and the Director General replaced Comsat.
The newly created Assembly of Parties consisted of a representative from each 
member state as it did under the old arrangement. Representatives met every two years to 
transact the business of the organization and to discuss constitutional matters and long 
term issues. Voting in the Assembly was based on a one-nation one-vote policy allowing 
all nations equal representation. A two-thirds vote was required formally to approve 
decisions that came before the Assembly.
The Meeting of Signatories convened annually to discuss technical, financial and 
operational matters. Like the Assembly of Parties, the Meeting of Signatories, had a one- 
nation one-vote policy. Membership was open to any ITU nation or its signatory that 
wished to join. Membership continued to increase annually as states sought to avail 
themselves of the benefits of access to and use of the space segment.
The Board of Governors, which replaced the ICSC, consisted of twenty-seven 
members chosen by the Assembly of Parties to reflect the geographic diversity of the 
organization. The Board’s responsibilities were to supervise the organization’s mandate
160
United States Department of State, “International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization, Agreement between Intelsat and united States of America,’’ Treaties and 
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to design, develop, construct, establish, operate and maintain the Intelsat space segment 
and any other activities upon which Intelsat was authorized to embark. The Board 
established a new system of voting that allowed all nations representation. Unlike the 
ICSC, where a system of weighed voting tied a nation’s voting power to its level of 
investment, the new arrangement limited large investors such as the United States, which 
possessed more than 40% of Intelsat shares, from exercising more than 40% of the vote, 
opening the way for the inclusion of other nations in decision-making. Under this new 
arrangement, representation on the Board was not limited to nations with large amounts 
of shares, but was open to any nation that possessed more than 1.5% of shares.
For those nations whose shares fell below the 1.5% minimum range for board 
representation, the Board reserved five additional seats as set-asides. These set-asides 
could have been used by either the individual nation whose shares fell below the 
minimum or by a group of nations who, together, failed to fulfill the minimum of shares 
required for representation on the Board. Nations below the range were permitted to form 
coalitions with similar nations to gain representation on the Board or to increase the level 
of representation that they already possessed. This new arrangement was designed to 
prevent excessive influence by a small number of large investors and to prevent the 
exclusion of small developing states. The new voting rule also created a wider geographic 
base, allowing more developing nations representation on the Board for the first time 
(Appendix I).
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The fourth structure, an Executive Organ, was established in Washington, D.C., 
under the leadership of the Director General. Appointed by the Board of Governors, the 
Director General, was the new structure that had been created to replace Comsat as 
manager of Intelsat and reported directly to the Board of Governors,. The manager was 
responsible for technical staffing, budget and finance, administration, and other 
operational functions. Comsat continued to function as Management Services Contractor 
of technical affairs until 1979. After 1979, its role have been reduced to that of an 
independent contractor as the Director General’s office assumed Comsat’s managerial 
role.
The role of the manager was to “design, develop, construct, establish, maintain, 
and operate the space segment of a the global commercial communications satellite 
system.”161 To bring greater accountability to the process, however, the Director General 
appointed foreign staff “assignees” for specified periods and created a committee to 
review all Comsat decisions. Foreign “assignees” were non-U.S. staff appointed to create 
a more nationally diverse institution. The review process continued until Comsat’s role of 
Management Services Contractor ended in 1979.162 It was successful in ensuring that 
Comsat’s influence was reduced.
See Collino. The INTELSAT System, p. 61.
Ibid p. 62.
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Separate Systems and International Satellite Communication.
The Intelsat monopoly persisted virtually unchallenged in the first two decades 
following its inception, occasionally making allowances for other suppliers to provide 
services under specified conditions. However, in 1984, the deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry in many industrialized nations resulted in a plethora of new 
satellite suppliers seeking to enter the world market. As the AT&T monopoly was 
dismantled, in the United States, satellite companies such as PanAmSat, Orion and 
Tel star, emerged and petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for 
approval to provide satellite services to the global community. Pressures from these new 
firms resulted in the introduction of the first separate satellite system rule in the United 
States which permitted new companies to operate under specified conditions. This new 
rule posed the first real threat to the stability of the Intelsat monopoly.
Despite the domestic opposition of the new firms to the international satellite 
monopoly, their presence, however, was not enough to erode Intelsat’s domination of the 
global satellite market monopoly. Intelsat’s continued dominance can best be explained 
by structural characteristics of the international satellite sector which distinguishes it 
from other international regimes. Since Intelsat’s inception, the national signatories have 
played a central decision-making role through Intelsat’s Meeting of Signatories. All 
decisions to allow competition in the global satellite market have to meet with their 
approval. Intelsat’ structure allowed national telecommunications suppliers to play 
significant decision-making roles while being isolated from bureaucratic politics in
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member states. This structure empowered signatories to selectively restrict competition 
from nonlntelsat suppliers.
The tensions over the issue of separate satellite systems was addressed in the new 
agreement was that of competition within the global system. In the first decade of its 
operation, competition in the provision of international satellite services was prohibited. 
However, in the second decade of its operation, the consensus around this position began 
to erode, creating major disagreements among members as to how the international 
satellite system should and would be organized. The resistance to the Intelsat monopoly 
system emerged in the second decade of the organizations and had its roots among the 
Europeans.
The United States’ initial support for a single global system was based on 
technical and commercial criteria: “There are political, economic and technical reasons 
for the basic United States objective of a single global system.... With a single global 
system, there would be avoidance of major problems of interference, and more efficient 
use of the frequency spectrum.”163 As a result, the parties to the Interim Agreement agreed 
a single global telecommunications system and agreed not to participate in any satellite 
system other than Intelsat. The agreement did acknowledge that there might be times 
when other satellite systems would be needed in order to meet the unique needs of some 
governments or that the creation of separate satellite systems might be necessary for the
163 Kildrow, p. 59.
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sake of the national interest. While allowances were made for such needs, nevertheless 
the overriding mandate was a commitment to the monopoly system that discourages 
competing satellite systems.
The European discontent stemmed from a distrust of COMSAT’s control of 
research and development and its control of contracts for services. l64They argued that 
separate satellite systems would achieve greater operational flexibility at a substantially 
lower cost when compared to that of using Intelsat services, and that Carriers could 
provide business data and video distribution services at a comparatively lower cost .lfo 
Separate systems, they argue, would stimulate technological innovation, improve 
network efficiency, reduce user costs and create new business opportunities resulting in 
major benefits for the public without economic harm to Intelsat. Intelsat would not be 
harmed economically, they argued, because the proposed separate systems would be 
established only in areas in which Intelsat did not operate and had no intention of 
operating in the future.166
Comsat deeply opposed the operation of separate satellite systems. Comsat argued 
that separate systems seeking to enter the global market were from companies that were
164 Ibid.
165
INTELSAT, “Flexibility to Complete: INTELSAT in an Era of Separate 
Systems,” Addendum No. 1 to BG-63-39E B/6/85, August 19, 1985.
166 Ibid.
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supplying the same technology and services as those provided by Intelsat, resulting in a 
loss of traffic and revenue for Intelsat. The consequences, Comsat argues, was be an 
increase in Intelsat’s rates with devastating consequences for developing nations.167
Despite its objections, Comsat acquiesced to separate systems within the Intelsat 
framework under certain circumstances. The system had to be technically compatible 
with Intelsat, should not result in loss of income or traffic for Intelsat, and must not 
interfere with Intelsat’s ability to carry out its primary function, which is to transmit 
voice, record and data traffic. These conditions were established as the criteria for 
Intelsat’s approval of separate satellite systems.168 However, Comsat maintained its 
opposition to regional satellite systems.
In March of 1983, in reaction to the impending breakup of AT&T and the 
creation of competition in the United States’ telecommunications industry, the FCC 
received petitions from several United States’ firms for authorization to establish separate 
satellite systems independent of Intelsat. These petitions (Table 2) prompted the FCC to 
reexamine existing US policy to determine whether separate systems should be allowed 
to operate in light of existing laws, treaties and foreign policy. As a result, in 1985, the
167 Ibid
168
These recommendations came out of the Report of the Twentieth Century Task 
Force, op. cit.
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FCC establish a committee to review the concerns of separate satellite systems and to 
propose changes in United States’ international satellite policy established in 1963.
The outcome of the review was President Reagan’s 1984 Presidential 
Determination Number 85-2, which marked the beginning of a monumental shift in US 
policy when the Federal
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Table 3-2: United States Companies Licensed, Operational, and with Applications
Pending to Provide International Satellite Communications Services (1984- 
1994)
Type of System Licensed Operational Unlicensed, with
Application
Pending
Geostationary169 4 4 0
Big LEO170 3 0 3
Little LEO171 3 1 6
Broadcasting satellite services172 0 0 1
28 Gigahertz frequency or higher173 0 0 11
Source: The United States general A ccounting Office, Telecommunications: Com petition Issues in 
International Satellite Com munications. W ashington, D.C.: NTIS, October 1996), page 27.
169
These satellite systems were located 22,300 miles above the earth and operated on 
the C band (4 to 6 gigahertz portion of the spectrum) and the Ku band (12 to 14 gigahertz 
of the spectrum).
170
Big LEOs transmitted radio signals above i gigahertz portion of the spectrum. 
These satellite systems were generally used to send voice and facsimile, as well as data 
transmissions.
171
Little LEOs transmitted radio signals below 1 gigahertz on the spectrum. These 
satellite systems were generally used to send only non-voice data transmissions.
172
These satellites are geostationary but were licensed by the FCC under a separate 
licensing category. They offer one-way communications. These satellites were not in 
competition with Intelsat.
173
These satellite systems were either geostationary or LEOs. Their services included 
on-demand data or video applications directly to the home. These satellite services were 
also not in competition with Intelsat.
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Communications Commission (FCC) authorized the operation of alternative satellite 
systems for reasons of national security.174 These private commercial international 
satellite systems were permitted to independent of the Intelsat system. The new FCC 
policy included the following restrictions established by Intelsat to prevent new suppliers 
from undermining the flow of traffic and profits to the Intelsat system:
a) separate systems may not interconnect directly or indirectly with the 
existing public-switched network, that is, the Intelsat network,
b) separate systems operators cannot operate common carriers, that is, 
providers of telephone and telex services
c) the use of separate systems by United States carriers require 
authorization from the FCC in accordance with Section 214 of the 
Communications Act of 1934.17:1
The FCC's decision authorizing the operation of United States domestic separate 
systems was met with a variety of responses. The United Kingdom supported the 
introduction of competition:
174
Senior Interagency Group on International Communication and Information 
Policy. A White Paper on New International Satellite Systems (Springfield, Va: National 
Technical Information Services, 1985).
17?
Federal Communications Commission, “Separate satellite Systems for 
International Communications: In the Matter of Establishing Satellite Systems Providing 
International Communications,’’ 101 F.C.C. 2d 1046 (1985), pp 290-291.
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It is the United Kingdom's continuing strong commitment to Intelsat as 
the principal organization responsible for the provision of global satellite 
facilities for international communications. [However its support of 
separate systems] was clearly consistent with the United Kingdom 
government's support for the development of competing international 
telecommunications systems, both satellite and cable, in response to 
market needs. .. .Intelsat must be prepared to meet competition.176
The position of the FCC and its counterpart in the United Kingdom conflicted
greatly with the principles, norms and values of the Intelsat regime. As Intelsat’s Director
General stated in his response:
It is well known that Intelsat Governments (Parties) and 
telecommunications entities (Signatories) have steadfastly opposed any 
change in the policy embodied in the Intelsat Agreements which provides 
for the establishment and operation of a single global communications 
satellite system. These member Governments and telecommunications 
authorities have expressed both outright opposition to the authorization of 
separate international communications satellite systems apart from 
Intelsat, and serious reservations about the change in U.S. policy reflected 
in the 28 November Presidential Determination. They have communicated 
both directly with appropriate agencies of the United States’ Government 
and through the passage of unanimous resolutions by the Assembly of
176
A letter to the Director General of Intelsat dated August 22, 1986 from Mr. Robert 
Priddle of the United Kingdom department of Trade and Industry in response to an 
inquiry from Intelsat regarding the United Kingdom’s position on separate systems.
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Parties, the principal organ of Intelsat, and the Meeting of Signatories,
representing the investing telecommunications entities of Intelsat.177
Intelsat remained committed to a single global system with limited use of separate 
satellite systems despite growing domestic pressures for change. Even the ensuing 
changes in domestic policy we see in the United States, Great Britain and will see in 
Jamaica, were insufficient to alter Intelsat’s fundamental operating principle of a single 
global system which remained intact. The principle of the separate satellite system did not 
take root in Intelsat despite the proliferation of private satellite companies (Appendix III) 
and changes in the domestic policy of its representatives. National representatives 
continued to maintain strong support for a single global system. While national 
governments continued to press for the use of separate systems, rather than resulting in 
changes in Intelsat policy, domestic pressures and domestic policy changes only resulted 
in an inconsistency between domestic policy on separate systems and that of the 
principles and norms of the international regime and states’ representatives.
Inconsistencies between domestic satellite policy and the position of national 
signatories within Intelsat can be attributed to the organizational structure of Intelsat. At 
the heart of the inconsistency were the Intelsat structures the Meeting of Signatories and 
the Meeting of Parties. The signatories were the primary decision-makers as well as the
177
INTELSAT, “INTELSAT Director General Statement on United States’ Actions 
Regarding Separate Satellite Systems," BG-64-76E. August 19, 1985.
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organization’s principal investors in the Intelsat system and therefore sought to maintain 
and protect its investment. The signatories’ interests were clearly enhanced by the 
preservation of the Intelsat monopoly. The Assembly of Parties is also empowered to 
protect the organization’s investments. Intelsat’s structure therefore functions to protect 
the status quo of a single global system and deter entry of competition or any changes that 
are inconsistent with the investment goals of the organization.
International Telecommunications System and International Regime Change
To summarize the dynamics of the first three decades of the organization’s 
existence - first, the regime experienced a significant growth in membership during its 
first three decades. The new members, which consisted mostly of developing nations, 
sought more of a voice in the organization. While these developing nations sought to 
increase their power, they echoed the European nations’ demand for a reduction in the 
power and influence of Comsat.
The number of new states seeking to participate in the governance of the satellite 
regime was only surpassed by the number of new firms seeking to enter the global 
satellite market. The new firms posed a threat to the single global satellite system as it 
sought to end the Intelsat monopoly. While the needs of developing states and the new 
firms placed new demands for change on Intelsat, the developing states were initially 
more successful in realizing their objective of reducing Comsat’s influence.
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One analysis that proves useful in explaining why new states were more 
successful than the new firms within the international satellite regime is Stephen 
Krasner’s analysis of international regime change.I7S In his analysis, Krasner argues that 
there are two kinds of changes that occur in an international regime - internal and external 
regime changes. Internal regime change is where there are changes in regime principles 
and norms and changes that occur in rules and procedures.179 By contrast, external regime 
changes occur where there are changes in principles and norms. This latter change, 
Krasner argues, constitutes a change in the regime itself. On the other hand, Krasner 
argued that a lack of coherence in a regime’s principles, norms, rules or decision-making 
procedures results in the weakening of the regime, making the regime less coherent or 
highly inconsistent.
The Intelsat members were successful in negotiating the Definitive Agreement. It 
introduced changes in the organization’s rules and decision-making procedures. These 
changes constituted the successful internal adjustment that occurred in Intelsat’s internal 
organizational structure. These changes in the Definitive Agreement were the outcome of 
the inclusion of the growing number of developing nations in the organization’s decision­
making and the reduction of the control of the largest member, the United States. The
178
Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables” in Stephen D. Krasner eel., International Regimes (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1983) pp 3-4.
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Agreement reflected internal regime adjustments rather than regime change and was 
successful in making significant adjustments to Intelsat’s rules and decision-making 
procedures.
The Agreement was not an attempt to transform the regime’s single global system 
structure. The separate satellite system policy, on the other hand, constituted an attempt to 
fundamentally transform the regime’s character by changing its principles and norms. If 
successful, it would bring a significant transformation to the very character of the Intelsat 
system, changing it from monopoly to a more competitive system. As a result, it met with 
resistance from Comsat and those who benefitted from the monopoly system.
Conclusion
There were many changes in the international telecommunications sector in the 
1980's which impinged on the Intelsat regime. Chief among these changes was the 
deregulation of the telecommunication industry in the United States that resulted in the 
end of the AT&T monopoly. As other nations followed suit the character of the global 
telecommunications industry changed from one of monopoly control to one where 
competition became increasingly acceptable. As the industry changed globally, pressures 
from the domestic systems were exerted on Intelsat to introduce a separate systems policy 
that reflected the changes that were already evident in the international 
telecommunications regime.
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Intelsat’s national signatories, such as those of the United States, Great Britain 
and Jamaica, battled internally with competing economic interests over the introduction 
of separate satellite system into the global satellite market. Comsat had been the strongest 
major supporter for a single satellite system. However, the deregulation of the United 
States telecommunications market resulted in the creation of new competitive satellite 
firms which posed a threat to the continuation of the single global system. The use of 
separate satellite systems conflicted with the interests of national signatories and created 
the basis of conflict between domestic groups seeking their use.
Jamaica’s teleport demonstrated several features of the global satellite sector.
First, it described the obstacles inherent in the attempt by a separate satellite system to 
penetrate the Intelsat dominated global system. Second, it uncovered the mechanisms that 
were in place that serve to preserve the monopoly status quo in the face of new and 
conflicting principles that emerged to challenge the monopoly status quo that would 
undermine the liberalization of the sector. Third, the project highlights the ways in which 
transnational cooperation between satellite systems in both the United States and Jamaica 
impact the sector. The combined strategies of both Comsat, Cable and Wireless and 
Jamintel were employed to keep intact the global organizational structure of Intelsat as 
well as the national satellite sector.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SECTOR: 
ITS HISTORY AND TRANSFORMATION
Introduction
There were two kinds of changes taking place in the international 
telecommunications satellite sector in 1984. One was the change in the international 
regime which governed the sector. The second change, which precipitated the change in 
the regime was the change in the international telephone and telegraph market. The 
satellite sector had also been impacted by these significant transformations.
In 1984, when the liberalization of the global market began, the global market 
began to experience transformations in its structure, where it moved from a sector with 
few firms and significant barriers to entry to many firms and more accessible to newer 
commercial entities. Other changes can be partly attributed to technological innovations 
in the telecommunications sector and in the computer industries. These innovations 
facilitated new enterprises which brought about an increase in the number of actors 
seeking to provide services. However, Intelsat continued to place limitations on new 
entrants so that they operated within the context of governmental regulations and 
authoritative oversight.
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The chapter examines the evolution of the international satellite market from 1960 
until it experienced significant transformations in 1989 when the Digiport decision was 
implemented. It was over this market that Intelsat presided. The chapter highlights the 
technological changes that occurred within that period and discusses the implications of 
these innovations for competition and change. It sheds some light on the conflicts and 
contradictions of this sector as a result of these changes that later culminated in the 
separate satellite system policy. Finally, it reflects on the implications for competition 
within the satellite sector for the future of the Intelsat regime.
The History of the Development of the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Industry
In 1957, the Soviet Union launch its first satellite, Sputnik. This launch created an 
urgency in the United States to develop its own satellite sector. As a result, in 1960 
AT&T applied for and received an FCC license to engage in experimental satellite 
communications with the goal of implementing an operating satellite system. As a result 
of this experimentation, TELSTAR was launched in 1962. In 1963, RCA and Hughes 
Aircraft Company, both of which had also been granted the same privilege by NASA, 
also launched their projects - RELAY and SYNCOM, respectively. These innovations led 
to the passage of the US Communications Satellite Act in 1962 which authorized the 
formation of Comsat. The satellite systems of RCA and Hughes became the basis on 
which Comsat formed its operation. Then in 1965 Comsat launched its own commercial 
communications satellite, EARLY BIRD.
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These innovations in the United States prompted Canada to launch its first 
domestic communications satellite in 1972. Two years later, Western Union launched the 
first United States private domestic satellite, WESTAR. RCA also followed soon 
thereafter with the launch of a second domestic satellite, RCA SATECOM. By 1976, 
AT&T and Comsat had collaborated in the launch of the COMSTAR series of satellites 
which were intended for voice and data transmission. This satellite series provided a 
tremendous boost to the television and cable industries.
Of the satellite corporations that played a role in the emergence of the satelli te 
sector, Western Union, one of the primary forerunners of the industry, is no longer in 
existence. Hughes continues to operate and is currently a manufacturer of satellite 
systems. However, Hughes, which had partnered with GTE, in the early 1960s, now 
provides satellite services for the domestic market and does not interfere with the 
international market controlled by Intelsat. AT&T still operates satellites but is no longer 
in partnership with COMSAT.
By 1978, fourteen years after Intelsat was established, these companies began 
gearing their operations for real competition in the international telecommunications 
market. As a result, for the first time, Intelsat faced the possibility of competition from 
the new companies attempting to operate outside of the Intelsat system and furthering 
their own private pursuits. While these domestic companies were emerging, suppliers 
from other regions of the world also began to surface as another possible source of
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competition. In 1976, PALAPA, a regional system, was launched in Indonesia. The same 
year, Japan launched its domestic satellite system, followed by India in 1982 and 
Australia, Mexico and Brazil in 1985. The major challenge to Intelsat, however, came 
with the creation of Pan A mS at in 1983 and later Orion in 1984. Both firms attempted, for 
the first time, to provide services to a market dominated by Intelsat. Technological 
innovation also posed a major challenge to the Intelsat system, creating potential 
alternatives to satellite technology.
Technological Challenges
The transformation of the telecommunication sector was affected not only by the 
deregulation of the telephone and telegraph markets but also by the proliferation of 
technological innovation in fiber optics, personal communications systems and in 
maritime and mobile technology. These technological changes provided alternatives to 
satellite communications and posed a threat to Intelsat’s market. The greatest threat from 
these technological changes, however, was that they provided a point of accessibility to 
the international satellite market for potential new separate satellite systems.
The technology that had a significant impact on the satellite sector was fiber 
optics. In 1988, the first fiberoptic trans-Atlantic telephone cable, known as TAT-8, was 
laid across the Atlantic ocean. Trans-Pacific cables were soon to follow. Fiber optic 
technology had the potential of transporting a greater volume of telephone, data and video 
traffic at a significantly lower cost than satellite technology. Fiber-optics, however, unlike
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satellite technology, was designed to only relay information from point to point and not 
from point to multipoint as television broadcast technology. Nevertheless, the ability of 
fiber optics technology to transfer larger volumes of telephone calls provided an 
alternative to satellite communications.
A second innovation that directly affected the international satellite system was 
personal communications systems (PCS) technology. PCS is a new generation of wireless 
phone technology that three types of digital technology - Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA), Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM), and Time Division 
Multiple Access (TDMA).180 Digital technology is a significant improvement over the 
former analog technology. The difference is not only in the quality of the reception 
received, but also in the range of service possibilities. Digital phone technology provides 
a variety of user possibilities - wireless phone, paging, message services and data 
services. PCS technology, which operates through low earth orbit (LEO) satellites, has 
the capable of being used anywhere. The major drawback of PCS technology is that with 
the three digital technologies, phones using one of the digital technologies may not work 
on another. 181
A third technological innovation, which provided a challenge for the international 
communications satellite industry, occurred within the area of maritime and mobile
180 See http://dmsweb.badm.sc.edu/grover/telecomold/pcs home.him.
181 See http://inventors.about.com/jibrarv/weekl\7aaQ72199.him.
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technology, also. In 1976, COMSAT launched a new type of satellite — MARISAT — 
for the purpose of providing mobile services to the United States Navy and other 
maritime clients. Europe followed shortly after with the launch of MARECS. As a result 
of both endeavors, in 1979 the United Nations International Maritime Organization 
established the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) to regulate 
services in that sector in the manner similar to Intelsat. At its inception, INMARISAT 
utilized both MARISAT and MARECS, doing so until it launched its own satellites, 
INMARISAT II and INMARISAT III. The maritime and mobile telecommunications 
market for the first time offered alternative means of communication thereby posing a 
threat to the land-based satellite systems which Intelsat represented.
Competition and the International Telecommunications Satellite Industry
The gravest threat to the international telecommunications satellite industry, 
however, came from companies seeking to compete in the market with Intelsat. 
Beginning in 1983, the FCC received five applications from satellite companies seeking 
licenses to operate in the international satellite market. The companies were Pan 
American Satellite Corporation (PanAmSat), Orion Satellite Corporation. International 
Satellite Inc., RCA American Communications, and Cygnus Corporation. The FCC 
immediately began its deliberations on PanAmSat, International Satellite Inc. and 
RCA AC. However, deliberations on Orion Satellite and Cygnus were postponed until a 
later date. PanAmSat’s goal was to provide services between North America and Latin 
America while RCA’s was to provide services between the US, Europe, and Africa.
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Based on the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, satellite companies outside 
the Intelsat system were not permitted to operate unless the United States determined that 
their operation was necessary and required in the national interest. The Senior Interagency 
Group on International Communication and Information Policy was established to review 
existing policy to determine whether the operation of separate systems would be in the 
national interest. It was the recommendation of this committee that the national interest 
would be enhanced allowing the operation of separate satellite systems. As a result, on 
November 28, 1984, the president of the United States issued a determination which 
permitted the operation of separate satellite systems on the grounds that they enhance the 
national interest.182
Prior to the November 1984 declaration, United States firms faced restrictions 
from both Intelsat and the FCC that limited their ability to provide satellite services 
internationally. They were allowed to compete only in the area of television broadcasting, 
video, data and voice transmission. They were restricted from entry into any area of 
telephone services between companies and individuals that involved the use of local 
telephone services. This restriction resulted in the protection of 85% of Intelsat's income 
since firms were allowed to operate on condition that the services they provided caused 
neither technical nor economic hardship to Intelsat.183
Department of State Bulletin, Communications Satellite Systems, 1985.
New York Times, July 26, 1985.
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United States firms providing satellite services overseas encountered additional 
restrictions imposed by foreign regulatory agencies which limited their overseas 
operation. As a result of these restrictive policies, these companies diverted their efforts 
from providing telephone services into operating private communications networks and 
providing international television and video services.184 Both markets, particularly the 
international television and video market have been the least restrictive of the 
telecommunications markets and where private firms have managed to create a niche.
The international television and video market can be distinguished by regional and 
international or transoceanic broadcasts. United States firms as well as foreign firms have 
found the market for regional broadcasts more profitable and traditionally have formed a 
market characterized by fewer restrictions than the telephone service market. As a result, 
this market became an area of growth for satellite service providers. The international and 
transoceanic broadcasts market, however, was largely controlled by Intelsat which 
continued to dominate the television and broadcast market due to its excess capacity, its 
market access and its size. Services such as local news media, transmitting news from one 
region to another, generally relied on Intelsat services, so fewer providers emerged in this 
area.
As a result of Intelsat’s dominance in transoceanic broadcasting, regional 
broadcasters tended not to develop the capacity for transoceanic broadcasting. Companies
184 Ibid. p. 29
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entering the market for transoceanic services were often government-owned or had strong 
ties to government. This relationship allowed them added privileges in the setting of the 
price for the services they offered. The international television and video market 
became the avenue through which emerging firms, such as PanAmSat and Orion could 
launch their entry into the international satellite market.
PanAmSat
PanAmSat was the first private commercial entity that emerged to challenge 
Intelsat’s dominance in the international satellite market. While PanAmSat led the way 
for the introduction of separate satellite systems, its survival within the satellite sector 
remained dubious. As a result it waged a long and protracted battle both domestically and 
internationally to establish its operation. Its battle for survival persisted against what it 
perceived as unfair competition, despite its successful presence in the global satellite 
markets.
In May 1984 PanAmSat, which is owned by Alpha Lyracom, a Connecticut-based 
sole proprietorship, filed an application with the FCC for the establishment of a private 
satellite system in Latin America to provide international satellite services between Latin 
America and the United States. This application came in the light of President Reagan’s
185
See, United States, General Accounting Office, “ Telecommunications: 
Competition Issues in International Satellite Communications. Report to the Chairman, 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation - United States Senate, October 
1996, GAO/RCED-97-1,
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1984 declaration that private satellite operators be allowed to compete with the Intelsat 
system in global satellite communications. As the first privately-owned international 
communications satellite system, PanAmSat was the first commercial entity to officially 
challenge the Intelsat monopoly. Prior to the PanAmSat launch, US and foreign 
companies used satellites within their borders but no one sought to challenge the Intelsat 
monopoly. PanAmSat’s goal was the establishment of international satellites for business 
communications and television links between the US, Latin America and Western 
Europe. Using its geostationary satellite, PAS I, which had the capacity to beam 
television programs, video, audio and data signals to all sites in the United States, Europe 
and Latin America, it could simultaneously cany 36 TV channels.
A year after it requested FCC approval, PanAmSat was granted the conditional 
approval requested for the construction of its satellites.186 In its bid for approval, 
PanAmSat was required to disclose to Intelsat the full range of equipment it planned to 
use in its operations and where and how this equipment was to be used. The nations 
which would be the recipients of these intended services also had to send documents in 
support of the claims made. Intelsat responded to the bid for approval with a request that 
PanAmSat demonstrate financial qualification by the end of the year, without which the 
approval for operation would not be granted.
This occurred on September 3, 1985.
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After several requests from PanAmSat for extensions for meeting the requirement 
of financial qualification, on July 9, 1986, Intelsat’s board of governors rejected 
PanAmSat’s bid to launch and operate its satellite system on the grounds that PanAmSat 
had failed to fully inform Intelsat of how it had planned to use its 24 transponders.187 The 
United States and Peru had provided information for only five transponders that would be 
used to transmit video, data and private voice services between the United States and 
Latin America instead of twenty-four.188
A year later in April of 1987, Intelsat granted conditional approval for 
PanAmSat’s operation of twenty-four transponders, including the five Latin American 
transponders between the US and Peru. Six of the 24 transponders were designed for 
traffic between Europe and North and South America. The satellite, which was located at 
the eastern tip of Brazil, would also handle data, telex and radio communications for the 
financial, manufacturing and mining industries. It was also designated to broadcast 36 
television channels simultaneously.
187
See “Intelsat Board of Governors Rejects U.S. call for Extraordinary Assembly of 
parties on PanAmSat Coordination,” Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, June 23, 1986. Requests by 
PanAmSat for 45-day extensions for meeting the requirement of financial qualification 
were made on November 21, moving the deadline from December 1 to January 15, 1986. 
The request was granted by Intelsat on December 12th, 1985. Five subsequent requests for 
extensions were made and granted on January 21, 1986, March 24, 1986, May 2, 1986, 
June 18, 1986, and July 3 i f  1986. 
iss
The San Diego Union-Tribune, “Consortium Rejects U.S. Bid for Satellite”, 
Thursday July 10, 1986, pg. A-24.
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The battle for entry into the international satellite market was soon followed by 
the battle over who would dominate the market. After Intelsat’s approval of PanAmSat, a 
series of confrontations between PanAmSat and Intelsat soon surfaced. PanAmSat 
accused Intelsat of promoting an international boycott against its satellites by putting up 
“bureaucratic roadblocks” that prevented PanAmSat signals from being received in places 
where Intelsat had control of the market. Both Intelsat and Comsat vehemently denied 
PanAmSat charges, claiming instead that Intelsat had increased PanAmSat’s access to 
Intelsat member nations instead of embarking upon a strategy of obstruction.189 
PanAmSat also accused Comsat of unfair competition and petitioned the United States 
courts to intervene.
In September of 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that PanAmSat could 
pursue a $1.5 billion antitrust suit against Comsat, alleging that Comsat practiced 
predatory pricing and that Comsat had discouraged other signatories from doing business 
with PanAmSat. Because Comsat’s action was the result of its role as the US signatory to 
Intelsat, a prior court had earlier decided that, because it was an international 
organization, Comsat was immune from U.S. antitrust laws. The 1.991 Court decision was
189
Los Angeles Times, November 27. 1988 in 
Http://web.lexis-nex is.com/universe/document.
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a reversal of the earlier lower court decision, where it concluded that Comsat was not
190immune.
Additional charges of unfair business practices and obstructions to PanAmSat’s 
efforts had also come from outside the United States. Since launching PanAmSat, its 
parent company, Alpha Lyracom, has been embroiled in a battle with Entel, the state-run 
Argentinian telephone and telegraph cartel and seven independent TV network stations. 
The networks desired to be linked to PanAmSat’s satellite.191
Peru had initially chosen the Intelsat system. However, it later decided against 
Intelsat, particularly because only a small percentage of Intelsat’s transmitting capacity 
was allotted for television broadcasting. That allotment had already been dominated by 
Entel who, as Argentina’s signatory to Intelsat, also owned the only microwave grid that 
TV broadcasters needed to transmit programs to stations. By restriction of access to the 
microwave grid, Entel denied potential broadcasters the ability to transmit programs 
using PanAmSat satellites.
In 1985, PanAmSat was successful in luring business away from the Intelsat 
network when its parent company Alpha Lyracom, offered Peru the use of a high- 
powered video transponder that would cover Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Northern Chile
190 See “Monopoly in Orbit,” The Economist, October 26, 1991, p. 19.
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for a mere $1 per year. Despite the many obstructions, by 1995, PanAmSat’s income 
managed to rise to $116.1 million, almost doubling from the previous year’s $63.7 
million.192
Orion
The second private domestic satellite company to receive both Intelsat and FCC 
approval was the Orion Network Systems. Though the first to apply for approval before 
the FCC, Orion followed PanAmSat in breaking the 25-year Intelsat monopoly on 
international communications between nations. Orion launched two geostationary 
satellites to locations above the Atlantic, the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. Its 
licenses prohibited telephone calls on the public telephone network.
After a long battle with Intelsat which began in 1983 when it petitioned the FCC 
for approval for the provision of voice, data and video services for corporations and 
government agencies between the US and the United Kingdom, Orion finally won 
approval from the FCC in 1987. Two years later, Orion received an approval from Intelsat 
to operate its commercial satellites.193 Its licenses prohibited the use of telephone calls on 
the public telephone network.
New York Times, June 16, 1996. 
This occurred on June 22, 1989.
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Unlike PanAmSat, which planned to provide services between the United States 
and Latin America, Orion was the first firm that attempted to provide services between 
nations that were outside of the United States. It was designed to be the first transoceanic 
separate satellite system engaging in intercontinental provision of services and as a result 
would be in direct competition with the Intelsat market.194 Also unlike PanAmSat which 
focused on transmitting television signals through its satellites, Orion concentrated 20% 
of its efforts in video and 80% in private telecommunications networks for businesses. It 
was therefore expected to cause Intelsat “significant economic harm.” In spite of the 
impending threat, the decision was made by Intelsat to grant approval for Orion to operate 
after receiving assurances from United States and the United Kingdom that both nations 
would remain committed to do business with Intelsat in the long run and that Orion’s 
operations would be limited to private corporate networks.193
Factors Affecting Competition
In spite of PanAmSat and Orion's presence in the international satellite market, 
sustained international competition failed to take root within the international 
telecommunications market. The failure of competition can be attributed to several 
factors. First, Intelsat’s signatories had close ties to their governments. As a result, their
194
PR Newswire Association, Inc., “Intelsat Board of Governors Consults Orion 
System,” Washington, June 22, 1989.
195
John Burgess, “Rockville Company Rejoices Over Satellite Network Okay,” The 
Washington Post, July 19, 1989. p. FI. Also Nancy Dunne, “Board of Intelsat Backs 
Competitors”, The Financial Times (London), June 23, 1989, p. 8.
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governments were willing to protect them at any cost, from outside competition. As in the 
instances of the American Satellite Corporation in Jamaica and PanAmSat in Peru, new 
firms seeking access to foreign markets were denied access as governments imposed 
regulations to prevent separate satellite systems’ access to the local market.
Competitors had to seek permission from domestic licensing bureaus to provide 
services to a country. Domestic telecommunications bureaus were entrusted with the 
authority to approve applications for use of the specific spectrum of radio frequencies, for 
setting up ground stations to send or receive satellite signals or to interconnect with the 
domestic telephone system. These bureaus served as an extension to the International 
Telecommunications Union Radiocommunications Sector (ITU-R), whose responsibility 
it is to allocate radio frequencies and to register radio frequency assignments in the 
geostationary satellite orbit in order to avoid harmful interference between radio stations 
of different countries. Again, as in the case of Peru, the necessary approvals were not 
forthcoming.
Second, the Intelsat signatories were often the only domestic institutions 
authorized to grant licenses for the operation of competitive firms. They therefore lacked 
the incentive to approve service providers who posed challenges to the existing or future 
markets served by the signatories. Signatories had a financial motive to restrict
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competitors’ access to local markets.196 In 1996, seventy one percent of Intelsat’s 
signatories were directly responsible for making the decisions concerning licensing, 
spectrum allocation and market access, allowing them to restrict or deny licensing of 
prospective competitors.197 An additional fourteen percent of the signatories were separate 
from but nevertheless related to the licensing bodies and were able to exert some 
influence on decisions.198
The third restriction to competition is that, in the event that a separate satellite 
system did gain access, there were no guarantees that needed access would continue in the 
future for that company. A company getting approval for access for a period of one year, 
would not be guaranteed for another, neither would there be any guarantee that other 
companies seeking access to that country’s market thereafter would be successful. Each 
non-Intelsat company had to negotiate entry into a foreign market to provide global 
services each time access was desired, with no guarantee of success. Intelsat’s access, on 
the other hand, was automatic and it never needed to negotiate its privileges.
196
United States General Accounting Office, Telecommunications: Competitive 
Impact of Restructuring the International Satellite Organizations , Report to the 
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-96-204 p.5.
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United States, General Accounting Office, k‘ Telecommunications: Competition 
Issues in International Satellite Communications. Report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation - United States Senate, October 1996, 
GAO/RCED-97-1, p. 27.
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A fourth factor hindering competition in the telecommunications market was that 
separate systems first had to secure agreements from local companies to provide services 
after which negotiations with Intelsat for access would take place. Because the 
negotiation process was lengthy and time consuming, time delays resulted in heavy 
financial losses for separate satellite systems. New companies’ abilities to freely compete 
in these markets were undermined by the possibility of denials and delays.
Finally, Intelsat had been the recipient of special advantages that were not 
available to its competitors. Intelsat had easy access to financial capital and enjoyed other 
special privileges, the most important being exemptions from taxation and easier access 
to orbital slots (locations in space). It also enjoyed special immunity from lawsuits. These 
advantages gave Intelsat a competitive edge while undermining the survival of new 
companies.
COMSAT argued that there were no special advantages given to Intelsat over 
competing firms. It noted that the existence of separate satellite systems was itself an 
indication that there were few barriers to entry and that Intelsat had no market 
dominance.109 Intelsat, COMSAT argued, bore tremendous responsibilities for providing 
universal services at nondiscriminatory prices to the international community, especially 
to developing nations, thereby posing limitations on its ability to compete in the market. 
COMSAT also noted that because Intelsat was an intergovernmental organization, its
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efficiency as an economic entity was greatly undermined since consensus was needed on 
all decisions. The organization was thereby impeded in its attempts to respond rapidly to 
changes in the market. Intelsat’s competitors disagreed with this stance.200
Restructuring
By 1996 new domestic and foreign companies had surfaced (Tables 4-2 to 4-4) 
resulting in the creation of the Alliance for Competitive International Satellite Services 
(ACISS). This was a seven-company lobbying group that was created within the United 
States to oppose the market advantage that Intelsat possessed.201 Members of the 
consortium agreed that in its initial stages Intelsat had served a vital function in creating a 
global network. However, they argued that the needs of the satellite sector had changed, 
As a result, Intelsat’s preferential treatments - its tax privileges, immunity from lawsuits, 
preferential access to radio spectrum and space for satellites - had become a hindrance to 
the satellite sector. ACISS was organized to press for a change and to urge a restructuring 
of the satellite sector.
One proposal for restructuring called for the elimination of the Intelsat 




ACISS consisted of PanAmSat, Orion Network Systems, Columbia 
Communications Corporation, Motorola Inc., Odyssey Worldwide Services, Orbital 
Communications Corporation, TRW and Loral Space and Communications Limited.
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authoritatively allocate commercial benefits such as its tax exemptions and preferential 
access to radio spectrum to the organization, thereby resulting in market advantages. For 
its opponents, the elimination of the intergovernmental arrangement would also mean the 
elimination of benefits that Intelsat received and ultimately Intelsat’s global market 
dominance, making it possible for the creation and entry of new firms into the global 
satellite market.
Many developing nations had grave concerns about the elimination of the 
intergovernmental arrangement. They believed that the arrangement not only allowed the 
organization benefits but with it also came the responsibility of ensuring the provision of 
basic satellite services to developing nations. As a result, they argued that access to basic 
telecommunications services such as telephone using satellites would be threatened in the 
absence of Intelsat’s intergovernmental arrangement. Should the intergovernmental 
arrangement be relinquished, these states would be unwilling to rely on the private sector 
to ensure the provision of these basic services.
A second proposal for restructuring which was also advanced by ACISS, was to 
split Intelsat into three companies in order to reduce Intelsat’s size and market 
dominance. Under this arrangement, Intelsat would remain an intergovernmental 
organization, and create two affiliate companies, the shares of which would be sold to the 
public. The two affiliates would focus on improved satellite services, whereas Intelsat
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would focus on basic telephone services, especially for developing nations. The affiliates 
would have no special privileges or immunities.
The third proposal for restructuring Intelsat, endorsed by the US government, was 
to divide the organization in two entities - an intergovernmental arrangement and an 
entity for providing advanced services. The first entity would be the intergovernmental 
arrangement which would be 20% owned by signatories. This entity would continue to 
focus on basic telecommunications services such as telephone. The affiliate entity would 
be privatized, and would concentrate on providing more advanced services such as video 
and data. The privately owned affiliate would have no special privileges or immunities. 
Business transactions between the two entities would take place as if they had no prior 
economic relationship. The affiliate would be subject to competition laws in the countries 
in which it operates.
ACISS’s proposal for restructuring was turned down on the grounds that “[t]hat 
view does not have any support in the rest of the world.”202 ACISS argued that the 
restructuring effort could not be successful unless Intelsat’s large transoceanic capacities 
were reduced and countries were willing to accept the new companies. However ACISS, 
the United States government and COMSAT all agreed that the market was capable and
202
Statement made by John Mattingly, vice president and general manager of Comsat 
quoted in Investor's Business Daily, September 12, 1996.
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willing to offer services such as video, data and mobile telephone services and should be 
open for such ends.
Conclusion
The transformation of the Intelsat system began in the United States with one 
firm, PanAmSat receiving a license to operate and less than a dozen looming in the 
background awaiting their approval to operate. Internationally, other firms followed suit. 
PanAmSat’s approval set a precedent that paved the way for future transformations of the 
international telecommunications satellite industry and that later affected the decisions of 
companies such as the American Satellite Corporation which were now able to act as 
intermediaries to deliver satellite services for international business transactions.
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Table 4-1 Significant Events in Communications Satellite: 1945 - 1990203
1945 Arthur C. Clark’s article: “Extra-Terrestrial Relays”
1956 First Trans-Atlantic Telephone Cable: TAT-1
1957 Sputnik: Russia launches the first earth satellite 
1960 First successful DELTA Launch Vehicle
1960 AT&T applies to FCC for experimental satellite communications license
1961 The start of TELSTAR, RELAY and SYNCOM programs
1962 TELSTAR and RELAY launched
1962 US Communications Satellite Act
1963 SYNCOM launched
1964 INTELSAT formed
1965 COMSAT’s Early Bird — the first commercial communications satellite 
1969 INTELSAT-III series provides global coverage
1972 AN IK: The first Domestic Communications Satellite (Canada)
1974 WESTAR: The first US Domestic Communications Satellite
1975 INTELS AT - IV A :
1975 RCA SATECOM: The first operational body-stabilized communications satellite
1976 M ARIS AT: The first mobile communications satellite
1976 PALAPA: Indonesia launches domestic communications satellite 
1979 INMARSAT formed
1988 TAT-8: The first Fiber-Optic Trans-Atlantic telephone cable
2 0 3
Source: David J. Whalen, “Communications Satellites: Making the Global Village 
Possible,” http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/satcomhistory.html.
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By 1995 there were a total of 30 US operational domestic satellites authorized by 
the FCC. There are the top firms in operation.
Source: Comsat’s written comments on the GAO Draft Report: 
“Telecommunications: Competitive Impact of Restructuring the International Satellite 
Organization,” p. 29.
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Tabie 4-6: International Satellite Systems and their Investors












Cable and Wireless 







Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE JAMAICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
Introduction
The rapidly transforming global satellite market of the 1980’s had a cascading 
effect on the domestic telecommunications market, and as international competition 
increased, so did concerns for the viability of these domestic sectors. In the decade 
between 1980 and 1990, two patterns began to emerge in the revenue of the Jamaican 
telecommunications sector. First, the revenue in the international component of the 
sector began to escalate, while simultaneously, a pattern of decline of revenue in the 
domestic sector, set in. The decline, which began in 1980, continued until 1989, the 
period of the Digiport negotiations. It resulted in more than a 50% reduction in the 
income accruing to the domestic component of the sector. [Fig 5.1]
The concerns for the viability of Jamaica’s domestic telecommunications segment 
emerged from both Cable and Wireless and the Ministry of Public Utilities and 
Transport (MPUT) - both sought an immediate solution to the decreasing revenue in the 
domestic component and the possible impact on the continued provision of domestic 
services. The Ministry's solution to the decline in revenue stream, proposed in 1985, 
was a policy of cross-subsidization, whereby income generated from the international 
component was transferred to the domestic component. This transfer was intended to
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offset the costs of the provision of services in the domestic component. 209 The cross­
subsidization policy was adopted in 1989.
The restructuring of the Jamaican telecommunications sector initiated in 1985 by 
the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport (MPUT) to address the decline in revenue 
began shortly after several significant global events; most notably, the opening of the 
global telecommunications market to competition, and the action of the global satellite 
regime, led by Intelsat, to allow limited competition in satellite services. The 
restructuring consisted of three stages: a) the privatization of the sector, b) the merger 
of domestic and international operations under a single entity - Telecommunications of 
Jamaica (TOJ), and c) a revised regulatory regime that would solidify Cable and 
Wireless’ control of the sector. It ultimately resulted in the elimination of all 
competition within the sector, and subsequently, it led to the closing of the sector to 
international competition. Moreover, Jampro’s attempt to liberalize the sector using the 
services of the American Satellite Company for the Digiport was defeated, as it 
represented a threat to the state’s restructuring of the sector.
Several key actors facilitated the restructuring the Jamaican telecommunications 
sector. These actors were Cable and Wireless, Jamintel, Jamaica Telephone Company, 
Telephone of Jamaica, the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport, the National 
Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ), and Industrial Commercial Development. Cable 
and Wireless International initially supplied international services but later supplied all
209 Spiller and Sampson, p. 66.
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telecommunications services. The Jamaica Telephone Company and Jamintel were 
domestic entities in partnership with Cable and Wireless to provide domestic and 
international services respectively. The Industrial Commercial Development was an 
indigenous firm with ownership shares in the telecommunications sector. The stages of 
the restructuring were conducted under the auspices of the National Investment Bank of 
Jamaica.
This chapter will begin with an examination of the historical evolution of the 
telecommunications sector in order to demonstrate how it progressed from its previous 
use of multiple providers to that of the single Cable and Wireless monopoly. Secondly, 
it will examine the domestic and international economic contexts that impinged on the 
state-directed restructuring of the sector and which resulted in Cable and Wireless’ 
emergence as the dominant supplier of the sector. Thirdly, the chapter will look at the 
impact of the restructuring on the Digiport negotiations and Jampro’s decision to use the 
American Satellite Company, a competitive non-Intelsat satellite system. And finally, 
the chapter will examine the roles played by these actors in the restructuring of the 
sector in order to determine the causes of restructuring and its effects on both the 
liberalization of the sector and the Digiport negotiations.
The chapter lays the foundation for explaining why Jamaica failed to liberalize 
its services in satellite technology. The creation of new telecommunications firms and 
the establishment of the separate satellite systems policy of both the U.S. and Intelsat 
posed a potential threat to the viability of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector, which
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led to the state’s decision to eliminate competition. Germane to the closing of 
Jamaica’s telecommunications sector to competition was the new cross-subsidization 
policy, which involved its full restructuring. Cross-subsidization was designed to rescue 
the sector from the diminishing returns from the provision of domestic 
telecommunications services. Under the new restructuring agreement, all attempts to 
liberalize the sector using non-Intelsat satellites would be eliminated.
The History of Jamaica’s Telecommunications Sector
The Jamaica telecommunications sector, which began in 1870 under the colonial 
regime of Great Britain, consisted of both a domestic and an international component. 
The first international telephone was installed that same year by the state-owned West 
India and Panama Telegraph Company (WI&PT), which later was renamed Cable and 
Wireless. Because West India and Panama Telegraph Company (WI&PT) and Cable 
and Wireless were imperial operations, Jamaica’s relationship with the companies was 
an intrastate relationship, which changed in 1962 at the onset of Jamaica’s 
independence.210
During the colonial period, the domestic segment of the sector had been served 
by a succession of monopoly telecommunications providers. In 1892, the Jamaica 
Telephone Company was incorporated to provide services once provided by the West 
India and Panama Telegraph Company (WI&PT). Its operator was the British Telephone
210Pablo T. Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson, “Telecommunications Regulation in 
Jamaica” in Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller eds. Regulations, Institutions and 
Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 45.
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and General Trust (T&GT), Jamaica’s first telecommunications service provider and the 
majority shareholder in the Jamaica Telephone Company. It provided services on a non­
exclusive basis until 1925 when it received its forty-year exclusive license to operate in 
the capital area of Kingston and St. Andrew. The All Island Telephone System provided 
services for the rest of the island under the ownership of the Jamaica Post Office.
In 1945, the Jamaica Telephone Company acquired the All Island Telephone 
System, resulting in its provision of services to the entire island. Telephone and General 
Trust (T&GT) became the provider of services to the domestic component. It received a 
forty-year exclusive right to provide such services under the All-Island License, which 
stipulated that the provision of domestic services would be under private ownership and 
that there would be a “fair” as well as an “attractive” rate of return.211 Jamaica
Telephone Company operated under this agreement until 1966. Prior to this period, the 
telecommunications sector consisted solely of telephone and telegraph services, and had 
experienced a “modest but continued growth” in services.212
Shortly before the nation’s independence from Britain in 1962, T&GT 
announced its refusal to continue to invest in the Jamaica Telephone Company’s
21'Spiller and Cezley I. Sampson p.39. See also Alvin G. Wint, “Pioneering 
Telephone Privatization: Jamaica,” in Ravi Ramamuti, ed. Privatizing Monopolies: Lessons 
From the Telecommunications and Transport Sectors in Latin America. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 1996), also p. 63.
212Spiller and Sampson, p. 39.
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operation in the domestic component because of uncertainties in both the market as well 
as the in the newly independent political regime. After independence, T&GT began 
negotiations to renew its license. These negotiations lasted three years and ended in 
1966. T&GT’s unprofitable operation in Jamaica resulted in the sale of 50% of its 
shares in the Jamaica Telephone Company to a Canadian holding company, the 
Continental Telephone Company, which was contracted to provide domestic services 
and to increase existing levels of investment in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector. 
Continental’s expectations, however, were greatly inflated, and the company soon 
suffered extensive losses from which it never recovered.213
The sector’s instability extended beyond its service providers to its regulatory 
framework. The post independence period saw a change in the sector’s regulatory 
regime: from a system of ad hoc and temporary regulatory boards, to one replaced by the 
permanent and independent Jamaica Public Utilities Commission in 1966. The 
Commission issued new licenses to the Jamaica Telephone Company, and vowed to 
introduce a “Jamaicanization” plan designed to increase the percentage of indigenous 
ownership of the sector that would be implemented by the year 1971.214 However, by 
1975, the Commission was disbanded with the nationalization of the Jamaica Telephone
2l3Ibid. pp. 49-50.
214Ibid.
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Company. It, nevertheless, later resurfaced as the Ministry of Public Utilities and 
Transport in 1976.215
The Continental Telephone Company made various attempts to extricate itself 
from its troubled performance, making several petitions to the utilities commission for a 
rate increase. Each petition was met with opposition from both the regulatory 
commission and the Seaga regime. In 1975, when the Manley regime assumed power, 
the prime minister undertook the full nationalization of the domestic sector - a decision 
that was welcomed by Continental Telephone. It availed itself of the opportunity to sell 
all its holdings to the state, thereby initiating the process of the nationalization of 
domestic telecommunications in 1975. These domestic holdings remained nationalized 
until 1987. Cable and Wireless continued to maintain control of 51% of the shares in 
the international component.
Negotiations to privatize all domestic holdings began in 1985 with the return to 
power of a new government headed by Seaga, and under the influence of the 
privatization recommendations of the IMF Structural Adjustment Program of 1982. 
Negotiations began two years later and Cable and Wireless emerged as Jamaica’s sole 
provider of telecommunications services after it had acquired the majority of 
government shares in the domestic component. All other providers of domestic service 
had since departed, leaving Cable and Wireless the sole investor in both the domestic
2l5Ibid. p. 56.
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and international segments.
While the domestic component repeatedly changed service providers, the 
international component, by contrast, was characteristically more stable, with Cable and 
Wireless as the component’s only provider of international telecommunications services 
since its inception in 1870. Unlike the domestic component, which initially was more 
profitable and more regulated, the international component of the sector was relatively 
less regulated. It operated without a license, with minimum to no regulation, and with a 
fixed price system.216
In 1961, in the shadows of Jamaica’s independence, Cable and Wireless 
successfully negotiated with the soon-to-be newly independent state its first exclusive 
license to provide external services under the Radio and Telegraph Control Act. Prices 
remained low and continued so until the late 1970s. Cable and Wireless increased its 
investments in the segment with the addition of an earth station and the development of 
its satellite technology. In 1968 it renegotiated with the government and received a 
twenty-year extension of the 1961 license that allowed it to operate until 1988.217 Cable
2l6Ibid, p. 60
2l7Ibid, p. 63.
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and Wireless operated the international segment jointly with the state even as the 
domestic component remained completely nationalized.218
In 1971, Cable and Wireless began negotiations with the state for the creation of 
the nation’s first international telecommunications service provider. Jamintel was 
created as a joint venture between Cable and Wireless and the Jamaican government in 
which Cable and Wireless owned 49 percent of the shares and the government owned 
51 percent and operated as a separate entity from the domestic service provider. The 
Jamaica Public Utilities Commission licensed Cable and Wireless under this new 
arrangement. In addition, the government assumed the cost of the international 
telecommunications operations that had formerly been wholly owned and operated by 
Cable and Wireless. By 1975, the international segment experienced yet another 
milestone with the introduction of international direct dialing. This milestone triggered 
a tremendous boom in Jamintel’s profit levels.
Cable and W ireless and  the Jamaica Telecommunications Sector
Jamaica’s telecommunications sector has endured many changes since Jamaica’s 
independence in 1962. However, the presence of Cable and Wireless in the international 
component has remained a constant since 1870. Its presence shaped and conditioned 
Jamaica’s modem telecommunications sector. First, Cable and Wireless’ presence was 
proved profitable for its operations in the domestic segment. Even as the state
218 W int p .50.
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nationalized the domestic component, Cable and Wireless continued to hold 51% of the 
shares of the international component, maintaining control over Jamintel during the 
state take-over of the domestic component. By 1987, when the state privatized the 
sector, Cable and Wireless took the opportunity to solidify its control over the entire 
telecommunications sector through the acquisition of the majority 80% of the shares of 
both the domestic and international components. Upon privatization of the sector, Cable 
and Wireless renegotiated a favorable 25-year agreement in 1987.
In addition to the continued rise in revenue from international 
telecommunications, three factors have led to Cable and Wireless’ presence and 
dominance in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector. The first was Jamaica's regulatory 
regime, from which Cable and Wireless benefited greatly; the second was Cable and 
Wireless’ ability to minimize the risks involved in operating within the Jamaican 
economy; and the third was the strategic importance of Jamaica, which allowed the 
company the opportunity to fulfill its goals for the Caribbean region.
The Sector’s Regulatory Climate
The telecommunications sector’s regulatory and pricing regime consisted of 
three features: a) the negotiation of license agreements, b) the regulation of operations 
within the sector; and c) the creation of incentives by the state that encouraged corporate 
expansion within the sector -  and which time and again proved favorable to Cable and 
Wireless. The licensing of telecommunications operators was central to the operation of
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the sector. The speed with which the state awarded the operator its license and the 
duration and conditions of the license determined the nature of the relationship between 
the operators in the sector and the state. It affected the level of involvement the operator 
elected to undertake as well as the risks it was willing to assume. Cable and W ireless’ 
license negotiations had been speedy, generous and favorable. Dunn and Gooden 
contend that the terms of the negotiations between Cable and Wireless and the Jamaican 
government were “unduly generous.” 219
The state’s generosity toward Cable and Wireless was evident in both the 1968 
and 1988 negotiations in which the company was granted a 20-year monopoly over all 
aspects of domestic telephone operations in the latter instance, and control over the 
international component in the former. In addition, it was granted other sub-licenses to 
operate in the areas of external telecommunications, wireless telephone, telegraph, telex 
and teleprinting services.220 Dunn and Gooden note that globally, the average length of 
a license is approximately 7 to 10 years, a period that allows a company to recover its 
investments. Furthermore, the Ministry also allowed Cable and Wireless the right to 
install and to approve the installments of all attachments to the network by any of its 
users, and the right to levy tariffs or fines for any unauthorized connections. Cable and
2i9Hopeton S. Dunn and Winston S. Gooden, “Telecommunications in Jamaica” at 
http:/www.vii.org/papers/jama.htm. p. 2.
220Ibid.
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Wireless’ license also guaranteed a return rate of between 17.5 and 20% of assets that 
were revalued to adjust for inflation.
Additionally, Cable and Wireless received favorable treatment with regards to 
the protection and regulation of operations within the sector. McCormick argues that 
the regulatory regime in Jamaica, as well as in other developing nations, can best be 
described as lacking both the power to exert regulatory control over the sector and the 
presence of any well-constituted set of regulatory policies.221 Spiller and Sampson also 
note that the Public Utilities Commission, which was charged with the responsibility of 
regulating the sector, had, on occasion, faced great challenges due to the company’s 
accounting procedures. These accounting procedures, they argue, were “designed to 
facilitate control by the holding company rather than by the regulators.”222
The state’s regulatory regime facilitated Cable and Wireless’ preferential access 
to investment opportunities within the sector, from which it benefited significantly. 
Moreover, Ministry inducements resulted in Cable and Wireless" increasing investment 
levels that led it to expand its operations in the sector. The Ministry also guaranteed 
Cable and Wireless exclusive access to investment opportunities, as evidenced in the 
1988-privatization negotiations, which facilitated the state transfer of its ownership of
221 Patricia M cCorm ick, “Telecom m unications Privatization Issues in Jamaica, “ in 
Telecommunications Policy . Vol. 17, No. 2, March 1993, p. 151.
222Spiller and Sampson, p. 54
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shares in the domestic component, and its portion of shares owned in the international 
component, to Cable and Wireless. During these negotiations, Cable and Wireless was 
the only private entity invited to the negotiating table. Once there, the terms the 
company received added up to enormous benefits -  benefits that Wint argues were 
tantamount to a government “giveaway” of shares to Cable and Wireless.223 These 
“giveaways” were the contractual arrangement between Cable and Wireless and the 
state, in which Cable and Wireless included a twenty-five year monopoly agreement 
instead of the seven to ten year norm, with an added benefit of the guarantee of return of 
between 17% to 20% on assets, among others. These “giveaways,” Wint further states, 
were the result of the state’s weak bargaining position.224
Familiarity with Jamaica and the Risks Involved in Business Operations
Cable and Wireless’ longevity in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector gave it a 
familiarity with the risks involved in its Jamaica operations. Its longevity included its 
ability to survive a period of nationalization, emerging as the only supplier in both 
domestic and international operations when the sector was later privatized. However, 
while the domestic component was nationalized, Cable and Wireless maintained 
majority control of the international component, which remained privatized. It operated 
in partnership with the state during this period, and its profits in the international 
component increased while the component expanded.
22 Wint. p. 68.
224Ibid, p. 68..
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
158
When the domestic component was privatized in 1989, Cable and Wireless 
acquired majority control of that component as well, making it the only supplier in the 
sector. The company had outlived all other foreign suppliers. Jamaica began to rely on 
Cable and Wireless for its technology, capital and expertise to modernize the country’s 
aging telecommunications infrastructure, while the company, in turn, enjoyed 
unrestrained access to the domestic telecommunications market.22'’ It experienced a 
favorable economic climate in which both its needs and the needs of the state were 
adequately met, compared to the less than viable operations of its predecessors T&GT 
and The Continental Telephone Company.226
The Sector’s Strategic Importance
After five years of state ownership of the domestic telecommunications 
operations under the Manley regime, the Seaga regime assumed control of the 
government in 1982, touting a privatization agenda.227 Moreover, Seaga became the 
recipient of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program from 1982 to 1987, which was in 
harmony with his administration’s privatization agenda. Privatization negotiations 
began in 1985 and ended successfully in 1987 with the sale of state shares to Cable and 
Wireless. Seaga’s privatization agenda allowed Cable and Wireless to acquire
22-Tbid.
226lbid, p. 57.
22,Wint p. 50; McCormick p. 151.
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controlling interests in the sector, resulting in the shift of 100 percent of state ownership 
of the domestic component to the private sector. Thus, state ownership of the domestic 
component shifted from 100% of the telecommunications shares in 1987 to 0% 
ownership by 1990.
The sale in 1987 of Jamaica’s domestic segment to Cable and Wireless signaled, 
for the first time, Cable and Wireless’ control of both the domestic and international 
components of the sector. Cable and Wireless gained control of JTC and Jamintel and 
was in a position to realize the company’s strategic plans for the region. As Cable and 
Wireless acquired shares in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector, it simultaneously 
undertook a multi-year program to acquire telecommunications markets across the 
globe.
Beginning in 1986, the company purchased shares in the telecommunications 
sectors of Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis in the Caribbean, and as well as in the South 
Pacific, Sub-Sahara Africa, and in the Middle East.228 Wint maintains that Cable and 
Wireless’ acquisition of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector was central to the 
company’s vision for the region and was consistent with its initiatives throughout the 
globe. Cable and Wireless’ domestic and international acquisitions in Jamaica, Wint 
argues, would complement its other acquisitions in the Caribbean, making it well suited
228 Wint p .60.
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as a regional hub.229It was this strategic interest in the Caribbean that, according to Wint, 
was the driving force behind Cable and Wireless’ acquisition and control of the majority 
of the shares in the sector.230 Jamaica’s market size was therefore, not an indicator of its 
importance to Cable and Wireless.231
While W int’s analysis demonstrates a clear interest on the part of Cable and 
Wireless in Jamaica’s telecommunications sector, his conclusion that Cable and 
Wireless’ interest in Jamaica was more strategic than economic is rather dubious. The 
period of 1985 to 1987 when Cable and Wireless strategically sought to acquire 
holdings in Jamaica from the privatization of the sector was also the period in which the 
Digiport Project had its genesis. During this period, Jampro had initiated a feasibility 
study, which indicated the revenue potential of the establishment of an offshore 
information processing industry. This industry, using telecommunications satellite 
technology, would have the potential of transcending the local market to reach its 
multinational clientele worldwide, extending to corporations located within the 
industrialized nations. The income-generating potential of Jamaica’s information- 





See “Proposal for the Provision of Enhanced Telecommunications Services for 
Jam aica’s Free Zone,’’ (JA), 1986.
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services for the Digiport project and its concerns about competition from the American 
Satellite Company clearly demonstrated economic concerns more than strategic 
considerations.233
Cross-Subsidization and the Political Economy of the Jamaican 
Telecommunications Sector: 1980-1990
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From 1980 until 1990, two trends began to emerge in the revenue of Jamaica’s 
telecommunications sector. The first trend was the rapid increase in revenue in the 
international segment, reflecting more than a 100 percent increase over that of the 1980 
level. [Fig. 5-1] It began with close to $J 4,000 per line in 1980 and increased to $J 
8,000 per line in 1989. Net profits in real income for the provision of international 
services increased significantly from less than $J 50,000 in 1981 to $J 200,000 in 1989. 
[Fig. 5-2]234 Thus, the steady increase in profits from 1980-1989 in the international 
component, made it central to the survival of the sector as a whole.
This boom in the sector was attributed to two domestic actions.235The first was 
the introduction of international direct dialing in 1977 which resulted in an increase in 
international long-distance calling, with calls more than doubling between 1980 and 
1989. [Fig 5-2] With the exception of the period between 1984-1985 when the level of 
international calls remained constant, growth in international direct long-distance calls 
continued virtually uninterrupted for the remainder of the decade, albeit at a reduced 
rate of growth after 1984. [Fig. 5-2]
234 For total num ber of lines see Appendix VII: N um ber of Main Lines (Thousands)
23\Spiller and Sampson, pp. 65-71.
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The second factor that added to the growth of the international segment was Prime 
Minister Seaga’s reversal of the former Prime Minister Michael Manley’s “controversial 
socialist policies.”2'’6 These policies included Manley’s decision in 1976 to establish 
diplomatic relations with Cuba during his visit to Cuba. Castro subsequently visited 
Jamaica a year later, and the reciprocal visits resulted shortly thereafter in an influx of 
Cuban doctors to provide medical services to Jamaica. Other controversial Manley 
policies included the nationalization of the bauxite and telecommunications sectors, a 
land reform policy, which consisted of the expropriation of lands and businesses 
without compensation, and a controversial Crash Program where transfer payments 
were made to large numbers of individuals. 237 Manley’s policies led to the flight of both 
domestic and foreign capital from the nation, further intensifying the pressure from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to liberalize the Jamaican economy.
The result of the flight of capital from Jamaica was the involvement of the IMF in 
Jamaica’s economic affairs. The flight had produced a strain on the nation’s balance of 
payment reserves and the fiscal budget of the Manley regime, increasing the pressure for
236 Ibid, p. 42.
237Ne!son, W. Keith and Novella Z. Keith. The Social Origins o f  Democratic 
Socialism in Jamaica (Philadelphia: Tem ple  University Press, 1992) p. 260. The Crash 
Program was an em ploym ent creation program where opportunities were created for the 
society 's poorest through the cleaning of road em bankm ents and gullies, roads and 
buildings maintenance, and some construction projects.
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reform from the IMF.238 Seaga’s electoral victory and his determination to reverse 
Manley’s policies began a flow of new and increased investment back into the 
telecommunications sector. Segments of the business community which had fled to the 
United States during the Manley regime for fear of losing their businesses, returned to 
Jamaica, their fears now relieved. Thus, renewed confidence resulted in increased 
investments in many areas of the economy including the telecommunications sector, and 
increased telecommunications revenues at the start of the decade.239 This trend, 
however, would not continue.
While revenue from the international service increased continuously, revenue 
from the domestic segment experienced a downturn. In 1980, revenue from the 
domestic component, which had increased by 50 percent over the 1977 level, began to 
experience a sharp reduction in income -  which was in direct proportion to the 
increasing flight of capital that was taking place during the same period. This reduction 
continued until 1989 where it rested at less than 60 percent of the 1980 level. [Fig. 5-1] 
Income from domestic services declined from $J 6,000 per line in 1980 and continued 
steadily downwards to approximately $J 3,000 per line in 1989. In 1984, for the first 
time in the sector’s history, revenue from domestic services fell and continued to fall 
below that of the international component [Fig.5-1], primarily due to outmoded
238 Wint, p. 53.
239Ibid.
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equipment unable to meet the segment’s demands.240 The continued decline in income 
in this segment foretold a potential disruption in the segment’s ability to continue 
providing domestic services. It led to the proposal of a cross-subsidization measure that 
would offset declining revenue in the domestic component with revenue from the more 
vibrant international segment.
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The Cross-Subsidization Measure
The proposed cross-subsidization measure was designed, and depended on, the 
successful negotiations and implementation of three prerequisite steps - with no 
guarantee that under separate ownership of domestic and international services, the 
providers of international services could be relied on to consistently transfer the needed 
revenue to the providers of domestic services. Thus, the first step in cross-subsidization 
was the merger of the international and domestic operations of Jamintel and JTC under 
a single entity that would facilitate the transfer of state shares to the private sector; the 
second was the privatization of the sector to comply with IMF structural adjustment 
mandates; the third was the establishment of the necessary regulatory framework that 
would guarantee Cable and Wireless monopoly control of both segments. The new 
regulatory regime would ensure that income from both domestic and international 
components would not be diverted to the emerging competitive international suppliers 
that resulted from the new international separate satellite policy. All three steps 
constituted the restructuring of Jamaica’s telecommunications regime, which was 
instituted in 1987 in order to facilitate the new cross-subsidization arrangement.
The Merger of the Jam aica Telephone Company and Jamintel
The first step in the cross-subsidization scheme was the merger between JTC and 
Jamintel. Negotiations for the merger began in 1985 between Cable and Wireless and 
the Jamaican government through its agent, the National Investment Bank of Jamaica
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
(NEBJ), the autonomous quasi-governmental body headed by Mayer Matalon. 
Negotiations were designed to bring together under one entity, Jamaica’s state-owned 
domestic component and its international component, which was majority-owned by 
Cable and Wireless. The process began with the creation of a holding company, 
Telecommunications of Jamaica, TOJ, which was chaired by Matalon, who also served 
as the chairman of the domestic service provider JTC. 241 Negotiations successfully 
ended on May 19, 1987, with an agreement between the government, Cable and 
Wireless, and the new entity, Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ).
As a result of the negotiations, TOJ was incorporated as a private company that 
would serve as the holding company of both JTC and Jamintel. The two entities turned 
over their shares to the new TOJ, and in return, they received shares in the newly 
formed TOJ. Under the merger agreement, both JTC and Jamintel became wholly 
owned subsidiaries of TOJ. The state agreed to divest itself of any remaining shares it 
still held in either of the two pre-existing companies. New regulatory procedures for 
licensing and price setting were set into place. The Board of Directors of TOJ 
established a date of April 1, 1991, in which all aspects of the merger would be 
completed. The Board stipulated that the merger was designed to create greater 
efficiency and that TOJ would be the coordinator of different functions which prior to 
the merger had been handled separately by the individual firms.
24lWint. p. 55.
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The Privatization of the Jamaican Telecommunications Sector
The second step in the cross-subsidization scheme was the privatization of both 
Jamaica Telephone Company and Jamintel in which the state-owned shares in the newly 
created TOJ would be transferred to Cable and Wireless. Privatization was more than 
the mechanism through which cross-subsidization would occur. This solution also 
represented the method that met the approval of the international community to address 
Jamaica’s poor economic performance. When Seaga was elected Prime Minister in 
1981, the new administration’s first challenge was to address the nation’s economic 
concerns.242 These concerns included escalating oil prices, high importation of consumer 
goods, escalating flight of capital, high debt obligations and declining bauxite and 
agricultural revenues on which the nation very heavily depended. The new regime also 
encountered an increased budget from the social programs established under the Manley 
regime.
As a result of the nation’s poor economic performance, the IMF had proposed a 
comprehensive plan of economic restructuring aimed at increasing competition, the 
reduction of the public sector in some areas, and a reduction in the national deficit.243 
These prescriptions were included in the IMF Structural Adjustment Program of 1982-
242Seaga began serving in 1982.
243 McCormick, p. 156.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
170
1987 as a precondition for future IMF structural adjustment loans.244 At the heart of this 
proposal was the privatization of industries that had been nationalized under the Manley 
regime. Other IMF measures included the removal of price and wage controls, foreign 
exchange controls, food subsidies, tariffs, and extensive financial reforms. To address 
the problems in the Jamaican telecommunications sector, the IMF prescribed a 
mandatory privatization program, which Seaga accepted. Seaga’s privatization endeavor 
was designed to reverse the nationalization policies of the previous Manley regime in 
order to restore economic performance to previous levels.
The first act in the privatization process, after the creation of TOJ, was the transfer 
of shares to the private sector, following a prescribed formula of 80% / 20% indigenous 
/ foreign ownership that was based on a post-independence decision to ‘Jamaicanize’ 
the sector. The formula required that Cable and Wireless control a maximum of 20% of 
the shares. However, at the conclusion of the privatization negotiations, the state 
elected to digress from its “Jamaicanization” goal, opting instead for a larger foreign- 
control of the sector.
The privatization began in July of 1987, when Cable and Wireless received its 
first 20% of state-owned shares. By October of that year, the state transferred an 
additional 19% of the shares to Cable and Wireless, bringing its shares to 39%, with the 
state maintaining the remaining 61%>. In September of 1988, in accordance with its
244lbid.
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“Jamaicanization” policy, the goal of which was to increase indigenous ownership, the 
state transferred 21% of its total shares to the locally owned Industrial Commercial 
Development (ICD), the largest non-financial private company that was listed on the 
Jamaican Stock Exchange, and which was owned by Eli Matalon, brother of Mayer 
Matalon. The state continued holding 40% of the total shares, while Cable and Wireless 
maintained 39%. With this proportion, the state continued to hold the largest interest in 
the sector.
In July of 1989, the state sold an additional 20% of its totally held stock to Cable 
and Wireless, which at that point assumed the controlling interest in the sector, its 
stocks totaling 59%, and the state’s, 20%. In November of 1990, the state disbursed the 
remaining 20% of its shares to Cable and Wireless, bringing Cable and Wireless’ total 
to 79% of the total shares and 21 % to indigenous, that is, Jamaican ownership. Clearly, 
the remaining percentage of Jamaican ownership of the sector reflected a reversal of the 
previously stated “Jamaicanization” objective.245
Moreover, as the state privatization of the telecommunications sector and the 
newly established Digiport project was being negotiated, Cable and Wireless was 
simultaneously successfully negotiating with the state for the exclusive provision of the 
project’s satellite services as Intelsat’s signatory. Cable and Wireless' success was
24riHopeton S. Dunn and Winston S. Gooden,“Telecommunications in Jamaica” at 
http:/www.vii.org/papers/iama.htm.http://wvvw.vii.org/papers/jama.htm. p. 3.
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sealed with the purchase of 35% of the shares in the Digiport project. AT&T, the U.S. 
signatory to Intelsat, was invited to acquire 35% of the total shares while the remaining 
30% was acquired by T O J.246 Cable and Wireless and TOJ became the majority owners 
of the project, making Intelsat, rather than the American Satellite Company, the supplier 
of satellite services to the Digiport.
Monopolization and Regulatory Oversight
The third step taken by the state in the cross-subsidization scheme was the 
establishment of the new regulatory framework. In 1987, when the merger between the 
domestic and international components under TOJ was finalized, the Ministry of Public 
Utility and Transport issued a new license for TOJ’s operation in compliance with 
Jamaica’s Telecommunications Act. This license guaranteed the company a 25-year 
monopoly for the provision of both domestic and international services. Jamaica 
Telephone would exclusively provide domestic telephone services, while Jamintel 
would exclusively provide international services. The Ministry assumed the role of 
sole regulator of the sector. Its primary task was to end competition in the sector.
At the issuance of these licenses, Jamaica Telephone and Jamintel were each 80% 
owned by Cable and Wireless and 21% owned by Industrial Commercial Development 
Ltd. The new license barred the participation of interest groups from decision-making
246McComnick, p. 152.
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in the sector, a privilege which had been granted under the previous license.49 This new 
arrangement ensured the success of the new cross-subsidization scheme given that the 
American Satellite Company, and any other operator that threatened the sector’s ability 
to generate a profit, were restricted, thus, making all profits from the provision of 
international services available to TOJ for subsidization of the domestic component.
Jamaica’s decision to eliminate competition in the telecommunications sector 
came at a pivotal time in the history of the international satellite system. In 1987, the 
year the restructuring began, Intelsat granted conditional approval for PanAmSat to 
operate its twenty-four transponders for provision of services to the U.S. and Peru. This 
action broke new ground for the international satellite system, creating a more 
competitive international environment. Soon other firms such as Orion followed suit, 
creating a niche for companies such as the American Satellite Company that emerged as 
intermediaries or brokers for the new emerging satellite companies.
Cross-subsidization and its Discontents
Spider and Sampson note that the shift in the state’s policy from its original goal 
of indigenous ownership to the disbursement of state-owned shares to Cable and 
Wireless was due to “strong fiscal and foreign exchange pressures” in 1988 to 1989.39 
Instead of offering the shares to the local business enterprises as the post-independence
"Spider and Sampson p. 40.
"Spider and Sampson, p. 77.
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‘Jamaicanization’ policy of 1966 mandated, the state instead opted for the wholesale 
distribution of its shares to Cable and Wireless.40 Spiller and Sampson argue that the 
nation’s economic crisis, coupled with its demand for foreign exchange, made the sale 
of shares to Cable and Wireless more desirable for addressing the issues with which the 
nation was faced, than the planned indigenous ownership of the telecommunications 
sector Cable and Wireless possessed the needed finances and foreign exchange. The 
state depended on Cable and Wireless for the needed foreign exchange, capital, 
technology, and entrepreneurial leadership. That dependence was, therefore, a deciding 
factor in the state’s decision not to ‘Jamaicanize’ the sector.
Wint notes that the privatization negotiations between the state and Cable and 
Wireless demonstrated several features of Jamaica’s domestic telecommunications 
sector. First, Cable and Wireless’ management enjoyed amicable relations with the state 
in its operation of the sector.41 As a result of the company’s importance to the sector the 
state was more than willing to conduct the privatization negotiations in secrecy rather 
than to invite the participation and involvement of other players. The process was 
therefore not open to bids from other suppliers.42
4(,Ibid. p. 39. 
41 Wint, p. 60. 
42Ibid, p. 58.
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Wint argues that the outcome of the privatization process demonstrated that the 
regime had ulterior motives other than meeting IMF Staictural Adjustment requirements 
for dissolving the shares. He points out that the level of secrecy with which the shares 
were transferred to Cable and Wireless reflected other motives. Wint contends that the 
regime motivation might have been the state’s desire to acquire Cable and Wireless’ 
technological expertise, their capital, as well as their managerial expertise for the 
modernization of Jamaica’s telecommunications infrastructure.43 Nevertheless, these 
goals could also have been achieved using the resources of the American Satellite 
Company since the Digiport project was only one aspect of Jamaica’s strategy to 
modernize the infrastructure, and one which the initial feasibility study done by Jampro 
demonstrated would enhance the overall income and goals of the sector. The level of 
secrecy therefore represented the protection of Cable and Wireless’ control of the sector 
rather than a mere acquisition.
Dunn and Gooden attribute to the regulatory regime that existed between the state 
and Cable and Wireless the method by which the state transferred ownership to Cable 
and Wireless, and the ease with which Cable and Wireless was able to gain ownership 
of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector. The state failed to open the sale of shares in 
TOJ to the highest bidder. Instead, it allowed Cable and Wireless to be the only bidder. 
Telecommunications policymaking in Jamaica, as well as in other Caribbean nations, 
they argue, has traditionally followed the pattern of a “private, almost secret
43Ibid. p. 57.
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arrangement between political and bureaucratic elites within the state, on one hand, and 
the foreign or local operating company on the other.”44 They claim that in Jamaica, this 
modus operandi has continued because the leadership in the Ministry of Public Utilities 
holds views that tire similar to those held by elite managers within Cable and Wireless. 
As a result, Cable and Wireless “has been operating without any independent regulatory 
control to represent or protect the public interest.”45 The Ministry’s stated preference for 
the operation of Cable and Wireless resulted in a shift in the Ministry’s role, that is, the 
Ministry became the protector of Cable and Wireless’ interests. In carrying out its role, 
the Ministry would soon articulate Cable and Wireless’ interests as the interests of the 
sector and the nation as a whole.46
Dunn and Gooden attributed the exclusion of competition in the divestment of 
telecommunications assets as the result of the “secret arrangement between political and 
bureaucratic elites within the state” which characterizes the regulatory environment 
between the state and Cable and Wireless. This arrangement was one that had been 
forged as a result of Cable and Wireless’ ability to survive despite the sector’s legacy of 
discontinuity. The sector’s history included the fluctuation between different 
telecommunications providers such as Telephone and General Trust (T&GT) and
44 Dunn and Gooden, p. 3.
45Ibid.
46Letler from The Ministry to Jampro dated August 28, 1985, (JA), in which the
Ministry strongly stated its opposition to the use of a US firm for the Digiport project.
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Continental Telephone Company. It was only two decades prior to the privatization 
attempt of 1985 during which the operations of both companies proved unsuccessful 
and unproductive, and resulted in the state extricating the Continental Telephone 
Company’s holdings by nationalizing its assets in 1975. On the other hand, the 
operations of Cable and Wireless had proven successful, with its profits increasing 
significantly from the provision of international services and realized returns - all of 
which allowed the state to realize a sizable revenue.47 [Fig. 5-2]
Wint also raises concerns about the National Investment Bank of Jamaica’s (NIBJ) 
ability to promote the nation’s interests with Mayer Matalon at its helm, and who also 
headed TOJ, given his fraternal relationship to Eli Matalon, the head of Industrial 
Commercial Development Ltd., which acquired the state’s 21% share that was slated for 
indigenous ownership. 48 Wint describes this arrangement as a “sweetheart deal” in 
which actors who headed the privatization negotiations - the Matalon family and Cable 
and Wireless - stood to gain both personally and corporately from the outcome of the 
negotiations. The negotiations, structured in this manner, would inevitably eliminate 
outside bidding through secret agreements between interested parties.
This Cable and Wireless / Matalon “sweetheart deal” of high returns and lengthier 
monopoly privileges in the sector, Wint further contends, was the price the state had to
47In Figure 5-2, state revenue is indicated by the gap between gross profits and net 
after tax
48 Wint, p. 55
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pay in order to accomplish its goal of modernizing the sector. This reliance on the 
sector, Wint maintains, placed the state in a weak negotiating position. On the other 
hand, the state had in fact benefited from the investment decisions and the flow of 
capital and income generated from Cable and Wireless’ operation in the island when 
compared to its negative experiences with other providers such as Continental 
Telephone Company and T&GT. The new competitive international environment and 
Jamaica’s new niche in the offshore information industry made other alternatives 
available to the state, such as the American Satellite Company, on which to base its 
economic development agenda. Nevertheless, Cable and Wireless and Jamaica’s 
domestic providers in favor of the exclusive use of Cable and Wireless, resisted the 
possibility of considering alternative service providers.
Jamaica’s sector had initially involved the provision of domestic 
telecommunications services by several different telecommunications providers. 
Because of the failure of these firms to realize a profit on their investments, the sector 
experienced turnovers in the providers of services, which in turn, led to the reduction of 
investment capital to the sector. Cable and Wireless, however, remained the exception. 
It remained a constant supplier of international services and later, a supplier of both 
domestic and international components. Therefore, a more plausible explanation of the 
Ministry’s willingness to transfer capital to Cable and Wireless without seeking the 
highest bidder may be attributed to the Ministry’s institutional memory of failed efforts 
in the past. The state’s past unsuccessful and unfavorable experiences with T&GT and
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Continental Telephone Company contrasted with long and close relations with Cable 
and Wireless that were likely to explain the preferential treatment accorded to it.
Conclusion
Beginning in 1980, Jamaica’s telecommunications sector faced several challenges, 
at the heart of which was the new competitive globed telecommunications environment. 
The new international global environment created new economic possibilities for 
Jamaica -  it as well created new challenges for the nation’s development. Jampro rose 
to the new opportunities with the introduction of the Jamaica Digiport initiative that 
would establish a new offshore information processing industry, and which would 
become a revenue source for the nation’s economic development.
The Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport also rose to the occasion to address 
the new challenges that were posed by the global economy. The Ministry’s cross­
subsidization strategy resulted in a stringent regulatory program whereby all entries into 
Jamaica’s telecommunications sector were categorically denied.50 Its decision to 
obstruct competition reflect its view that the introduction of competition in value-added 
and long distance services would undercut the success of the cross-subsidization efforts 
and would be a liability to the regime.’1 The closing of Jamaica’s telecommunications 
sector was the Ministry’s attempt to prevent the liberalization that w'as occurring in the
M,Spiller and Sampson, p. 78.
51 Ibid. p. 76.
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U.S., European, and Japanese telecommunications market in 1984. The Ministry as 
well did not want its initiative to revive Jamaica’s domestic component through the 
proposed cross-subsidization measures to be undermined by the U.S. presidential 
decision to establish a separate satellite system policy.
Amidst these international dynamics, Jampro initiated the Jamaica Digiport 
project, expecting to gain from the more enhanced services and competitive pricing 
structures of the new international environment. Jampro proposed using the American 
Satellite Company to provide international satellite services for the Digiport. However, 
introducing a new actor to the international component at that historical juncture raised 
concerns from both the Ministry and Cable and Wireless as to the viability of cross­
subsidization as a strategy for the revival of the fledgling domestic component. The 
Ministry’s deliberation with Cable and Wireless resulted in the unification of both 
international and domestic components in order to subsidize the domestic segment with 
income from the international segment. Thus, Jampro’s proposal to use a non-Intelsat 
satellite became an unwelcome gesture.
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CHAPTER SIX
DOMESTIC POLITICS, THE INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE REGIME AND 
THE JAMAICA DIGIPORT INTERNATIONAL
Introduction
The 1988 decision of the Jamaican government to establish the U.S.$ 2 million 
Jamaica Digiport International facility heralded Jamaica’s official entry into the 
information industry. This decision was the outcome of a series of negotiations that 
lasted five years, beginning with a plan that would include the use of competitive 
satellite systems and ending with the closing of the sector to competition. This chapter 
seeks an answer to the question of why Jamaica undertook this course of action and why 
it was able to bypass the new international practices of competition in the sector. It 
examines the decision-making process that surrounded the acquisition of satellite 
technology for the Digiport project in order to determine the factors that impinged on 
the choice and the closing of the sector to competition.
The Digiport project was expected to attract new foreign investment to 
Jamaica’s offshore information processing industry while creating job opportunities. 
Located in the Montego Bay Free Zone area, the project targeted foreign firms which 
provided services in the area of airline and hotel reservations, credit authorization, and
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other office procedures in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.52 The 
Digiport facility was expected to provide long distance voice, international toll-free 
(800) calls, facsimile, video links, and high-speed data transmission services between 
Jamaica and the United States.
The final arrangement for the Digiport was based on a consortium of three 
telecommunications suppliers: American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) which 
owned 35% of the total shares, Cable and Wireless International which owned 35%, and 
Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ) which owned 30% of the shares. AT&T and 
C&W were responsible for providing international services, whereas TOJ provided 
support for the domestic telecommunications network. The consortium elected to 
remain within the Intelsat satellite system.
The final agreement on the teleport project was the result of years of negotiation 
and conflict between Jampro and the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport. Jampro 
had partnered with Teleport International in this venture using the satellite technology 
and services of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) and American Satellite 
Company. Lending its support to the Ministry’s opposition was Telecommunications of 
Jamaica - which included Jamintel and Jamaica Telephone company, Industrial
-^The Montego Bay free port zone at that time was one of two facilities which 
consisted of space for factories and warehouses that received 100%= tax exemption for all 
businesses, exemption front custom and import duties, exemption from foreign exchange 
control and no restrictions on the repatriation of profits and assets.
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Commercial Development, - the largest indigenous company on the Jamaican Stock 
Exchange, the National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ), and the most powerful 
political family - the Matalons, who owned shares in TOJ and ICD, and included a 
family member who also headed the NIBJ. The anti-liberalization coalition also 
included international support from Comsat, which objected to Jamaica’s use of a non- 
Intelsat satellite system.
At the heart of the conflict was the issue of whether Jamaica would remain 
within the Intelsat satellite system or would take advantage of the new climate of 
liberalization that had swept the telecommunications industry in the 1980's, particularly 
in the area of satellite technology. JNIP viewed the new economic climate as an 
opportunity to take advantage of competitive prices and improved technology in the 
telecommunications market. Jamintel’s view, however, was that the new climate of 
liberalization was a threat to the stability and security of the business environment to 
which the carriers had grown accustomed.
As the Ministry embarked on its restructuring of the sector, the Jamaica 
Promotions (Jampro) initiated its plans to establish the Digiport project. Jampro had 
positioned itself to draw from the confluence of global and technological changes for its 
development agenda through the establishment of an offshore information processing 
industry where the Digiport, using the competitive American Satellite Company (ASC), 
would generate newr sources of revenue from which the state would benefit. The
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decision to use ASC, however, failed to materialize. This chapter chronicles the 
activities that led to ASC’s defeat.
At one level the project signaled a new income stream for Jamaica’s 
development. Yet at another, it represented a significant threat to existing revenue 
sources that promised to undermine the cross-subsidization agenda that was being 
negotiated between the Ministry and the sector’s service providers. The Ministry acted 
to protect the sector’s revenue by monopolizing Cable and Wireless’ operations and 
rigidly guarding the sector from competition. Jampro’s decision to use the American 
Satellite Coiporation for the Digiport project, therefore, failed to materialize.
There are two ways that one might view Jampro’s actions in its attempt to 
acquire the non-Intelsat satellite system. One might argue that Jampro attempted to 
widen the conflict to the international arena in order to secure the involvement and 
support of other transnational actors. Instead, Jamaica successfully managed to maintain 
its autonomy from United States transnational actors. This study will argue to the 
contrary. First, Jampro’s actions in the international community were solely in keeping 
with the guidelines established by the FCC and by Intelsat. Second, Jamaica did not 
maintain its autonomy from United States transnational actors. Rather, it merely 
realigned with a different set of transnational actors whose interests were in line with 
the winning coalition.
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Jamintel, one the other hand, used its position both internally and externally to 
affect outcomes. Internationally, as Jamaica’s signatory to Intelsat, Jamintel created 
alliances to gain the support of other members within the Intelsat board of Governors. 
Domestically, TOJ, used the influence of its chairman, Mayer Matalon, to exercise 
substantial leverage to overturn the decision to acquire the more efficient, more 
competitive separate satellite system. By maintaining the Intelsat monopoly 
domestically, it was successful in protecting the company’s declining income through 
the sector’s strategy of cross-subsidization.
At the end of the Digiport negotiations Jampro’s objectives for its operation had 
been significantly transformed with regard to ownership, control and selection of 
satellite technology for the operation. Domestic interests and coalition activities played 
a considerable role in the decision to close the sector, and thereby mitigating the effects 
of global telecommunications trends. Additionally, domestic coalition politics were 
significant in the defeat of liberalization in the satellite sector. This chapter analyzes the 
processes that led to this outcome, demonstrating the interaction between sector 
dynamics, domestic politics, and the international telecommunications regime.
The Teleport Initiative: the Planning Stage
In 1985 JNIP embarked on a strategy to attract United States corporations to its 
offshore information processing industry. JNIP was the agency charged with the 
responsibility of “promoting sustainable economic development in Jamaica by assisting
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the private sector to create jobs and increase productivity, capital formation and foreign 
exchange earnings in targeted industries through the effective delivery of technical, 
promotional and facilitator services both locally and overseas.”'’3 JNIP enlisted the 
services of Teleport International (TI), a United States coiporation, to undertake a 
feasibility study to determine whether the establishment of a second Free Zone would 
enhance Jamaica’s information processing industry. The study concluded with a 
recommendation for the establishment of a second Free Zone as well as the 
establishment of teleport facilities. These facilities were to consist of two elements: a 
satellite earth station and a local area network (LAN) serving companies in the free zone 
area. The facilities were intended to reduce costs by buying satellite circuits on a 
wholesale rather than retail basis.
JNIP embraced the idea of a teleport for several reasons. First, the deregulation 
of the United States telecommunications industry created a number of new domestic 
telecommunications entities, such as the American Satellite Corporation (ASC), that 
served as either suppliers or brokers of services in the market of international satellite 
services and were independent of the Intelsat system. JNIP had hoped to attract such 
companies with the expectation of receiving cheaper and more enhanced satellite 
services that were expected to accelerate the development of this sector. Third, the 
project would incorporate a new and more favorable exchange rate adjustment policy
53Taken from Jampro’s Mission Statement in the lobby of Jampro’s headquarters 
in Kingston, Jamaica. West Indies. Prior to 1985, Jampro had been operating under the 
name Jamaica National Investment Program (JNIP).
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intended to attract service industries such as data entry and hotel, airline and car 
reservation firms. The teleport would then be marketed to serve the needs of United 
States corporations. Fourth, the teleport project would coincide with a grant from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) that was intended to 
enhance the development of Jamaica’s information sector.54
In November of 1984 JNIP entered into discussions with Teleport International 
to attract labor-intensive United States companies to Jamaica to take advantage of the 
information service industries. The goal of the teleport initiative was to provide 
“innovative communications services of the highest quality and lowest price” and “to 
create the technological climate for an information services corporation to shift labor 
and communications intensive operations offshore to a lower wage/higher productivity 
location.”55 Teleport International’s plan was to increase employment within the 
Jamaican labor force, while bringing facilities and telecommunications technology to 
Jamaica that w'ould serve the telemarketing, reservation centers (hotel, airlines), remote 
secretarial services, and data entry companies.''’6 Foreign companies would establish 
their offices in the Jamaica Free Zone where they would use the teleport facilities to 
conduct their businesses between Jamaica and their home countries. The teleport would 
ensure reliable, high speed, and high quality communications for voice, data and video.
54 Interview with McLarty and Gooden. See also “Jamaica Digiport International: 
Creating jobs earning Foreign Exchange in The Daily Gleaner, July 24lh 1989.
5'Memo from Jampro to the Prime Minister, Oct 11, 1985 p.9 (Jamaica).
^’Interview with Mr. Winston Gooden on July 20lh 1993
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Teleport International proposed to accomplish this by providing Jamaica with private 
two-way lines or one-way switched or unswitched voice, data, and video services 
between points within the Free Zone and points outside of Jamaica. Under the 
leadership of Teleport International, Jamaica would develop closer economic and 
technological ties to the information industry of the United States.57
Teleport International argued that the use of a U.S. private non-Intelsat satellite 
system would be more cost effective than that provided through Jamaica International 
Telecommunications Company (Jamintel) and the Intelsat system.38 First, Teleport 
International asserted that non-Intelsat providers tended to be 25-30% cheaper than 
Intelsat for data lines and 15-20% cheaper for voice lines. Second, the non-Intelsat 
companies under consideration were technologically superior to Intelsat, and provided 
greater speed. Third, U.S. satellite companies had access to and expertise in marketing 
data entry, telemarketing, publishing, reservations, and other professional services 
within the U.S. domestic market, making them more desirable than Jamintel.39 Fourth, 
the initiative would produce an absolute increase in communications flow between the
57Ibid.
58Interview with Gooden on July 20, 1993. Also see Memo from Teleport 
International to JNIP dated May 1984.
59Memo from Teleport International.
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U.S. and the Caribbean, making it consistent with the U.S. - Caribbean Basin Initiative 
policy of closer involvement, and would lead to more technological transfers.60
As a result of Teleport International’s analysis, JNIP determined that the 
American Satellite Corporation, a non-Intelsat U.S. satellite company, was selected to 
provide private communications services between the United States and the Caribbean. 
JNIP anticipated that this arrangement would produce an approximately 90% reduction 
in costs below the current Intelsat rate.61 The anticipated savings was also expected to 
make Jamaica more attractive to foreign companies that are both labor intensive and 
communications intensive (that is, data entry and reservation firms), and who would 
transfer production from the U.S. and other countries to Jamaica in order to benefit from 
the cheaper labor force and the relatively lower telecommunication costs.62
The question of whether the American Satellite Corporation would divert 
business from Intelsat was a decision of whether or not to proceed with Teleport 
International’s plans. Because the teleport initiative was conceived as an entirely new 
category of services, Teleport International argued that it would not attract existing 
business from Intelsat and would not harm the existing Intelsat arrangements. Teleport 
International further asserted that bringing new enterprises into the existing system
60Memo from Teleport International.
6lSee letter from Teleport International to JNIP dated August 21, 1985, as well as 
the application to the Ministry for a license dated October 2, 1985, (JA)
62 Memo from Teleport International.
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would lead to more traffic over the public switched network, which would only benefit 
Intelsat and its Jamaican signatory.63
On November 2nd, 1984, when JNIP announced the teleport project, it 
immediately proceeded to establish a consortium of service providers that would under­
gird the teleport initiative.64 Interested parties included Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph (NTT), Ceito (a Japanese trading company), the American Satellite 
Corporation, and the Bank of Tokyo. NTT sought to make the teleport project the 
company’s first international project since the breakup of the NTT monopoly, and in 
keeping with the company’s decision to find “good business ventures throughout the 
world.”66 In December of 1984, NTT met with JNIP and Jamaica’s Prime Minister 
Edward Seaga to discuss the teleport and to view the location. The Prime Minister 
expressed his firm commitment to the Teleport International project. 66 His support was 
followed by instructions to the Ministry of Public Utility and Transport in January of 
1985 to ensure that Jamintel would refrain from any developments that would in any 
way conflict with, or undermine, the teleport project. This project, the prime minister 
declared, “forms the basis on which a whole range of data processing industries, as well
“ Interview with Gooden, August 1993.
64 Ibid.
“ Quoted from correspondence between NTT and JNIP in December 1984, (JA) 
“ Ibid.
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as book publication and offshore businesses are expected to be established in Montego 
Bay in an area reserved for the purpose.”67
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Teleport Initiative
The ability to operate the Digiport using a private satellite system was predicated 
upon the successful maneuvering of three processes - two of which were external and 
one internal. These were:
1. A license from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, because a U.S.
satellite company would be providing services between the United States and
Jamaica
2. Approval from Intelsat to operate non-Intelsat satellite services
3. A special license pursuant to the Radio and Telegraph Control Act, from the
Jamaican Ministry of Public Utility and Transport (MPUT).
Jamaica’s use of the American Satellite Corporation first required a license from 
the United States’ Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to ensure non­
interference with the Intelsat system.68 Under the FCC’s Buckley Letter, applicants 
wishing to be connected with the international public switch therefore had to file under 
section 214 of the United States Communications Act of 1934 and Part 63.01 of the
67Letter to Jamintel from Prime Minister Seaga dated January 28, 1985. (JA).
“ Federal Communications Commission, Separate Systems Notice, 100 FCC 2d at 
294, 314; Separate Systems Order. 101 FCC 2d at 1090; Separate System First 
Reconsidered paragraph 5.
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Communications rules. These FCC provisions ensured that the activities of the United 
States’ separate satellite systems were in keeping with United States treaty obligations 
with Intelsat, which prevented connection to the international public switch network by 
domestic separate satellite systems. Teleport International therefore requested permission 
from the FCC to construct satellite facilities and for the American Satellite Corporation to 
operate, transmit and receive satellite services for the provision of non-switched private 
telecommunications lines that would be connected to the international public switched 
system tor business communications between the United States and Jamaica.69 The 
Jamaican government initiated the procedure with an inquiry addressed to the United 
States Ambassador to Jamaica about the process. In response to Jampro's inquiry, the 
United States ambassador explained in a letter that:70
U.S. policy and practice in authorizing international 
satellite communication services is that any U.S. 
international satellite system separate from Intelsat for 
international public satellite telecommunications between 
the U.S. and another country is restricted to 
communications not interconnected with the public- 
switched (telephone, telegram or telex) systems in either 
country. Service is therefore restricted to ‘private, intra­
corporate communications links’. Basic public telephone, 
telex and telegraph are off limits. This policy was designed
69Letter from Jampro to the Prime xMinister’s office dated June 5th 1986, (JA).
™By 1985, when this letter was written, JNIP’s name had been changed to Jampro 
or Jamaica Promotions.
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to protect Intelsat from traffic and revenue diversion in its 
major service, international telephone.'1
The American Satellite Corporation was required to conform to the terms of the Buckley 
Letter and would be granted a conditional license by the FCC to construct and operate a 
satellite earth station or other transponder facilities. While the FCC’s policy prohibited 
domestic satellite companies from connecting with the international public switched 
network, the FCC nevertheless allowed one exception to be made under the Buckley 
Letter, which states that:
certainly exceptional circumstances may exist where it 
would be in the interest of the United States to use 
d o m e stic  s a te l l i te s  fo r p u b lic  in te rn a tio n a l 
telecommunications within nearby countries. One such case 
would be where the global system could not provide the 
service required. Another case would be where the service 
planned would be clearly uneconomical or impractical 
using the Intelsat system.72
7’Letter from US Embassy in Jamaica, Dec 9th 1985 to Mrs Corrine 
McLarty, Head of Jampro, (JA). The letter was in response to Mrs. McLarty’s 
inquiry concerning the Buckley Letter, which states the conditions under which the 
U.S.’s FCC would approve domestic satellite systems for use and its relevance to 
Jamaica’s request for satellite service.
72James L. Buckley, Undersecretary of State, to the FCC, July 23rd, 1981. 
FCC document
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On October 9, 1986, the FCC approved the provision of services between the 
United States and Jamaica by the American Satellite Corporation. The FCC approval 
signaled that the American Satellite Coiporation had met all of the following three 
criteria: 1) the proposed service was consistent with all current FCC policies; 2) Intelsat 
could not provide the proposed service, therefore the project would not cause economic 
or technical harm; and 3) the proposed system was in fact a separate satellite system, that 
is the provision of international service based on a satellite system that was either new or 
significantly modified from the Intelsat system.7'1
Intelsat and the Teleport Initiative
The second phase of the licensing process that had to be undertaken by Jampro 
was the appeal to Intelsat. Because of United States’ treaty obligations, the FCC required 
that Teleport International’s request adhere to Intelsat’s Article XIV(d) on Technical and 
Economic Coordination.74 Article XIV(d) specifically prohibited Intelsat member states 
from engaging in any activity that would result in either technological or economic 
interference with the Intelsat satellite systems. In June 1986, the government of Jamaica, 
led by Jampro, petitioned the Intelsat Board of Governors for a license to establish 
teleport facilities between U.S. and Jamaica using a two-way transponder provided by the
73INTELSAT, "Events in the United States Relating to Separate International 
Satellite Systems”, BG-72-44E B/6/87, Pg 5. The document may be found at the FCC 
office in Washington, D.C., United States of America.
74Letter from Jampro to the Prime Minister's office October 9th 1986, (JA). See 
also the FCC's File # I-T-C-85-187, “American Satellite Corporation”, as well as FCC File 
# I-T-C-85-188. The FCC documents may be obtained from the FCC office in 
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
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American Satellite Corporation based on a satellite system that was either new or 
significantly modified from the Intelsat system. Jampro had high expectations for the 
approval of the teleport project based on the fact that the project was similar to existing 
transponder services between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico.
The approval process consisted of three phases. First, the Director General 
reviews the application and submits a recommendation to the Board of Governors. 
Second, the Board of Governors, with the assistance of the Technical Committee, reviews 
the request and submits its recommendations to the Assembly of Parties. Third, the 
Assembly of Parties makes a final review and issues its recommendations.
Intelsat’s Board of Governors consists of states such as the U.S., which has a 
direct and permanent voice. Jamaica, however, was represented by the signatory, 
Compania del Telefono de la Republica Dominicana (CODETEL), which also 
represented a coalition of five other nations of the region — the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Trinidad. In order to place the teleport project on the 
agenda of Intelsat’s Board of Governors’ meeting, jampro had to achieve either a 
consensus among the other five states or a majority vote of the Board. Intelsat had 
historically operated on the basis of a consensus rather than a majority. Jampro, therefore, 
needed to lobby the five other nations represented by CODETEL, as well as other direct 
Board members to persuade them of the critical economic importance of the teleport
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project to Jamaica.7’’ Therefore, in order to gain the assent of members of its group, 
Jampro needed to establish the similarities between the teleport project and the 
transponder projects of Mexico and Canada which had been approved by the United 
States.76
Efforts to place the teleport project on the agenda of the Intelsat Board of 
Governors’ meeting in June of 1986 in Rio de Janeiro failed. Trinidad, Dominican 
Republic, Bahamas, and Barbados vigorously opposed the effort, but the foremost 
opposition came from Jamaica’s signatory, Jamintel. Thus, Jampro was unable to obtain 
the needed majority within the Caribbean group in order to place the matter directly 
before the Board. “It became apparent that Jamintel had successfully lobbied these 
members who were then all strongly opposed to the teleport project.’’77 Jampro 
immediately began to lobby other Intelsat countries extensively in an attempt to increase 
the level of support for the teleport project. Jampro held subsequent discussions with 
Australia, Canada, France and the Cameroon — board members who showed lukewarm 
support. Britain and its signatory, Cable and Wireless, the Nordic group (Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland and Norway) and Germany, in contrast, were very strongly opposed to 
the project.78 Opponents of the project believed that it would result in a loss of revenue to
75Ibid.
76Ibicl.
77 Ib id .
78lbid.
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Intelsat.79 Nevertheless, despite the lack of resounding support for the use of non-Intelsat 
satellites, Jampro’s mission was not a loss. It was successful in gaining Intelsat’s 
authorization for the use of the American Satellite Company.
Bureaucratic Politics and the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport (MPUT)
The third process, which had to be navigated in order to liberalize Jamaica’s 
satellite service, was the acquisition of domestic licenses to operate. Teleport 
International was required to obtain a special license from the Ministry of Public Utilities 
and Transport pursuant to the Radio and Telegraph Control Act. This license would 
determine 1) the duration of the license; 2) the exclusive nature of the license; and 3) the 
length of notice that was required by the government for termination of the license 
agreement. A request for a 27-year exclusive contract without prior notice of termination 
was made on October 2, 1985. This request was rejected by the Ministry, which instead 
recommended a seventeen-year contract - ten years of which would be exclusive, and 
with a two-year notice of termination.
The Ministry stipulated that after the ten-year exclusive period, the state would 
have the option of assigning or disposing of the contract, thereby allowing other 
applicants to offer similar services. Since the license was for international connections, 
the Ministry also objected to the provision of services from one point to another within 
the country. The license would only allow services from one point in the nation directed
79Ibid.
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at another point outside the country.
The Ministry expressed continued support for the use of Jamintel over a new 
carrier by ensuring its continued monopoly over the domestic market.80 As early as 
August 1985, the Ministry began articulating Jamintel’s concerns regarding the scope of 
the proposed license, arguing that the new license would pose a potential threat to the 
domestic telecommunications entities (Cable & Wireless, Jamintel and Telephone 
Company of Jamaica (TOJ)). It began to voice strong opposition to the project, for several 
reasons.81 To begin with, , the Ministry harbored doubts from the outset about obtaining 
external approvals through the cumbersome process from both the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission and Intelsat. Secondly, it argued that the project would be 
in competition with Jamintel.82 And thirdly, the Ministry viewed with great skepticism 
several claims made by Teleport International.
One claim made by Teleport International during the negotiation process was that 
the American Satellite Corporation would be exempt from article 14(d) of the Intelsat 
agreement, which required approval from Intelsat’s Assembly of Parties prior to the 
establishment, acquisition or utilization of any satellite facilities. This claim later proved
80A letter from the Ministry to Jampro dated August 28, 1995, (JA). See also the 
application for a license from Teleport International to the Ministry dated October 2, 1985, 
(JA).
The Ministry raised opposition to Jampro in a letter dated August 28, 1985, (JA).
82Jbid.
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to be false. The second of Teleport International’s claims - that it could immediately 
begin services as soon as the physical facilities were in place as a result of a previous 
agreement with the U.S. Department of State and the FCC, also proved false.83 The 
Ministry’s concerns proved to be valid when the teleport project experienced a series of 
delays due to Teleport International’s inability to secure the needed authorization from 
both Intelsat and the FCC as it had hoped. “We have been proven correct,” the Ministry 
declared. “They cannot achieve anything before the next Assembly of Parties scheduled 
for I987.”84
The Ministry’s strongest objection to the project was based on its concern that the 
teleport project constituted a dramatic change from the status quo of the Intelsat 
monopoly system which allowed 21 U.S. domestic satellites to provide TV, audio, and 
data services to Caribbean countries on a receive-only basis. The Ministry had agreed to 
the receive-only condition in 1985 and reaffirmed the agreement the very week that the 
teleport project was being reviewed. The Ministry viewed the teleport project as 
representing a policy shift and a violation of Jamaica’s international obligations to 
Intelsat.
The Ministry expressed a third area of opposition to the teleport project. This 
opposition was on the grounds that Intelsat had at that period created similar services in
X?A letter to Jampro from the Ministry’s permanent secretary dated January 16, 
1986, (JA).
84A letter to Jampro from the Ministry dated January 16, 1985, (JA).
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the formation of the International Business Services (IBS). IBS was available 
immediately and provided teleport services, without the lengthy approval process needed 
for use of non-Intelsat systems.. Opinions differed as to the comparative costs between 
IBS and domestic satellites. Teleport International argued that its proposed domestic 
satellites were more cost effective than IBS. Nevertheless, the Ministry asserted that 
discussions were underway between Jamintel and COMSAT, on a possible collaboration 
in a teleport project.
COMSAT had no objections to the idea of partnership with other national 
signatories in the establishment of a teleport. The Ministry also felt that a partnership 
with COMSAT would be an attractive proposition because COMSAT possessed in-house 
marketing capabilities and because it had the capabilities to undertake such a venture as 
the Digiport project. The Ministry noted that they should be presented with other 
available options, such as the “vastly improved” services being offered by the Intelsat 
system and not just the American Satellite Company, as Teleport International was 
proposing.8,1
The Ministry expressed additional concerns about the rapid increase in the number 
of domestic satellite corporations, stating that they had sprung up as a result of 
deregulation, noting that in a few years, very few domestic satellite companies would
toMemo to the Prime Minister from the Ministry dated October 11, 1985, p. 9,
(JA).
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remain.86 It strongly recommended that Jamaica go with the services of AT&T, RCA, or 
COMSAT, which were associated with Intelsat and which had more experience in 
providing telecommunications services. Moreover, they owned and operated their own 
satellites, and in the case of COMSAT, had planned to build a teleport similar to that 
proposed by Teleport International.87
Domestic Responses to the Jamaica Digiport Project
Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ) also had several concerns about the 
teleport project and concurred with the Ministry’s objection. Jamintel was not allowed to 
operate within the jurisdiction of the teleport under Teleport International’s initiative as a 
result of the company’s belief that Jamintel did not possess the marketing capacity or the 
technological superiority to successfully market the newly-formed information 
processing industry.88 Teleport International also believed that Jamintel was also not in a 
position to provide the type of services that were being contemplated by the project.89
Jampro argued that Teleport International’s marketing package for the project was 
vastly superior to those of Jamintel and that the proposed teleport would not compete 
with Jamintel. Jampro assured Jamintel that neither entity would experience loss of
R6Ibid.
87Ibid.
88A letter from Jampro to both Jamintel and JTC dated April 18th 1986, (JA).
89Ibid.
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income as a result of the teleport project because of its location in the protected duty-free 
zone.90 In addition, no loss in income would result, Jampro argued, since Jamintel and 
JATELCO/JTC were not in the business of providing dedicated leased lines.91 Jampro 
also argued that since neither entity provided dedicated leased line services, the national 
interest would be better served using by the existing arrangement since the Jamaican 
Government would have equity in the project.92
Hardly persuaded by Jampro’s claims, in 1985 Jamintel embarked on negotiations 
with AT&T to address the shortcomings that Jampro had identified.93 Jamintel argued 
that the selection of AT&T as its service provider would ensure that it would shortly be 
capable of offering private line data services using U.S. domestic systems at considerably 
lower prices than those stated in its original proposal, which was based on the use of the 
Intelsat system at prices that would be subject to the approval of the FCC,94 Jamintel 
selected AT&T because its satellite network was quite extensive and its earth terminals in 
the United States were located close to major cities.95
90 Ib id .
91 lb i d.
92Ibid.
93A letter to Jamintel from AT&T asserting AT&T’s support of JaminteFs 
marketing needs, November 26, 1985, (JA).
94A letter from Jamintel to Jampro dated December 3. 1985, (JA).
"Ibid.
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Jampro, however, was not swayed by Jamintel’s vision for the future. Instead Jampro 
argued that in 1986 AT&T had embarked on its own study of the feasibility of 
establishing teleport facilities in Jamaica and concluded that although a teleport was 
economically and technologically feasible, AT&T did not wish to establish operations in 
Jamaica.96 Jampro noted that its own research also revealed that IBM had expressed 
unwillingness to enter territory where AT&T feared to tread and that Sprint and MCI 
wanted to wait to view the results of Jamaica’s experience before contemplating 
involvement.97 Jampro was, therefore, convinced that Jamintel would never be able to 
fulfill its lofty goals for establishing a teleport in Jamaica.
In April of 1986, approximately two months after Jampro and Teleport 
International had reached an agreement, the Cabinet met to deliberate on granting a four- 
year period of exclusive rights for the provision of services. Under the terms of the 
contract, Jamintel would be restricted from providing services using Intelsat, leaving the 
American Satellite Corporation free to provide cheaper services. The American Satellite 
Corporation would also be allowed to compete with Jamintel with respect to local or long
"Jampro’s “Teleport Terms of Reference,” November 2, 1984, (JA). See also letter 
to Jamintel, April 18, 1986, (JA).
^Ibid-
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distance public switched services. At the end of the four-year period, Jamintel would be 
free to provide satellite services.98
The provisions of the license under deliberation by the Cabinet raised several 
concerns. In a letter to Jamintel and the Ministry, Cable and Wireless articulated their 
concerns about the impact of the introduction of another external telecommunications 
entity on the viability of both Jamintel and JATELCO." Cable and Wireless stated that
...It is our understanding that the initial proposal by Teleport International 
would introduce special services which are NOT now being undertaken by 
Jamintel, but what we have before us is the provision of normal externa] 
telecommunications services between Jamaica and any point outside Jamaica 
unless Jamintel is unwilling to provide such service or is unable to offer in place 
of such services an adequate telecommunications service.”100
Cable and Wireless’ assertion that the services that were being orchestrated by 
Teleport International were nothing more than “normal external telecommunications 
services,” was an assertion that the American Satellite Company was in fact encroaching
98A letter of amendment to the license agreement from the Jamaica Attorney 
General’s office dated August 21, 1986, (JA).
"Letter to Jamintel and the Ministry from Cable and Wireless dated April 5, 1986,
(JA).
100A letter to Jamintel and the Ministry from the chairman of the board of 
Directors of Cable and Wireless, April 5, 1986, (JA).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
205
on and a violation of the monopoly rights of Jamintel to provide “normal external 
telecommunications services” within Jamaica.
Jamintel argued that the use of the American Satellite Corporation would cause a 
diversion of income from the hotel and commercial sectors from Jamintel and JATELCO, 
and would ultimately jeopardize the foreign exchange flows that would otherwise accrue 
to the government.'01 Jamintel also had several concerns that the contract would permit 
the American Satellite Corporation to operate, not only within the Free Zone, but to 
points within Jamaica that were within a five-mile radius of the Free Zone, and therefore, 
within the public external telecommunications service over which Jamintel had a 
monopoly.102
Cable and Wireless disagreed with claims that the American Satellite Corporation 
would be providing special services that were beyond the realm of Jamintel’s normal 
activities. Cable and Wireless argued vehemently that granting a license to Teleport 
International for the operation of the American Satellite Company was in fact creating 
external telecommunications services that were in direct competition with Jamintel. Cable 
and Wireless also noted that granting of a license for the teleport project would represent 
a shift in government policy toward Cable and Wireless and a violation of the monopoly 
agreement.
IOlIbid.
102A letter to the Prime Minister from Mr. Mayer Matalon, Chairman of the 
Jamaica Telephone company, on April 15, 1986, (JA).
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Such Licenses contravene the Government of Jamaica’s 
agreement with Cable and Wireless signed November 1970, 
which stated that Jamintel would be the sole licensee in the 
field of overseas telecommunications in Jamaica and 
Clause 17103, which indicates that if Jamintel is willing and 
able to provide for all Jam aica’s Free Zone 
telecommunications requirements, a license cannot be 
granted elsewhere.
Teleport International’s license would seem to be the 
setting up of separate telecommunications facilities to serve 
new industries attracted to Montego Bay and would be the 
introduction of competition for international and domestic 
telecommunications services in Jamaica. Moreover, the 
new competition would be licensed to operate on a highly 
privileged basis, without the international and public 
service responsibility imposed on Jamintel, without the 
obligation to share revenue with JATELCO and with all the 
fiscal advantages of operating with a Free Zone area. This 
new policy would severely impair Jamintel’s viability and 
the interest of shareholders. Cable and Wireless therefore 
fully opposes the proposition to Jamintel’s Board of 
Directors.103
l03Clause 17 of the 1968 agreement between the Government of Jamaica 
and Cable and Wireless. This clause was later assigned to Jamintel.
104A letter to Jamintel and the Ministry from the chairman of the board of 
Directors of Cable and Wireless, April 5. 1986, (JA)..
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In May of 1986, there were discussions within the Cabinet as to whether Jamintel, 
acting by itself or within any other relationship, would be able to compete against the 
teleport project at the end of the four years. Jamintel was also concerned about “the 
erosion of the license agreed upon” between Cable and Wireless and the Jamaican 
government.105 This concern was the basis of a letter to the prime minister in which 
Jamintel stated that “the company (Jamintel) now has in place an external 
telecommunications system which can meet all the objectives and purposes of the 
proposed license to Teleport International and the needs of the Free Zone. The Company 
would also undertake the enhancement of such services where necessary to support the 
development of the free port.”106
In September 1986, Jamintel and JATELCO increased the level of opposition 
against the teleport project. The companies presented their arguments to the prime 
minister and to Jampro. They argued that if the teleport were to provide 
telecommunications services to all the companies in the Free Zone as well as to those 
companies involved in information services outside the Free Zone, then a substantial 
portion of their revenue would be lost as a result of companies that would migrate to Free 
Zone areas to benefit from the cheaper services. Both companies argued that the 
consequence of the teleport project would be a large number of firms switching from the
105A letter from Jamintel to Prime Minister Edward Seaga dated April 5, 1986,
(JA).
l(xTbici.
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public network of Jamintel and Jatelco to private lines of the American Satellite 
Corporation the teleport.107
Jamintel initiated discussions with COMSAT and AT&T to create a joint venture 
between both companies and Jamintel to provide services comparable to American 
Satellite Corporation. Jamintel argued that because of its extensive operations in the 
United States, its ownership of earth satellites, and its telemarketing operations, AT&T’s 
capabilities were superior to those of the American Satellite Corporation. Shortly 
thereafter, Jamintel released its “Proposal for the Provision of Enhanced 
Telecommunications Services for Jamaica’s Free Zone.” In this report Jamintel declared 
itself as possessing the technical capability and the international contacts to provide and 
market telecommunications services to meet the objective of the Jamaican government to 
attract United States investors to Jamaica’s offshore information processing industry.108 It 
declared that it was able to deliver a wide range of services and to attract businesses from 
both local and overseas markets. Jamintel remained committed to its stance that its 
technical and marketing capabilities were indeed superior to the arrangements made by 
Teleport International.
i07A letter from Mr. Mayer Matalon to the Prime Minister dated April 15, 1986
(JA).
108A letter to Jamintel and JTC from JNIP dated April 18, 1986, (JA). See also 
JNIP document “Teleport Terms of Reference,” November 2, 1984, (JA). For the pro- 
Jamintel position, see JaminteFs “Proposal for he Provision of Enhanced 
Telecommunications Services for Jamaica’s Free Zone,” (JA).
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The Final Stage of the Teleport Project
Added to the number of dissenting voices in opposition to the use of the American 
Satellite Corporation was the Industrial Commercial Development (ICD), a private 
holding company that was the largest non-financial company listed on the Jamaican 
Stock Exchange and which owned 21% of shares in the newly privatized sector. ICD 
possessed the largest domestic shareholding in Telecommunications of Jamaica, the 
parent company of Jamintel. ICD’s chairman was Eli Matalon, a brother of Mayer 
Matalon who headed Telecommunications of Jamaica. As chairman of the Jamaica 
Telephone Company, Mayer Matalon had strongly urged the Ministry to deny licenses to 
the American Satellite Company on the grounds that it was a violation of contract 
agreements with Cable and Wireless and a detraction of revenue from Jamintel. Eli 
Matalon, also a partner in the telecommunications sector as a head of ICD, also pressed 
for the dissolution of the old partnership and encouraged Prime Minister Seaga to 
commence with the new arrangement headed by Jamintel. 109
Before the Jamaican Parliament met to discuss and vote on the issue of licensing 
the teleport project, many changes had transpired that significantly transformed the 
project from the original conception of its authors. The first of a series of changes was the 
creation of the National Investment Bank of Jamaica (NIBJ) headed by Mayer Matalon. 
The Prime Minister had appointed the Bank to negotiate and oversee the government’s
109Carol S. Holzgerg, Minority and Power in a Black Society: The Jewish 
Community in Jamaica (Lanham, MD: The North-South Publishing Co, 1987). pp. 207- 
208.
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20% share in the teleport project.110 Matalon, in his capacity as the sector’s chief 
negotiator was determined to preserve the viability of the newly restructured sector by 
protecting it from competition. Matalon therefore strongly supported the use of Intelsat 
satellites rather than a separate satellite system.1 u
In several letters to the Prime Minister, Matalon urged a partnership of Jamintel 
with AT&T and Cable and Wireless instead of the Teleport International arrangement. 
Matalon argued that AT&T possessed the marketing skills that Jamaica needed and that 
their skills were superior to those of the American Satellite Corporation.112 As a result of 
these recommendations, in 1989 the Prime Minister and his cabinet authorized the 
abandonment of the Teleport International consortium using the American Satellite 
Corporation, and instead, gave way to the creation of the new consortium which consisted 
of Jamintel, the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (AT&T), and Cable and 
Wireless (C&W). Intelsat replaced the American Satellite Corporation as the provider of 
satellite services.
The winning coalition of the Ministry, Jamintel and Cable and Wireless, was 
amenable to the new arrangement and was willing to issue an exclusive license to the new 
consortium instead of the previous one. Under the new consortium, the teleport project
11 °A letter dated May 28, 1986 from NIBJ to Jampro, (JA).
’"See the letter to the Jamaican Prime Minister dated April 15, 1986, written by 
Mr. Mayer Matalon, then the Chairman of the Jamaica Telephone Company.
1 "Letter to the Jamaican Prime Minister dated April 15, 1986.
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was renamed the Jamaica Digiport International. Jamintel managed to achieve victory at 
the domestic level, and this victory prevented Jamaica from putting into effect the 
separate satellite systems rule, while instead reinforcing the monopoly system. Jamintel’s 
success was despite Jampro’s appeal to the international rule pertaining to the operation 
of separate satellite system.
Conclusion
The Jamaica Digiport was established as a means of providing new sources of 
revenue for the state, and as a way of taking advantage of changes in the 
telecommunications sector. These changes included the shift in ownership from national 
telecommunication monopolies to a more competitive global environment. Changes were 
also evident in the international satellite regime, which had also moved toward a more 
competitive satellite market. The American Satellite Corporation and other newly 
established separate satellite systems were a reflection of these global changes. 
Nevertheless, despite these global changes, which were evident in Intelsat and the FCC’s 
approval of the American Satellite Corporation’s involvement in providing satellite 
services to Jamaica, the Jamaican government officially moved to reject the use of a non- 
Intelsat satellite in the provision of service for the Digiport project.
The Digiport project became the battlefield in which those in favor of opening up 
the sector to foreign competition battled with those opposed. On the one hand was 
Jampro in partnership with the foreign Teleport International, and on the other stood the
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Ministry and Jamaica’s telecommunications suppliers, between whom was Cable and 
Wireless. The coalition effectively influenced the position of the prime minister, which 
resulted in his changing his December 1984 position from that in which he instructed the 
Ministry not to obstruct the American Satellite Company arrangement to his 1986 
position, when Cable and Wireless and the Intelsat system replaced the American 
Satellite Company.
The restructuring which accompanied the cross-subsidization policy solidified the 
monopoly control of Cable and Wireless over the sector and coincided with Jampro’s 
attempt to liberalize the sector with the introduction of the American Satellite 
Corporation. Jampro’s decision became a threat to the restructuring efforts, which were 
designed to impede liberalization from taking root locally. Domestic interests played a 
greater role in the state’s decision to close the sector, thereby mitigating the effects of 
global telecommunications trends. The anti-liberalization coalition played a decisive role 
in the defeat of the Digiport’s use of competitive satellite systems.
Two questions emerged from the analysis of Jamaica’s satellite acquisition for the 
Digiport project: why did Jamaica take the course it did in closing the sector to 
competition, and why was it able to do so in the light of existing international regulations 
permitting and approving Jamaica’s use of competitive satellite systems? First, Jamaica 
took the course it did because the interest of the winning coalition was one that benefited 
from maintaining the Intelsat monopoly. The winning coalition consisted of the
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Ministry, Cable and Wireless, Telecommunications of Jamaica, ICD, the Matalon 
brothers, and COMSAT, and it was opposed to competition.
Jamaica’s decision to close the sector to competition was based on its perceptions 
of the needs of the domestic component, the viability of which rested heavily on the 
success of the cross-subsidization between international and local communications. The 
cross-subsidization policy was proposed and implemented by the Ministry to protect the 
sector’s income and to address the negative effects that international competition might 
have on the sector’s income. Its success required the preservation of the former monopoly 
status quo. Second, Jamaica was unable to appeal to the regime regarding the decision 
not to liberalize the sector because the majority winning coalition consisted of Intelsat 
signatories, which served as decision makers within the regime. An appeal to Intelsat 
would be an appeal to these signatories, creating the possibility for further conflict 
between Jampro and its signatories.





The establishment of the Jamaica Digiport International in 1988 using the 
satellite technology and marketing capabilities of Cable and Wireless, AT&T and the 
Intelsat system was the result of five years of negotiations. This decision spelt victory for 
one of two contending factions. On the one hand was Jampro in alliance with Teleport 
International and the American Satellite Company which attempted to liberalize the 
sector’s use of satellite technology with the operation of the American Satellite Company, 
while on the other hand, the Ministry of Public Utility and Transport, in conjunction with 
Telecommunications of Jamaica, ICD, NIBJ and the international support of Comsat, 
elected to close the sector to competition.
The winning coalition in the Digiport negotiations desired the continuation of the 
Intelsat monopoly which the sector had enjoyed since 1963. This Intelsat monopoly 
operation using both Cable and Wireless and Telecommunications of Jamaica. In 1988 
the Ministry extended these monopoly privileges beyond the area of satellite services to 
the entire telecommunications sector. Its actions were part of a restructuring plan that was
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designed to prevent the operation of competitive satellite systems in the domestic 
component. The goal of the restructuring plan was to facilitate the new 
cross-subsidization policy to protect the domestic component.
This satellite acquisition process which resulted in the closing of the sector to 
competition raised two salient questions which this dissertation addressed. First, what 
explains Jamaica’s failure to liberalize the sector’s use of satellite technology as 
demonstrated in its 1988 decision to prevent competition? Second, how was it possible to 
undertake this measure amidst the powerful forces of global market liberalization trends 
in the telecommunications sector as well as in international regime principles and 
practices? It seeks to understand why the winning coalition was able to have such a strong 
influence in the face of power global trends.
This dissertation concludes that there were two overriding sectoral characteristics 
which allowed Jamaica the ability to withstand these two powerful global forces - the 
liberalization of the sector and the impact of the sector’s telecommunications 
multinationals on domestic politics. The first factor that led to the coalition’s success was 
the structure and processes within which the regulation of the global sector occurred. The 
Intelsat system functioned by setting guidelines for the operation of the global satellite. 
Among the guidelines was the separate satellite systems policy whereby national systems 
were permitted the use of separate systems which do not undermine Intelsat’s operations.
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Paradoxically, the decision to allow the use of separate satellite systems was 
authorized by Intelsat’s signatories whose interest it was to have the sector remain closed 
to competition. In Jamaica, the signatory had an interest in the market’s remaining closed 
and would benefit from such a closing. As a result, Intelsat’s signatories failed to act to 
open the market in accordance with Intelsat’s policies. Coalition politics within the 
country had a greater effect on Jamaica's failure to liberalize the use of satellite services 
than global trends and regime practices. These domestic interests in the sector served as 
the second set of factors that led to the closing of Jamaica’s sector to competitive satellite 
technology.
International Telecommunications Satellite Regime
One answer to the question of why the winning coalition was able to be as 
effective as it was in the face of global trends and regime policies can best be understood 
in the context of the Intelsat satellite regime w'hich had been in place since 1963. The 
purpose of the organization was to cooperatively provide uninterrupted global satellite 
services to all interested nations. Since its inception, the national signatories played a 
central decision-making role in Intelsat and all decisions to allow competition in the 
global satellite market had to meet with their approval. The signatories were empowered 
to make decisions concerning domestic satellite operations independent of domestic 
decision-making processes. This structure empowered signatories to selectively restrict 
competition from non-Intelsat suppliers.
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Until 1985, Intelsat was the monopoly supplier and sole regulator of the 
international satellite market. As a result of new telecommunications firms’ wishing to 
enter the satellite sector, both the United States and Intelsat established separate satellite 
systems policies to facilitate the operation of these independent suppliers. However, this 
ruling that favored the entry of new firms was not enough to erode Intelsat's domination 
of the global satellite market monopoly. The ability of separate satellite systems to 
effectively operate locally was undermined by the signatories. Intelsat's continued 
dominance can therefore be best explained by the actions of signatories domestically and 
at the level of the international institution.
While the Intelsat system expressed a commitment to opening the system to 
competition, the signatories’ interests were clearly enhanced by the preservation of the 
Intelsat monopoly. As the primary decision-makers as well as the organization's principal 
investors in the Intelsat system, the signatories, through the Meeting of Signatories and 
the Meeting of Parties, are empowered to protect the organization's investments.
Intelsat's structure and the role played by signatories within the system therefore 
functioned to protect the status quo of the single global system and to bar the entry of 
other firms whose activities did not enhance Intelsat’s investment goals. Intelsat's 
leadership therefore served as gatekeeper - monitoring the entry of non-Intelsat satellite 
firms within the global market. As a result, the monopoly status quo remained intact 
because of limitations placed by Intelsat’s signatories on the operation of competitive
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firms because the liberalization of Jamaica’s domestic satellite services was inconsistent 
with signatories and their interests.
The Jamaica Telecommunications Sector
The second factor that conditioned the success of the winning coalition was their 
material interests. These interests served as the impetus for their action. In 1984, when 
Jampro attempted to liberalize the sector to a non-Intelsat satellite system, it was based on 
two factors. First was the trend toward liberalization of the global telecommunications 
services. The period had witnessed the breakup of the AT&T monopoly in the US with 
similar actions in Great Britain and Japan and with it the entry of new firms into the 
sector. The second reason for the decision was the set of conditionalities prescribed by 
the IMF Structural Adjustment Program of 1982-1987.113 The IMF had required that 
Jamaica liberalize its telecommunications sector as a precondition for receiving future. 
Jamaica was subsequently able to get authorization to liberalize satellite services at two 
levels, that of the FCC and Intelsat’s Director General in 1986. Nevertheless, despite 
these approvals, domestic approval was not forthcoming, resulting in the closing of the 
sector to competition.
Proponents of the decision to close the sector were concerned that a competitive 
international environment where separate systems were allowed to operate posed a threat 
to the income of Jamaica’s domestic component. While the sector had begun to
1 l3McCormick, p. 146.
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experience rapid growth in international telecommunications services, that growth was 
matched only by the rapid decline in revenue from domestic telecommunications services 
(Fig. 5-1). The declining income in the domestic sector created a dilemma for which a 
solution was sought. A cross-subsidization policy was designed to address this dilemma 
by subsidizing the domestic component with income from that of the international. But 
first, a major restructuring of the sector was planned that would unite both components 
under a single ownership and closing the sector to competition. The interests of the 
winning coalition had indeed prevailed.
Contribution to the Literature
Cortell and Davis argue that international regimes play an important role in 
resolving domestic conflict particularly where there is close societal involvement in 
decision-making. During such a conflict, regimes are important, they argue, because 
coalition members may strategically use regime norms to enhance the probability of their 
success in solving domestic disputes. This strategy has a greater propensity for success 
when the decision-making institution is decentralized and there is a close societal/state 
relation. Actors who are able to appeal to international regime norms are more likely to be 
legitimized, resulting in the successful implementation of its policy. This appeal to 
international norms is “a legal right by which to elicit the government’s implementation 
of the rule’s prescription.” 114
ll4Cortell and Davis, p. 457.
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The international telecommunications satellite sector, however, is an exception to 
this phenomenon. The international regime principles were at odds with the interests of 
the winning coalition, many of whom were signatories of Intelsat. As a result, Jampro’s 
appeal to the veiy regime principles which were approved by Intelsat itself through the 
licensing process, were not honored and Jampro’s requests were denied. Jampro’s request 
to liberalize the sector was denied rather than legitimized.
Risse-Kappen also argues that international regimes are significant in affecting 
domestic outcomes. Their significance is based on three characteristics: the relative 
strength of states, the nature of state-society interaction and the nature of the policy 
network. Within the context of these characteristics, the extent to which the sector is 
regulated at the international level, he argues, determines the effectiveness of these 
structures. He concludes that international institutions are expected to reduce coalition- 
building requirements for transnational coalitions, especially those who advocate norm- 
compliance.115 The telecommunications satellite sector also serves as an exception to this 
case. Here, although highly regulated, those advocating compliance to Intelsat’s policy to 
allow liberalization were ineffective in opening Jamaica’s sector to competition. Instead, 
the winners in this conflict effectively engaged in their own coalition-building to oppose 
the opening of the sector to competition. Competition was effectively supplanted, 
producing the outcome that was inconsistent with the decision of the Intelsat regime that 
would liberalize the sector. The international regime policy which led to the consideration
115
Risse-Kappe, p. 30.
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of a competitive satellite system for the Digiport proposal constituted a conflict of 
interests for the Intelsat signatories and this conflict was resolved by implementing a 
decision which opposed regime policies. Jampro’s appeal to Intelsat’s rules and 
agreements had failed to produce the desired outcome.
Future Research
The year 1994 signaled two major milestones in the transformation of the 
international telecommunications sector. The first was the elimination of the Intelsat 
regime as the international institution charged with the responsibility of global 
governance in the international satellite sector. The second was the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) charged with the dual responsibilities of liberalizing the 
global telecommunications sector and negotiating telecommunications agreements, h  
April of that year, ministers from thirty-three nations signed the 1994 Marrakesh Treaty 
for the establishment of the WTO.
WTO held the responsibility for administering all agreements that were 
established within the framework of the Uruguay Round. In the area of 
telecommunications, its goals were the establishment of a multilateral trade network that 
would increase the level of investment in telecommunications equipment and services 
and progressively liberalize the telecommunications markets, opening up monopoly 
markets to competition. The signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services had 
far reaching implications since, for the first time, it placed trade in telecommunications
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services within the realm of the multilateral trading system.116 When the negotiations had 
ended, sixty-nine (69) nations, forty of which were developing states, also agreed to 
introduce domestic regulatory regimes consistent with the new WTO rules. Among them 
were Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, three nations which have had 
longstanding monopoly telecommunications sectors that have been completely dominated 
by Cable and Wireless.
Several rounds of negotiations have resulted in the agreements to enhance trade in 
telecommunications goods and services. The Negotiating Group on Basic 
Telecommunications (NGBT), which is open to all states and the European Community, 
lasted from April 1994 to April 1996 and resulted in 48 states committing to open 
national telecommunications markets to competition. The Group on Basic 
Telecommunications (GET), also open to all states and consisting of fifty five states and 
the European Community, lasted from July 1996 to February 1997. It addressed satellite 
service issues and resulted in the signing of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement 
(BTA) in February 1997 and the Information Technology Agreement in April of the same 
year.
The creation of the new WTO regime in 1994 represented a new' international 
telecommunications regime, replacing the former Intelsat regime. Under the new accord 
signed in 1997, the global sector would be governed by the rules of the WTO process.
116Http://www'.vvto.org/english/tratop e/servete e /te l04 e.htm.
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The norms of free trade would govern trade in basic telecommunications services as well 
as in higher level value-added telecommunications services such as satellite, internet and 
different types of data services. Parties to the WTO agreement were committed to open 
up their telecommunications service markets to direct foreign investment and to the 
removal of barriers within the domestic telecommunications sector, including the removal 
of barriers to access of public telecom networks under nondiscriminatory terms. Truly 
successful negotiations would be reflected by the opening for the first time of many 
domestic markets of Intelsat’s signatories that had remained closed during the period 
covered by this dissertation.
The change in the international satellite regime from Intelsat to the WTO provides 
a framework for the comparative analysis of the effects of institutional factors on 
domestic outcomes. Several key questions would compare the impact of the WTO on 
domestic decisions to maintain an open or closed domestic sector and whether or not 
there are differential effects on domestic outcomes. Other questions might include what is 
the relationship between the WTO regime and the former domestic signatories. How has 
domestic political outcomes been affected by this regime change, particularly as it relates 
to the opening and closing of domestic telecommunications sectors? Has the new WTO 
structure been more successful in addressing liberalization of domestic sectors? If so, 
what is the relationship between former signatories, the state and the new corporations 
seeking access to domestic markets under the new WTO system?
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Conclusion
The analysis of the Jamaica Digiport negotiations raised two key questions: why 
Jamaica opted to maintain a closed telecommunications monopoly, preventing the use of 
the American Satellite Corporation and how was it able to do so at that historical juncture 
of increasing liberalization trends. The trend toward liberalization was evident in the 
major industrialized nations, primarily the United States, Europe and Japan, even though 
Intelsat very cautiously embraced the idea of liberalization. Despite limitations on the 
new firms, Intelsat granted its authorization to liberalize Jamaica’s telecommunications 
sector.
Despite these trends, Jamaica failed to liberalize its telecommunications sector. 
This dissertation demonstrated that Jamaica’s failure to do so can best be explained by 
sectoral interests and characteristics - the most significant of which were a) the role of 
Intelsat’s signatories in both domestic and international decision-making of the sector; b) 
the close relationship between state bureaucracies and signatories that operate in the 
sector; and c) the interests of these signatories which was to maintain the monopoly 
sector so as to implement the cross-subsidization of domestic operations with income 
from the international operations.
The liberalization of the telecommunications sector served as a trigger for the 
chain of events that followed. These events included changes in Intelsat rules and norms, 
and the closing of Jamaica’s telecommunications sector to competition. While Intelsat’s
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signatories approved the use of separate satellite systems, Jamaica’s signatory had the 
ability to block its enforcement, thereby ensuring that liberalization would fail. The 
question posed for future research is: could liberalization in Jamaica only occur if there 
were a transformation in the Intelsat regime in which there were a change in the existing 
structure of governance or would a new international telecommunications satellite regime 
that was structured differently be more effective in producing different domestic options?








A business organization that provides regulated 
te le p h o n e , te le g ra p h , te le x , and d a ta  
communications to the general public and is 
regulated by an appropriate regulating agency, e.g. 
AT&T in the US, British Telecom in the United 
Kingdom
Communications Satellite Corporation, the United 
States’ signatory to INTELSAT, is a private 
corporation that provides technical and operational 
support services for the transglobal satellite system. 
COMSAT previously served as manager of 
INTELSAT.
The portion of a satellite system that is located on 
the earth surface. An earth station receives signals 
from and transmits to a satellite in space.
The federal Communications Commission is a 
board of five commissioners appointed by the 
president of the United States under the 
communications Act of 1934. It is responsible for 
regulating all interstate and foreign communications 
originating in the United States by means of radio, 
television, wire, cable and satellite.
Transmission technology in which information is 
transmitted over a very thin optical beam.
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Intelsat
ITU
local area network (LAN)
PTT
A satellite positioned about 36,000 km above the 
equator. The satellite’s equatorial orbit is 
synchronous with the earth therefore the satellite 
appears to be stationary. It is used for long distance 
communication. It is also referred to as 
geostationary satellite.
The International Telecommunications Satellite 
Organization is an international inter-governmental 
o rgan ization  responsible for the design, 
development, construction, and operation of the 
space segment of the global communications 
satellite system. It own and operates a global system 
of geosynchronous satellites that provides 
international telecommunications services all over 
the world.
The International Telecommunications Union, an 
international intergovernmental organization that 
coordinates and regulates international services in 
telephone and telegraph services.
A n e t w o r k  t h a t  c o n n e c t s  v a r i o u s  
telecommunications devices within a limited 
geographical area.
Post, Telephone and Telegraph are government 
agencies that provides the services for mail, 
telephone, and telegraph in most countries of the
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world except those in North America.
public switched telephone network A network established and operated by any common
carrier that provides circuit switching between 
public users.
public utilities commission The state regulatory board that is responsible for
communications regulation and other public utilities 
regulation.
satellite A man-made vehicle placed in orbit around the
earth to receive information from one point on earth 
and re-transmitted to another point on earth, thus 
providing a long distance communication link.
satellite communications A communication technique in which a geo­
synchronous satellite is used to relay information 
from one earth station to another.
The process that allows the transfer of information 
(audio, video, data) in the form of electromagnetic 
signals from a transmitter to one or more receivers.
A conference in which participants from a remote 
location communicate to each other with the help of 
telecommunications lines.
teleport A telecommunications facility that consists of high
speed satellites, a private telephone network and the 
capacity to transport data at high speed.
telecommunications
teleconferencing





A radio or radar transmitter/receiver activated for 
transmission by reception of a predetermined signal. 
Com m unications satellites contain several 
transponders to increase the number of transmission 
channels.
A type of teleconferencing in which geographically 
separated groups communicate with each other over 
telecommunication links with the help of audio and 
video technology.
The name of a communication satellite owned by 
Western Union.
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Asiasat Columbia* Hughes* Columbi
a*
Asiasat Thaicom







A me ri com*
Thaicom EchoStar
Westar*
Source: United States General Accounting Office: Telecommunications: Competition 
Issues in International Satellite Communications, p. 40.
n7Asterisks indicate United States separate satellite systems
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1 . 1 2Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 





ARAB GROUP III 
ARGENTINA/CHILE/PARAGUAY
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote 
d ’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Tongo, Zaire
Libia, Mauritania, Sudan, Syrua, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudia Arabia, 
Yemen
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar
ASEAN GROUP I Indonesia, Singapore 








Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic







































; UNITED STATES 26.91
; VENEZUELA/PERU 1.24
Source: INTELSAT, Board os B-81-E, July 1989
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Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Thailand 
China
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, 
France, Monaco, F.R.G., Iceland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Yugoslavia
Australia, New Zealand
F.R.G. to France, Luxembourg and Netherlands (one way), Sweden, 
Switzerland (TV Reception from Germany)
Monaco, UK
Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Honduras
Algeria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Nicaragua, UK,
US, Vietnam, Germany, US, USSR + non-INTELSAT nations
ASEAN, Australia, Indonesia (TV and audio use), Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
Portugal, UK to Indonesia
Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belgium & Sweden, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Columbia (Latin Beam). Denmark, Ecuador, France, 
Guatemala, Haiti (LB & NB), Honduras (domestic serv.), Italy, Jamiaca, 
Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, Netherland Antilles, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru (domestic serv.), Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad 
& Tobago, UK (domestic serv.), Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, US & 
Costa Rica; US & Domican Rep.; US & Eastern Europe; UK & Europe; 
UK & Germany; US & Luxembourg; US & UK, US & F.R.G. between 
US and Non-INTELSAT member nations in Latin America and the 
Caribbean; between Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, US and non- 
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US DOM SAT 
WESTAR V US
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APPENDIX V II: Number of Main Lines (Thousands)
























Source: Alvin G. Wint. Pioneering Telephone Privatization p. 53.
118
In 1987, the fiscal year-end for both companies was changed from December to March. 
The period represented by these data is the fifteen-month period from January 1986 to 
March 1987.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
236
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: 
Little,Brown and Company, 1971.
Ape, Joel and Joseph N. Pulson. The INTELSAT Global Satellite System. New York: 
American Institute of Aeronautics Inc., 1984
Archer, Clive. International Organization. London: George Allen and Unwin Publishers 
Ltd., 1983.
Bleazard, G.B. Introducing Satellite Communications. Manchester, England: The 
NationalComputing Center Ltd., 1985.
Caporaso, James. Ed. A Changing Internationa] Division of Labor. Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Riener Publishers, 1987.
Colino, Richard R. “The INTELSAT System: An Overview” in Apter and Pel ton. The 
INTELSAT Global Satellite System. New York: American Institute of 
Aeronautics, Inc., 1984.
Cortell, Andrew P. and Susan Peterson. Altered States: International Relations, Domestic 
Politics and Institutional Change. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002.
Cowhey, Peter F. “The International Telecommunications Regime” the Political Roots of 
High Technology,” International Organization. Vol. 44 (Spring 1990), pp. 169- 
199.
Cox, Robert W. “ Social Forces, States and World order: Beyond International Relations 
Theory” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics. New York : 
Columbia University Press, 1986.
Demac, Donna A. ed. Tracing New Orbits: Cooperation and Competition in Global 
Satellite Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam. Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993.
Federal Communications Commission. “In the Matter of Establishing Satellite Systems 
Providing International Communications,” 101 F.C.C. 2d 1046, (1985).
Friedan, Jeffry A. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a 
World of Global Finance,” International Organization. Vol 45, No. 4. (Autumn, 
1991), pp. 425-451.
Frobel, F., J. Heinrichs and O. Kreye. The New International Division of Labor. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
Galloway, Jonathan F. The Politics and Technology of Satellite Communications.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
237
Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1972.
Goldschmidt, Douglas. “The Entry of New Satellite Carriers in International 
Telecommunications: Some Interests of Developing Nations” in Donna Demac 
A. ed. Tracing New Orbits: Cooperation and Competition in Global Satellite 
Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Haas, Peter M. “Do Regimes Matter: Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean 
Pollution Control,” International Organization. Vol 43, No. 3 pp. 377-404.
____________. “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,”
International Organization. Vol. 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, pp. 1-36.
____________. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environment
Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons. “Theories of International Regimes,” 
International Organization. Vol. 41, Summer 1987, pp. 491-517.
Haufler, Virginia. “Crossing the boundary Between Public and Private: International 
Regimes and Nonstate Actors,” in Volker Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and 
International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. 94- 111.
Helleiner, Eric. States and the Re-emergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to 
the 1990's. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Henderson, Jeffrey and Manuel Castells, ed. Global Restructuring and Territorial 
Development. London: Sage Publications, 1987.
_______________ . The Globalization of High Technology Production: Society, Space and
Semiconductors in the Restructuring of the Modern World. New York: 
Routledge, 1989.
Hinchman, Walter and Associates. “The Economics of International Satellite 
Communications,” prepared for INTELSAT, May 1984.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck. Governing 
Capitalist Economies: Performance and control of Economic Sector. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1994.
INTELSAT. Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global 
Communications Satellite System. Washington, D.C. August 1964.
__________. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization. Washington, D.C, Feb. 1973.
_________ . Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization. Washington, D.C. Feb, 1973.
_________ . INTELSAT. Washington D.C. 1991.
James, Canute, “Caribbean Seeks Role as World’s Paperless Tiger,” in The London
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
Times, March 1991.
Keohane, Robert O. “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International 
Economic Regimes, 1967-1977 in Ole Holsti et ah, Change in the International 
System. Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 131-162.
______________. “The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization.
Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring) pp. 325-355. Also included in Krasner 1983.
______________. After Hegemony: cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984
______________. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International
Relations Theory. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
______________. “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 4 (December) 1988, pp. 379-396.
______________ and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.
Kildow, Judith Tegger. INTELSAT. Policy-Makers’ Dilemma. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1973.
Krasner, Stephen D. ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Knopf, Jeffrey W. “Beyond two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiation.” International Organization, 
Vol. 47, No. 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 599-628.
Levy, Steven A. “INTELSAT: Technology, Politics and the transformation of a Regime,” 
International Organization. Vol 29, No. 3, International Responses to 
Technology. (Summer, 1975), pp. 655-680.
Mayer, Peter, Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn, “Regime Theory: State of the Art and 
Perspectives,” in Volker Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and International 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
McCormick, Patricia. “Telecommunications Privatization Issues: The Jamaica
Experience.” Telecommunications Policy. Vol. 17, March 1993, pp. 145-157.
Nye, Joseph S. “Nuclear Learning and United States Security Regimes,” International 
Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 1987, pp. 371-402.
Oye, Kenneth A. ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986.
Pelton, Joseph N. “INTELSAT: Responding to New Challenges,” in Donna Demac. 
Tracing New Orbits: Cooperation and Competition in Global Satellite 
Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
Plowman, Edward. Space, Earth and Communication. Westport: Quorum Books, 1984.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
239
Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization, Vol 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460.
Rees, David W.E. Satellite Communications: The First Quarter Century of Service. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1990.
Rittberger, Volker. ed. Regime Theory and International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993.
Rosenau, James N. and J.P. Singh, Information Technologies and Global Politics: The
Changing Scope of Power and Governance. Albany, NY: S.U.N.Y. Press, 2002.
Ruggie, John Gerald. “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” 
International Organization. Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 557-84.
________________ . “International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in Krasner, International Regimes, 
pp. 195-232.
Sandholtz, Wayne. “Institutions and Collective Action: The New Telecommunications in 
Western Europe,” World Politics. Vol. 46, No. 2, Jan 1993, pp. 242-270.
Savage, James G. The Politics of International Telecommunications Regulation Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1989.
Shafer, Michael. Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects 
of State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Singh, J.P. “Negotiating Regime Change: The Weak, the Strong and the WTO Telecom 
Accord,” in James N. Rosenau and J.P. Singh, Information Technologies and 
Global Politics: The changing Scope of Power and Governance (Albany,NY: 
SUNY Press, 2002), p. 239- 272.
Snidal, Duncan. “The Limits of hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization. 
Vol. 39, No. 4 (Autumn, 1985) pp. 579-614.
____________. “The Game Theory of International Politics,” in Kenneth A. Oye. Ed.
Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 
25-57.
Snow, Marcelius S. “Competition by Private Carriers in International Commercial 
Satellite Traffic: Conception and Historical Background” in Donna Demac. 
Tracing New Orbits: Cooperation and Competition in Global Satellite 
Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
SpiHer, Pablo T. and Cezley I. Sampson. Regulations. Institutions and Commitment: The 
Jamaican Telecommunications Sector. (Unpublished paper) March 23, 1993.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
240
Stein, Arthur A. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Archaic World,” in 
Stephen D. Krasner, ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1983.
Stokes, Bruce. “Beaming Jobs Overseas,” National Journal. August 27, 1985, p. 1726.
Tedeschi, James T., Barry R. Sclenker and Thomas U. Bonoma, Conflict. Power and 
Games. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1973.
Vizas, II, Christopher J. “The Reality of Change, Satellite Technology, Economics, and 
Institutional Resistance,” in Donna Demac. Tracing New Orbits: Cooperation 
and Competition in Global Satellite Development. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1986.
Young, Oran R., “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World 
Politics. Vol. 32, No. 3 (April), 198, pp. 331-56.
_____________. “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in
Krasner, ed. International Regimes. 1983, pp. 93-114.
Weiss, Linda, ed. States in the Global Economy: Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Wint, Alvin G. “Pioneering Telephone Privatization: Jamaica,” in Ravi Ramamuti, ed. 
Privatizing Monopolies: Lessons Form the Telecommunications and Transport 
Sectors in Latin America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Zacher, Mark W. “Toward a Theory of International Regimes,” in Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 44, Spring/Summer 1990, pp. 139-157.
Zurn, Michael. “Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About the Domestic Sources of 
Regime Formation,” in Volker Rittberger, ed. Regime Theory and International 
Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
